Two-level finite element method with a stabilizing subgrid for the incompressible MHD equations

We consider the Galerkin finite element method (FEM) for the incompressible magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) equations in two dimension. The domain is discretized into a set of regular triangular elements and the finite-dimensional spaces employed consist of piecewise continuous linear interpolants enriched with the residual-free bubble functions. To find the bubble part of the solution, a two-level FEM with a stabilizing subgrid of a single node is described and its application to the MHD equations is displayed. Numerical approximations employing the proposed algorithm are presented for three benchmark problems including the MHD cavity flow and the MHD flow over a step. The results show that the proper choice of the subgrid node is crucial to get stable and accurate numerical approximations consistent with the physical configuration of the problem at a cheap computational cost. Furthermore, the approximate Solutions obtained show the well-known characteristics of the MHD flow. Copyright (C) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

On the role of intrinsic value in terms of environmental education

An understanding of instrumentally valuable nature resulted from anthropocentrism is incapable of producing long-term, real solutions to deal with environmental problems. It is obvious that these problems cannot be handled staying within the current understanding of nature-human relationship and without broaden the extent of ethics in a way to involve non-human entities. Human beings are prone to protect what they consider as intrinsically valuable. Further, they have a tendency to value the things around them and it can be improved. Thus, a big part of this can be succeeded through environmental education. Therefore, in this paper, I discuss the role of intrinsic value in terms of environmental education to handle the environmental problems, and investigate a new account of subjective intrinsic value about nature. (c) 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd

An Investigation on Conceptions of Freedom and Right

Freedom and right are the concepts that constitute the ground of legal and moral sides of our social lives. When we look at the history of thought, it seems that they are examined in many aspects. However, when we think on them more deeply, we can recognize that it is not clear enough in what aspects these concepts differ from each other. That is, although they are defined differ-ently, when their usage considered, it will be noticed that in many cases, they are used interchangeably. For example, in the Turkish Constitution of 1982, they are used as “fundamental rights and freedoms” referring two different con-cepts. However, in his study, in which the difference between the concept of right and freedom is discussed, considering the usage of these concepts within the Constitution of 1982, Prof. Dr. Kemal Gözler claims that “In terms of our positive law, it is not possible to make a distinction between the concept of right and freedom”1 Within another study, it is claimed that “freedom is the common root of all rights, right requires the freedom. If an individual is not free, then right cannot make a sens”. However, I think there is no such a hierarchical relation between freedom and right. For example, although he is deprived of physical freedom, a person sentenced to prison also has some rights. At this point, it becomes the matter of question what is understood by the concept of “freedom”, that is, the different definitions of freedom become as the main issue. Freedom, in general, is defined as thinking or acting without any prevention, limitation and forcing from outside. Hobbes claims unlimited freedom, which people have before so-cial contract, in fact, is equals to the having no freedom, and such an unlimited freedom provides no advantages within the social life. However, some other philosophers, such as Rousseau, Kant, make a distinction between the nega-tive and positive meaning of freedom, and they claim it is the positive meaning of the freedom that reveals the moral side of human beings. They emphasize the importance and indispensability of freedom for an individual. In this study, by examining the complex relation between the mutually intertwined concepts of right and freedom, I try to clarify in what aspects they differ from each other

Çevre etiği bağlamında insanmerkezci ve insanmerkezci-olmayan yaklaşımlarda özsel değer kavramının kullanımı: metaetik bir inceleme.

The concept of intrinsic value is one of the most disputed concepts of ethics, and in particular, environmental ethics. The traditional approaches towards nature are anthropocentric, attributing intrinsic value merely to human beings. Nowadays, environmental philosophers mostly try to distance themselves from anthropocentric attitudes, and they introduce ethical reasons, which do not consider nature merely instrumentally valuable. In general, environmental ethicists are prone to appeal to the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ to justify the necessity of enlarging the scope of moral concern. For this reason, in this dissertation, I aimed to clarify the role of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ in environmental ethics and I present a metaethical analysis of this concept within anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches. I discuss whether intrinsic value exists independently of a valuer, and specifically a human valuer, examining what ethicists mean by ‘intrinsic value’ and what they mean when they call something ‘intrinsically valuable’. In light of these discussions, contrary to defenders of objective value, like Moore, I defend the view that there would not be a value independently of a valuer and attribution of a value is a subjective act. I express that the subjective act of attributing value is related to the agent, but it need not be always for-agent’s-own sake. In other words, what I mean with ‘intrinsic value’ is not the value that is ‘in-itself’ owned by an object because of the object’s intrinsic properties; but the value ascribed to something ‘for-its-own-sake’, not for sake of consequences it might bring. Besides, on the basis of moral contractarianism and depending on Y. S. Lo’s “dispositional theory” grounded on Hume’s moral philosophy, I assert that subjectively attributed values can be universalized.Ph.D. - Doctoral Progra

Kant'ın ahlak felsefesinde özgürlük ve kötülük ilişkisi.

The purpose of this study is to examine concepts of freedom and evil, and to clarify their relation in terms of Kant’s moral philosophy. In this study, I firstly examine Kant’s understanding of freedom and the problems that this understanding leads to. I also discuss how the concept of freedom can be reconciled with the concept of evil expressed in the form of “propensity to evil”. Additionally, I attempt to show the significance of the notion of evil for Kant’s moral theory. Evil is one of the most criticized concepts of Kant’s philosophy and it is considered as inconsistent with his earlier thoughts by his contemporaries. Kant claims that the “propensity to evil” is universal to all of human race, but it does not mean that human beings are actually evil. They become good or evil with their free will (Willkür). In this study, I propose that Kant’s understanding of evil is a concept that helps to conceive one’s own freedom in terms of Kant’s morality. I also try to show that in spite of its similarities with the Christian doctrine of “original sin”, Kant’s conception of evil should not be considered as a religious issue; it is a matter of freedom as the extension of his moral theory and his earlier thoughts. Kant’s earlier works do not seem to be sufficient for comprehending his moral thoughts. Therefore, it can be proposed that with the introduction of the concept of evil in the Religion within the Limits of Reason, the missing part of Kant’s moral theory is completed.M.S. - Master of Scienc