Tradeable Spectrum Interference Rights

Spectrum rights have gained increasing attention since Ronald Coase pointed out that the most efficient way to assign spectrum is to give it to those users who value it most through property-like rights and secondary markets. Defining spectrum rights turns out to be difficult due to the nature of electronic emissions[1]. As a result, it may be more practical to define interference rights (similar to pollution rights) rather than exclusive usage rights. Interference rights give a user the right to interfere with another user up to a specified level. In this paper, we develop the idea of a market in spectrum interference rights and, using some plausible use cases, illustrate its characteristics. The paper therefore includes a detailed description of interference rights along with some first order quantitative modelling of the use cases coupled with qualitative analysis

Market Based Approaches for Dynamic Spectrum Assignment

Abstract—Much of the technical literature on spectrum sharing has been on developing technologies and systems for non-cooperative) opportunistic use. In this paper, we situate this approach to secondary spectrum use in a broader context, one that includes cooperative approaches to Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). In this paper, we introduce readers to this broader approach to DSA by contrasting it with non-cooperative sharing (opportunistic use), surveying relevant literature, and suggesting future directions for researc

Can Unlicensed Bands Be Used by Unlicensed Usage?

Since their introduction, unlicensed ISM bands have resulted in a wide range of new wireless devices and services. It is fair to say that the success of ISM was an important factor in the opening of the TV white space for unlicensed access. Further bands (e.g., 3550-3650 MHz) are being studied to support unlicensed access. Expansion of the unlicensed bands may well address one of the principle disadvantages of unlicensed (variable quality of service) which could result in a vibrant new group companies providing innovative services and better prices. However, given that many commercial mobile telephone operators are relying heavily on the unlicensed bands to manage growth in data traffic through the “offloading” strategy, the promise of these bands may be more limited than might otherwise be expected (Musey, 2013).\ud \ud Wireless data traffic has exploded in the past several years due to more capable devices and faster network technologies. While there is some debate on the trajectory of data growth, some notable reports include AT&T, which reported data growth of over 5000% from 2008 to 2010 and Cisco, who predicted that mobile data traffic will grow to 6.3 exabytes per month in average by 2015 (Hu, 2012). Although the data traffic increased dramatically, relatively little new spectrum for mobile operators has come online in the last several years; further, the “flat-rate” pricing strategy has led to declining Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) for the mobile operators. Their challenge, then, is how to satisfy the service demand with acceptable additional expenditures on infrastructure and spectrum utilization.\ud \ud A common response to this challenge has been to offload data traffic onto unlicensed (usually WiFi) networks. This can be accomplished either by establishing infrastructure (WiFi hotspots) or to use existing private networks. This phenomenon leads to two potential risks for spectrum entrants: (1) the use of offloading may overwhelm unlicensed spectrum and leave little access opportunities for newcomers; (2) the intensity of the traffic may increase interference and degrade innovative services.\ud \ud Consequently, opening more unlicensed frequency bands alone may not necessarily lead to more unlicensed usage. In this paper, we will estimate spectrum that left for unlicensed usage and analyze risks for unlicensed users in unlicensed bands in terms of access opportunities and monetary gain. We will further provide recommendations that help foster unlicensed usage in unlicensed bands

Credibility-Based Binary Feedback Model for Grid Resource Planning

In commercial grids, Grid Service Providers (GSPs) can improve their profitability by maintaining the lowest possible amount of resources to meet client demand. Their goal is to maximize profits by optimizing resource planning. In order to achieve this goal, they require an estimate of the demand for their service, but collecting demand data is costly and difficult. In this paper we develop an approach to building a proxy for demand, which we call a value profile. To construct a value profile, we use binary feedback from a collection of heterogeneous clients. We show that this can be used as a proxy for a demand function that represents a client’s willingness-to-pay for grid resources. As with all binary feedback systems, clients may require incentives to provide feedback and deterrents to selfish behavior, such as misrepresenting their true preferences to obtain superior services at lower costs. We use credibility mechanisms to detect untruthful feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients. Finally, we use game theory to study how cooperation can emerge in this community of clients and GSPs

How Do Limitations in Spectrum Fungibility Impact Spectrum Trading?

Secondary markets for spectrum trading have been considered an important solution for generating spectrum opportunities in an environment where scarcity is the rule. Nonetheless, an important factor when envisioning a successful spectrum trading environment is to consider how comparable an available frequency is to the frequency an spectrum user prefers. With this aim, we consider the fungibility scores previously determined in [1] in order to explore further parameters that can influence this quantification of the level of fungibility. Further, we merge these fungibility calculations with an existing spectrum trading model, SPECTRAD [2], seeking to determine the actual impact of the limitations of spectrum fungibility in the market viability

Characterization and Modeling of Spectrum Trading Markets

Telecommunication regulators are facing increasing pressure to make spectrum resources more widely available to new wireless services and providers. In spectrum trading markets, buyers and sellers determine the assignments of spectrum and, possibly, its uses. These markets are being considered or implemented by the regulatory bodies of many countries as a way to provide increasing efficiency in the use of spectrum and attend the demand for this resource. This work describes a classification for the implementation of spectrum trading markets and a way to model them and identify the conditions for their viability. Specifically, we make use of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to model the participants in these markets, analyze the behaviors that emerge from the interactions of its participants and determine the conditions for viable markets. Our results, provide guidelines that can be used by regulators and wireless service providers for the design and implementation of these markets

Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduce more spectrally efficient technologies and spectrum management regimes. That led to an environment where commercial wireless broadband need to share spectrum with the federal and non-federal operations. Implementing sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.\ud \ud With the significant exception of license-free wireless systems, commercial wireless services are based on exclusive use. With the policy change facilitating spectrum sharing, it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Beyond the technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved lie questions about how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced. This paper is reasoning about enforcement in a particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz and 3.5 GHz) that are currently being proposed for sharing between commercial services and incumbent spectrum users in the US. We examine three enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost elements, opportunity cost, and their adaptability

Dynamic Geospatial Spectrum Modelling: Taxonomy, Options and Consequences

Much of the research in Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) has focused on opportunistic access in the temporal domain. While this has been quite useful in establishing the technical feasibility of DSA systems, it has missed large sections of the overall DSA problem space. In this paper, we argue that the spatio-temporal operating context of specific environments matters to the selection of the appropriate technology for learning context information. We identify twelve potential operating environments and compare four context awareness approaches (on-board sensing, databases, sensor networks, and cooperative sharing) for these environments. Since our point of view is overall system cost and efficiency, this analysis has utility for those regulators whose objectives are reducing system costs and enhancing system efficiency. We conclude that regulators should pay attention to the operating environment of DSA systems when determining which approaches to context learning to encourage

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud \ud In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum

Spatio-Temporal Spectrum Holes and the Secondary User

DSA research must explicitly consider the perspective of secondary users. This paper considers the spatio-temporal properties of spectrum holes as they impact the secondary user’s communications needs. Like Weiss et.al. [1], this paper develops typology of spectrum holes from the point of view of the secondary user. Each type of spectrum hole is analyzed for the kinds of communications requirements that can be supported, illustrated, where possible, existing measurement data. The analysis concludes that a secondary user’s ability to meet their communications need varies considerably. More detailed analysis of the spatio-temporal density of spectrum holes would be necessary to further quantify these conclusions