ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLE ATTRIBUTES: AN AGRICULTURAL APPLICATION OF CONJOINT ANALYSIS

The use of conjoint analysis in assessing consumers' preferences for attributes is demonstrated with the apple as an example. Conjoint analysis may be used to estimate the importance of attributes and attribute levels through decomposition of consumers' ranking of alternative attribute combinations. It is shown that conjoint analysis provides results that may not be obtained from a survey where respondents are asked to directly state their assessment of the importance of attributes.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Influence of Environmental Risk on the Financial Structure of Oil and Gas Projects

The risk profile of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project affects its debt service ability. In particular, the total risk profile of an oil and gas project is heavily influenced by its environmental risk exposure. However, this risk is often not given a considerable weight in risk analysis, resulting in underestimation of project's total riskiness and consequent overestimation of the debt capacity. This study is aimed at understanding the dependence of the capital structure of oil and gas BOT projects on environmental risk exposure and proposes a methodology for incorporating such important risk into the total risk rating process to determine the debt leverage. As a result, it is shown that integrating environmental risks into the risk score of a project yields higher values of risk exposure, which may lead to a lower debt-to-equity ratio

Creep motion of an elastic string in a random potential

We study the creep motion of an elastic string in a two dimensional pinning landscape by Langevin dynamics simulations. We find that the Velocity-Force characteristics are well described by the creep formula predicted from phenomenological scaling arguments. We analyze the creep exponent $\mu$, and the roughness exponent $\zeta$. Two regimes are identified: when the temperature is larger than the strength of the disorder we find $\mu \approx 1/4$ and $\zeta \approx 2/3$, in agreement with the quasi-equilibrium-nucleation picture of creep motion; on the contrary, lowering enough the temperature, the values of $\mu$ and $\zeta$ increase showing a strong violation of the latter picture.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private Provision of Club and Public Goods

This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency. Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action.class action, collective litigation, mass tort, club, liability, deterrence

Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU

‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?’1 As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, (Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn and Tetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation.We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the flow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefit-cost analysis, and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems. Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefit-cost analysis, this chapter instead identifies the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of oversight.