Sale of visas: a smuggler's final song?

Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we show that legalisation through selling visas in combination with repression can be used to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. Simulations of the policy highlight the complementarities between repression and selling visas and call into question current policies

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and …rm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o¤ between the government’s shadow costs of …nancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of ex-ante informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession cost characteristics to public …rms at the termination of the concession.Public-private-partnership, privatization, adverse selection, regulation, natural monopoly, infrastructure, facilities

Education and Migration Choices in Hierarchical Societies: The Case of Matam, Senegal

The paper aims at studying determinants of schooling in traditional hierarchical societies confronted with an established history of outmigration. In the village, a ruling caste controls local political and religious institutions. For children who do not belong to the ruling caste, migration is a social mobility factor that is enhanced by formal schooling. Since formally educated children tend not to return, the ruling caste seeks to develop family loyalty by choosing religious education instead. The theory hence predicts that the social status of the family has a significant impact on educational choice. Children from the ruling caste who are sent abroad have a lower probability of being sent to formal school. They are more likely to be sent to Koranic schools that emphasize religious and family values. The theoretical predictions are tested on data from Matam region in Senegal, a region where roughly one of every two children have ever attended school.Schooling, Migration, Social Status, Haalpulaar