New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal

The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from this study are of importance for similar flood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world

Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection System in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005: Volume 1

This report presents the results of an investigation of the performance of the New Orleans regional flood protection system during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck the New Orleans region on August 29, 2005. This event resulted in the single most costly catastrophic failure of an engineered system in history. Current damage estimates at the time of this writing are on the order of $100 to$200 billion in the greater New Orleans area, and the official death count in New Orleans and southern Louisiana at the time of this writing stands at 1,293, with an additional 306 deaths in nearby southern Mississippi. An additional approximately 300 people are currently still listed as “missing”; it is expected that some of these missing were temporarily lost in the shuffle of the regional evacuation, but some of these are expected to have been carried out into the swamps and the Gulf of Mexico by the storm’s floodwaters, and some are expected to be recovered in the ongoing sifting through the debris of wrecked homes and businesses, so the current overall regional death count of 1,599 is expected to continue to rise a bit further. More than 450,000 people were initially displaced by this catastrophe, and at the time of this writing more than 200,000 residents of the greater New Orleans metropolitan area continue to be displaced from their homes by the floodwater damages from this storm event. This investigation has targeted three main questions as follow: (1) What happened?, (2) Why?, and (3) What types of changes are necessary to prevent recurrence of a disaster of this scale again in the future? To address these questions, this investigation has involved: (1) an initial field reconnaissance, forensic study and data gathering effort performed quickly after the arrival of Hurricanes Katrina (August 29, 2005) and Rita (September 24, 2005), (2) a review of the history of the regional flood protection system and its development, (3) a review of the challenging regional geology, (4) detailed studies of the events during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as the causes and mechanisms of the principal failures, (4) studies of the organizational and institutional issues affecting the performance of the flood protection system, (5) observations regarding the emergency repair and ongoing interim levee reconstruction efforts, and (6) development of findings and preliminary recommendations regarding changes that appear warranted in order to prevent recurrence of this type of catastrophe in the future. In the end, it is concluded that many things went wrong with the New Orleans flood protection system during Hurricane Katrina, and that the resulting catastrophe had it roots in three main causes: (1) a major natural disaster (the Hurricane itself), (2) the poor performance of the flood protection system, due to localized engineering failures, questionable judgments, errors, etc. involved in the detailed design, construction, operation and maintenance of the system, and (3) more global “organizational” and institutional problems associated with the governmental and local organizations responsible for the design, construction, operation, maintenance and funding of the overall flood protection system

Evaluation of resilience assessment methodologies

There are a wide range of different frameworks and methodologies for analysing Critical Infrastructure (CI) resilience, covering organisational, technological and social resilience. However, there is a lack of a clear methodology combining these three resilience domains into one framework. The final goal of the ongoing EU-project IMPROVER, ‘Improved risk evaluation and implementation of resilience concepts to Critical Infrastructure,’ is to develop one single improved and easy-to-use critical infrastructure resilience analysis tool which will be applicable within all resilience domains and to all types of critical infrastructure. This article presents part of this work, in which IMPROVER comprehensively evaluated, by demonstration and comparison, a selection of existing resilience methodologies in order to integrate their best features into the new methodology. The selected methodologies were The Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) (Lee et al., 2013), Guidelines for Critical Infrastructures Resilience Evaluation (CIRE) (Bertocchi et al., 2016) and the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Index (CIRI). The latter was developed within the consortium (Pursiainen et al., 2017). The results show that it is hard to evaluate and compare the different methodologies considering that the methodologies are not aiming to achieve the same thing. However, this evaluation shows that all the methodologies have pros and cons, and that the IMPROVER project should aim at combining, in so far as is possible and commensurable, the identified pros while avoiding the identified cons into a Critical Infrastructure resilience assessment framework compatible with the current guidelines for risk assessment in the Member States