Investment, Matching and Persistence in a modified Cash-in-Advance Economy

We simulate and estimate a new Keynesian search and matching model with sticky wages in which capital has to be financed with cash, at least partially. Our objective is to assess the ability of this framework to account for the persistence of output and inflation observed in the data. We find that our setup generates enough output and inflation persistence with standard stickiness parameters. The key factor driving these results is the inclusion of investment in the CIA constraint, rather than any other nominal or real rigidity. The model reproduces labor market dynamics after a positive increase in productivity: hours fall, nominal wages hardly react, and real wages go up. Regarding money supply shocks, we investigate the conditions under which our model specification generates the liquidity effect, a fact which is absent in most sticky price models.persistence; sticky prices; staggered bargaining wages; monetary facts; labor market facts; cash-in-advance.

On Stickiness, Cash in Advance, and Persistence

This paper shows that a model which combines sticky price and sticky wages with investment in the cash-in-advance constraint generates business cycle dynamics consistent with empirical evidence. The model reproduces the responses of the key macroeconomic variables to technology and money supply shocks. In particular, the model generates enough output and inflation persistence with standard stickiness parameters. This setup is also able to generate the liquidity effect after a money injection, overcoming other standard new Keynesian models.sticky prices; sticky wages; monetary facts; labor market facts; cash-in-advance

Nominal Rigidities, Monetary Policy and Pigou Cycles

Based on a two sector dynamic new Keynesian model with sticky prices, this paper makes two contributions to the Pigou cycle literature. First, the paper quantifies the contribution of `news shocks' -- signals of future productivity changes. Maximum likelihood estimates indicate that nondurable sector news shocks are roughly as volatile as contemporary shocks; in the durable good sector, the standard deviation of news shocks is 1/4 that of contemporaneous shocks. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the paper shows that the estimated interest rule contributes to Pigou cycles arising from nondurable sector news shocks. In particular, the Ramsey-optimal policy does not exhibit Pigou cycles while the estimated policy rule does. With sticky prices, intermediate good producers set current prices based on expected future marginal cost. The news shock implies a lower future marginal cost, and so nondurable goods prices start falling immediately. The estimated interest rate rule then prescribes a lower nominal interest rate, and so a fall in both the real interest rate and user cost of durables. As a result, purchases of durables also rise. In contrast, the Ramsey-optimal policy requires a higher nominal interest rate because the Ramsey policy attempts to minimize the distortions associated with within-sector price dispersion. The resulting dynamics under the Ramsey policy are, then, essentially the opposite of those under the estimated policy. Put simply, Pigou cycles arise in the model precisely because the central bank accommodates them.Pigou cycles; monetary policy

A Tale of Tax Policies in Open Economies

Recent financial crises in Europe as well as the periodic battles in the U.S. over the debt ceiling point to the importance of fiscal discipline among developed countries. This paper develops an open economy model, calibrated to the U.S. and a subset of the EMU, to evaluate the impact of various permanent tax changes. The first set of experiments considers a targeted one percentage point reduction in the government deficit-to-GDP ratio through raising one of: the consumption tax, the labor income tax, or the capital income tax. In terms of welfare, the consumption tax is found to be the least costly of the tax increases. A second set of experiments looks at deficit-neutral tax changes: partially replacing the capital income tax with either a higher labor income tax or higher consumption tax; and partially replacing the labor income tax with an increased consumption tax. Reducing reliance on capital income taxation is welfare-enhancing, although it leads to short term losses. Reducing labor income taxation improves international competitiveness and is welfare-improving.Fiscal policies, open economies, public deficits, tax reforms

MISE EN PLACE D'UNE CONSULTATION PHARMACEUTIQUE POUR LA PRISE EN CHARGE DES PATIENTS ATTEINTS D'HEPATITE C A L'HOPITAL DE LA CROIX-ROUSSE

LYON1-BU Santé (693882101) / SudocSudocFranceF

Staggered Bargaining and Hours Worked

A matching model with labor/leisure choice and staggered bargaining is used to explain (i)differences in GDP per hour and GDP per capita, (ii) differences in employment, (iii) differences in the proportion of part-time work across countries. The model predicts that the higher the level of rigidity in wages and hours the lower are GDP per capita, employment, part-time work and hours worked, but the higher is GDP per hours worked. In addition, it predicts that a country with a high level of rigidity in wages and hours and a high level of income taxation has higher GDP per hour and lower GDP per capita than a country with less rigidity and a lower level of taxation. This is due mostly to a lower level of employment, and not to a higher degree of part-time work. In contrast, a country with low levels of rigidity in hour and in wage setting but with a higher level of income taxation has a lower GDP per capita and a higher GDP per hour than the economy with low rigidity and low taxation, because of less employment but also because of a higher level of part-time workmatching, search, hours, staggered bargaining, labor market performance

Nash Bargaining, Money Creation, and Currency Union

This paper is an attempt to combine global macroeconomic objectives with an explicit analysis of resource allocation efficiency. It determines how money creation must be shared between Monetary Union members, given national particularities in the monetary transmission mechanisms. In a two-country "New Open Macroeconomics" model, we outline the optimality of an unequal treatment of nations. To this end, the original Nash bargaining concept is modified to allow a differentiated treatment of countries. By favoring the more flexible country and relying on international money flows to provide liquidity to the more rigid nation, all Union members register efficiency gains which compensate an unfavorable intertemporal inflation activity arbitrage in the Union Central Bank objective.Monetary union, Nash bargaining, New open macroeconomics