Response to the European Commission\u27s Report on the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive

This paper contains the European Company Law Experts\u27 response to the report of the European Commission of 28 June 2012 on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive of 2004 and the reform initiatives announced. For evaluating these initiatives the rationale of the mandatory bid rule is relevant (exit rationale, control premium rationale and undistorted choice rationale). On this basis the paper discusses each of the concerns raised by the European Commission: 1) The concept of acting in concert : The ECLE are of the opinion that a uniform concept for the Takeover Bids Directive, the Transparency Directive and the Acquisition Directive is not useful because of the different objectives of these Directives. As to the Takeover Directive it should be made clear that joint engagement activities of investors should not trigger a mandatory offer. 2) National derogations to the mandatory offer rule differ widely, but there are different types of derogations that pose different concerns. The ECLE recommend that the Directive should provide for a review process with respect to national derogations. 3) The ECLE believe that there are good reasons to close the loopholes against the “creep in” and the “creep on” acquisitions. 4) As to board neutrality and the break-through rule the ECLE believe that the default rules should be changed. The option rights should be given to the shareholders, not to the member states. The reciprocity rule is flawed. 5) The protection of the rights of employees should be addressed in a wider context and should not be taken up specifically for one type of transaction such as takeover bids

Zur "Konzernverantwortungsinitiative". rechtliche Überlegungen zu den vier Forderungen der Eidgenössischen Volksinitiative «Für verantwortungsvolle Unternehmen zum Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt»

Die Volksinitiative «Für verantwortungsvolle Unternehmen – zum Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt» (sog. «Konzernverantwortungsinitiative») fordert von Bundesrat und Parlament, mit verbindlichen Gesetzesbestimmungen dafür zu sorgen, dass international tätige Unternehmen mit Sitz in der Schweiz bei allen ihren Aktivitäten weltweit die international anerkannten Menschenrechte und Umweltstandards respektieren müssen. Konkret sollen die Unternehmen zu einer Sorgfaltspflichtprüfung verpflichtet werden. Konzernmuttergesellschaften sollen in der Schweiz eingeklagt werden können. Sie sollen nach Schweizer Recht für den Schaden haften, welchen ihre Tochtergesellschaften oder Zulieferunternehmen irgendwo auf der Welt aufgrund einer Verletzung von Menschenrechten oder Umweltstandards verursacht haben. Was ist von dieser geballten Ladung rechtlicher Regelungspostulate zu halten? Wie sind diese Forderungen im bestehenden rechtlichen Gefüge zu werten? Welche Folgen hätten sie für das Schweizer Konzernhaftungsrecht? Die Autoren nehmen sich dieser Fragen an und unter­ziehen sie einer kritischen rechtlichen Analyse

Vorabinformation an Grossaktionäre: Grenzen und Möglichkeiten nach Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht

Major shareholders occasionally seek additional or more detailed information from the board to assess the state of their company’s affairs, to ensure that the directors are behaving satisfactorily or, if not, to act upon their dissatisfactions and to influence corporate decision-making. This article deals with the question whether such selective supply of information to major shareholders is compatible with the basic corporate principle of equal treatment. If the shares are listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange, the capital market related right of information, which sets a higher threshold, applies, i.e. the shareholder information policy must comply with the more restrictive equality of treatment requirement striving for a «level playing field». The authors hold that information cannot always be provided on an absolute equal basis, rather that some inequalities of treatment are possible if justified. Although major shareholders are not privileged in terms of their status of information, upon substantial request, an exclusive passing on of additional or more detailed information during the financial year can be justified. However, the «abstain or release»-principle applies with respect to any price-sensitive facts that would provide insider information to individual shareholders, i.e. such information must be disclosed to an unlimited group of stakeholders