709 research outputs found
Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context
Issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality are widespread in the economic literature. They have been increasingly raised in specific contexts within the class of LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games in the last 20 years, notably with reference to monetary policy. The more general conditions ensuring nonneutrality in a strategic environment remain however to be inquired. We fill this gap by applying the classical theory of economic policy to a strategic context. This is also useful to highlight some existence conditions for policy game solutions. We restrict ourselves to the common LQ-games in a static perfect information framework, but our simple logic can be extended to other more general situations.LQ-policy games, policy ineffectiveness, controllability.
Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union
The recent economic literature shows a new interest in the links between politics and economics. In this paper, we join Hibbs’ partisanship theory with the literature of fiscal policies international co- ordination. Furthermore, by considering a monetary union context, we also open a new angle of view in the recent debate on the effects of the European Monetary Union. In fact, by considering the possibility of governments’ partisan behaviour, we analyse the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level and investigate the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. This paper also partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of co-operation and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are studied (e.g. the asymmetries in the governments’ preference due to their partisanship).partisanship, monetary union, international cooperation, policy games
Is corporatism feasible?
In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never find it profitable to co- operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility
Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context
In the last 20 years issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality (notably with reference to monetary policy) have been increasingly raised in the context of static LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games. The general conditions ensuring policy non-neutrality in a strategic environment remains however to be inquired. We state these conditions by generalizing the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and others to such a context. We also state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We finally show that the conditions for monetary policy effectiveness asserted in the literature respect our general conditions.LQ-policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability
NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non- neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the nonneutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the nonneutrality result can arise.neutrality, money, unions, policy game.
Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation
This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.policy games, policy effectiveness, controllability, equilibrium existence
The Cost of Social Pacts
Social pacts, while improving macroeconomic performance, usually impose costs on unions. To facilitate the formation of such pacts, various substitutes can operate, such as the payment of transfers or, to some extent, the conservativeness of the government, union’s inflation aversion or political partisanship.Social pacts; side payments; conservativeness; partisanship; unions
Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination?
In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that seem to imply the need for macroeconomic policy coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, partial coordination might be unable to cope with the negative externalities arising from a decentralized policy management. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which is found by recent literature able to impose wage moderation to the labor unions. We also discuss some aspects related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem.Conservative central bank budget constraints wage coordination monetary union
Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation
This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.policy games; policy effectiveness; controllability; equilibrium existence
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