Equal treatment and corporate criminal liability : need for EU intervention in public procurement?

A comparison of the different EU criminal justice systems reveals a significant diversity in the legal frameworks surrounding corporate criminal liability. There are differences in the typology of legal persons that can be held reliable, differences in the attribution mechanisms and differences in the offences in general and more specifically the offences legal persons can be held criminally liable for. Academic debate on this diversity is far from new. The novelty of this contribution consists of the combination of two totally different branches of law; it combines corporate criminal liability with the functioning of the EU’s internal market. Using the equal treatment requirement in public procurement procedures as a case study, it is demonstrated that diversity in the legal frameworks surrounding corporate criminal liability is not a mere theoretical and practical obstacle, but gives way for profound and complex legal questions. It is unclear whether—in light of the diversity in corporate criminal liability—it is feasible to ensure equal treatment of all participating procurement candidates. This contribution elaborates on possible interpretations of “equal treatment” in light if the principles underlying the proper functioning of the internal market and more specifically the functioning of public procurement given the diversity in the legal framework surrounding corporate criminal liability to substantiate the need for EU intervention

Unanimity, Consensus and Peripheral Parties as Determinants of EU Policy Coordination in Federal Member States

EU scholars have long argued that regions can shape the integration process, but there is no agreement on why this is so. While some authors consider constitutional powers, intergovernmental relations, or differentiated regional elites as independent variables, those interested in Europeanization argue that the ‘transformative power of Europe’ enticed both central and regional governments to adopt consensual policy styles, akin to those prevailing in the EU. Accordingly, new territorial arrangements would have made effective participation in the integration process possible. However, scholars have failed to pay due consideration to a crucial factor: the decision-making rule employed in the coordination mechanisms. In this article, I argue that cooperation among regions actually depends mostly on whether decisions are taken by consensus or unanimity. Common regional positions and impacts on EU decisions become unlikely if peripheral parties increase the levels of conflict. The arguments build on theoretical warrants taken from actor-centered institutionalism