The slippery slope of dishonesty

Recent experiments suggest that dishonesty can escalate from small levels to ever-larger ones along a 'slippery slope'. Activity in bilateral amygdala tracks this gradual adaptation to repeated acts of self-serving dishonesty

Experience with daptomycin daily dosing in ICU patients undergoing continuous renal replacement therapy

Purpose: For critically ill patients undergoing continuous renal replacement therapy (CRRT), daptomycin dosing recommendations are scarce. We, therefore, retrospectively assessed routinely measured daptomycin plasma concentrations, daptomycin dose administered and microbiological data in 11 critically ill patients with Gram-positive infections that had received daptomycin once daily. Methods: The retrospective analysis included critically ill patients treated at the intensive care unit (ICU) who had daptomycin plasma concentrations measured. Results: Daptomycin dose ranged from 3 to 8mg/kg/q24h in patients undergoing CRRT (n=7) and 6 to 10mg/kg/q24h in patients without CRRT (n=4). Peak and trough concentrations showed a high intra- and inter-patient variability in both groups, independent of the dosage per kg body weight. No drug accumulation was detected in CRRT patients with once-daily daptomycin dosing. Causative pathogens were Enterococcus faecium (n=6), coagulase-negative Staphylococcus (n=2), Staphylococcus aureus (n=2) and unknown in one patient. Microbiological eradication was successful in 8 of 11 patients. Two of three patients with unsuccessful microbiological eradication and fatal outcome had an Enterococcus faecium infection. Conclusion: In critically ill patients undergoing CRRT, daptomycin exposure with once-daily dosing was similar to ICU patients with normal renal function, but lower compared to healthy volunteers. Our data suggest that daptomycin once-daily dosing is appropriate in patients undergoing CRR

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees

Value-added taxation in the EC after 1992: Some applied general equilibrium calculations

This paper examines the quantitative effects of the transitional system of value-added taxation for intra-EC trade after 1992, as recently adopted by the ECOFIN-Council. First, the administration of the current destination principle and the interim solution are described and a mathematical formalization is provided. A short representation of the empirical general equilibrium model featuring seven EC regions and 14 production sectors follows. Finally, the effects of a switch to the transitional system are examined theoretically and by using policy simulations. When decomposing welfare effects, international tax revenue shifts prove to dominate, while substitution effects have relatively little influence on economic welfare. A generous arrangement with regard to long distance shopping, opening tax arbitrage possibilities to final consumers, favours low tax countries at the cost of their EC partners.Dieser Beitrag untersucht die quantitativen Efgekte der jüngst vom ECOFIN-Rat beschlossenen Übergangsregelung für die umsatzsteuerliche Behandlung des Handels in der EG nach 1992. Zunächst werden die Funktionsweise des bisherigen Bestimmungslandprinzips und der neuen Regelung beschrieben und mathematisch formalisiert. Es folgt eine kurze Darstellung des sieben EG-Regionen und 14 Produktionssektoren pro Land umfassenden empirischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells. Im letzten Teil wird zunächst theoretisch und dann anhand von Simulationsrechnungen auf die Wirkungen eines Wechsels zum Übergangssystems eingegangen. Bei einer Zerlegung der Wohlfahrtseffekte zeigt sich, dass internationale Steueraufkommensverschiebungen das Ergebnis quantitativ dominieren, während Substitionseffekte kaum Einfluss auf die ökonomische Wohlfahrt haben. Bei einer großzügigen Versandhandelsregelung, die den Endkonsumenten Möglichkeiten der Steuerarbitrage eröffnet, gewinnen Niedrigsteuerlander auf Kosten ihrer EG-Partner

Spatial prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering in Newman-Watts small-world networks

A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a pure strategist and can only take one of three strategies (\emph {cooperator}, \emph {defector}, and \emph {loner}); its strategical transformation is associated with both the number of strategical states and the magnitude of average profits, which are adopted and acquired by its coplayers in the previous round of play; a stochastic strategy mutation is applied when it gets into the trouble of \emph {local commons} that the agent and its neighbors are in the same state and get the same average payoffs. In the case of very low temptation to defect, it is found that agents are willing to participate in the game in typical small-world region and intensive collective oscillations arise in more random region.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure

Earnings distribution, corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non-manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970-1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de -linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Pay What You Want (PWYW) can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller competes with a traditional seller. Finally, we endogenize the market structure and let sellers choose their pricing strategy. The experimental results show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to keep the seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers pay voluntarily to a PWYW seller. We find that PWYW can be viable in isolation, but it is less successful as a competitive strategy because it does not drive traditional posted-price sellers out of the market. Instead, the existence of a posted-price competitor reduces buyers’ payments and prevents the PWYW seller from fully penetrating the market. If given the choice, the majority of sellers opt for setting a posted price rather than a PWYW pricing. We discuss the implications of these results for the use of PWYW as a marketing strategy

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas

This study investigates the influence of resource inequality and the fairness of the allocation procedure of unequal resources on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. We propose a simple formal behavioral model that incorporates conflicting selfish and social motivations. This model allows us to predict how inequality influences cooperative behavior. Allocation of resources is manipulated by three treatments that vary in terms of procedural justice: allocating resources randomly, based on merit, and based on ascription. As predicted, procedural justice influences cooperation significantly. Moreover, gender is found to be an important factor interacting with the association between procedural justice and cooperative behavior.