Upgrading and testing program for narrow band high resolution planetary IR imaging spectrometer

An imaging spectrometer, intended primarily for observations of the outer planets, which utilizes an acoustically tuned optical filter (ATOF) and a charge coupled device (CCD) television camera was modified to improve spatial resolution and sensitivity. The upgraded instrument was a spatial resolving power of approximately 1 arc second, as defined by an f/7 beam at the CCD position and it has this resolution over the 50 arc second field of view. Less vignetting occurs and sensitivity is four times greater. The spectral resolution of 15 A over the wavelength interval 6500 A - 11,000 A is unchanged. Mechanical utility has been increased by the use of a honeycomb optical table, mechanically rigid yet adjustable optical component mounts, and a camera focus translation stage. The upgraded instrument was used to observe Venus and Saturn

Simplified method introduces drift fields into cells

Drift fields are simply introduced into solar cells at low temperatures in short periods. This is done after their rectifying junctions and output contacts are applied

Elder-Caregiver: An Alarming Past, An Uncertain Future

Increased life expectancy is exacerbating the financial, physical, and emotional pressures on family members struggling to care for elderly parents. Elder law professional have a unique opportunity to positively impact this situation by educating themselves and their staffs to the family caregiver\u27s needs. This article identifies those needs and recommends expanded services to help meet them

Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May

This Article explores the widely disputed issue of whether Takings Clause protects against regulatory takings, offering a novel and intermediate solution. Critics of the regulatory takings doctrine have argued that the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does not cover regulatory takings. They have quickly moved from this claim to the conclusion that the incorporated Takings Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment also does not cover regulatory takings. In this Article, I accept the claim that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does not cover regulatory takings, but then explore the possibility that the incorporated Takings Clause does cover such takings. Applying Akhil Amar\u27s theory of incorporation, I argue that there are strong reasons, based on history, structure, and purpose, to conclude that the Takings Clause had a different meaning under the Fourteenth Amendment. Amar argues that the Bill of Rights was dominated by republican ideas, but that the Fourteenth Amendment was founded on more liberal notions intended to protect individual rights. This would suggest that a broad reading of the Takings Clause would further the principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, that some state courts had come to apply takings principles to regulatory and other nonphysical takings in the period between the enactment of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment provides additional support for the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment enactors would have understood it to apply to regulatory takings. While the paper does not attempt to prove that the Fourteenth Amendment Takings Clause applies to regulatory takings, leaving that task to others, it argues that critics of regulatory takings doctrine should no longer simply assume that the Constitution\u27s original meaning does not apply to state regulatory takings

Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution

In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly allows the states to engage in affirmative action. I argue that the original meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is constitutional. Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional. In fact, based on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows affirmative action. I do not, however, take the next step and argue that the Constitution’s original meaning forbids affirmative action. That would require a satisfactory understanding of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, an understanding that I do not believe we currently possess