Orzeczenia zbieżne (concurrent sentences) i orzeczenia konsekutywne (consecutive sentences) w angielskim prawie karnym

The purpose of this article is to analyze the institution of the concurrent and the consecutive sentences in the English criminal law. The differences between them are based on the way they are executed and on the premises which courts take into consideration. Generally, the concurrent sentences are imposed for offences which arose out of a single act and therefore the terms of imprisonment shall run at the same time (concurrently). However, a deeper analysis of the literature and the case law of the English courts leads to the conclusion that the differences between them are not so important, because the main role plays the totality principle. It changes the way the institution of the concurrent and the consecutive sentences shall be perceived

Gloss to the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-524/15, Criminal Proceedings against Luca Menci

This gloss discusses the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union taken in the judgment passed on 20 March 2018 in the case of Luca Menci (C-524/15) in reference to the restrictions of ne bis in idem principle. The main thesis of the Court concerned the admissibility of restrictions of ne bis in idem based on the principle of proportionality as a limitation clause and its accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The analysis of the right not to be tried or punished twice in Article 4 Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms allows us to formulate opposite conclusions. The application of the balancing test as a limitation clause for ne bis in idem, finds no support in the case-law of the ECtHR too. According to the Author, the position taken in Menci infringes Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which the meaning and scope of the rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall be at least be the same

The Nature of Responsibility of an Undertaking in Antitrust Proceedings and the Concept of ‘Criminal Charge’ in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

The present article aims to answer the question whether an undertaking’s responsibility (sometimes also referred to as liability) in an antitrust proceeding held by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the Polish National Competition Authority) is of a criminal nature. The notion of ‘criminal charge’ is rather extensively construed in the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, which has formulated the criteria for criminal responsibility. Taking these criteria into account, the author postulates that the severe character of pecuniary sanctions imposed in Polish antitrust proceedings is an argument for the criminal character of the proceedings. Thus the guarantees of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be applicable to Polish antitrust proceedings.Le présent article a pour objectif de répondre à la question de savoir si dans une procédure de concurrence devant le Président de l’Office polonais de protection de la concurrence et des consommateurs, la responsabilité d’un entrepreneur est de nature à porter une « accusation dans une affaire pénale ». Cette notion a été créée par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, dans laquelle sont énumérés les critères d’une telle évaluation de la responsabilité. À force de les considérer, l’auteur du présent article conclut que le lien entre la violation des règles du droit de la concurrence d’une part et les conséquences sous forme de peines pécuniaires de l’autre, parle en faveur de la nature pénale de cette responsabilité. Cela conduit à la nécessité de respecter, dans la procédure de concurrence, les garanties que requiert en matière pénale l’art. 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme