On Robust Discursive Equality

This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. I then showcase different candidate conceptions of purchase justice, and draw conclusions about the substantive commitments of justificatory reciprocity

On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism

Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls’s view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental. It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in public justification

Patterns of justification: on political liberalism and the primacy of public justification

The discussion develops the view that public justification in Rawls’s political liberalism, in one of its roles, is actualist in fully enfranchising actual reasonable citizens and fundamental in political liberalism’s order of justification. I anchor this reading in the political role Rawls accords to general reflective equilibrium, and examine in its light the relationship between public justification, pro tanto justification, political values, full justification, the wide view of public political culture and salient public reason intuitions. This leaves us with the question of how a more plausible, post-Rawlsian political liberalism should understand the commitment to discursive respect and robust discursive equality that is reflected in its view of actualist and fundamental public justification

A note on reciprocity of reasons

Rainer Forst and others claim that normative moral and political claims depend for their justification on meeting a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA). I focus on a core component of RGA, namely, the idea of reciprocity of reasons, distinguish between two readings of RGA, and argue that if reciprocity of reasons is understood in Forst’s terms, then RGA, even on the most promising reading, may not serve as a requirement of moral or political justification at all. The discussion concludes with constructive observations on a path forward for theorists who nevertheless are inclined to hold on to RGA

Public Justification, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality

The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I distinguish between the depth, scope and the purchase of the discursive standing that such justification allocates, and situate within this matrix Rawls’s view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that is rich in purchase, as seems desirable in emancipatory terms, it may be unable to allocate equal standing to all relevant people. And if it is to allocate equal standing, then the equality of that standing should be construed in terms that allow for unequal discursive purchase

Heavy Flavor Enhancement as a Signal of Color Deconfinement

We argue that the color deconfinement in heavy ion collisions may lead to enhanced production of hadrons with open heavy flavor (charm or bottom). We estimate the upper bound of this enhancement.Comment: 7 pages, LaTeX, 3 PS-figure

No Copernican Revolution: How supranational and national actors shaped the creation of the European Defence Fund

In 2020, EU member-states allocated nearly €8 billion out of the EU's 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to a new European Defence Fund (EDF). The creation of the Fund broke long-standing legal and ethical taboos against using EU budget money for defence and expanded the authority of the Commission in defence industrial policy, an area vital to national sovereignty. This thesis investigates the European Defence Fund as a case study of how European integration can take place in an area of “high politics” thought to be particularly resistant to integration. It adds nuance to the concept of a “sovereignty orthodoxy” in defence policy and contributes original insight into the nature of the defence sector and its “special” standing in EU integration literature. EU officials involved in the creation of the Fund at the time referred to their initiative as a “Copernican revolution”, insinuating that they were “changing the sun in the system”: defence industrial policy making in the EU would in future revolve around the Commission rather than the member-states. Analysis of the EDF so far has similarly predominantly focused on the role of the Commission as the initiator and main beneficiary of its creation. The roles and objectives of national actors in the creation of the Fund remain under-explored. This thesis argues that even though the creation of the European Defence Fund broke taboos, it was no “Copernican revolution”. Instead, it stemmed from complex alliances that crossed national-EU boundaries, resulting in an institutional blend of intergovernmental and supranational elements. Theoretically, the research uses the lines of inquiry identified by the two dominant actor-driven theoretical approaches to European integration – supranationalism and intergovernmentalism – as heuristics to analyse the policy entrepreneurship of EU institutional actors and the domestic preferences of relevant EU member-states. Industry influence is examined both at the domestic level – in the relationship between governments and defence firms – and at the supranational level, where defence industry representatives served as expert advisors and legitimacy-providers to the Commission.Conceptually, the thesis builds on the argument that portraying European integration processes as competence battles between national and supranational actors obscures the nuances of actors’ interests, motivations, and tactics, and the complex ecosystem of their interactions. To this end, it relies on the policy cycle as a structuring tool, which allows for an in-depth review of the interplay between national and supranational actors at each stage of the policy processes – agenda-setting, agenda-shaping, and decision-making.Methodologically, the thesis deploys process tracing as a main method for within-case analysis, drawing on primary and secondary written sources, as well as on 31 semi-structured elite interviews with officials from member-states, the Commission, the EDA, the EU Parliament, the European External Action Service, as well as with European defence firm representatives, who were directly involved in the process leading up to the creation of the EDF. Supranational policy entrepreneurship was crucial during the process of focusing policy makers’ attention on the issue of the European Defence Fund, maintaining the momentum behind the idea of EU defence funding for two decades, and progressively undermining the “taboos” against EU defence industrial integration – which were present both among member- states and inside the EU institutions. Nonetheless, national governments imposed checks on the ambitions of supranational advocates. The Commission was forced to accept major restrictions on its authority, and the European Parliament, while initially instrumental in paving the way for the EDF’s creation, emerged with limited scrutiny powers. At the agenda-shaping and decision-making stages, dividing lines did not run strictly between EU institutions and member-states. Rather, national actors entered into alliance with supranational policy entrepreneurs, in order to pursue their ideological and distributional interests.The Fund’s final institutional design leaves member-states in a position to determine the program’s success or failure. At the same time, it provides the Commission with the possibility to prove its value and progressively expand its authority and identity from market regulator to industrial policy shaper in the field of defence