The Role of Non-monetary Trade in Russian Transition

The appearance of significant non-monetary trade in the Russian transition of 1992-98 has been differently interpreted by analysts and observers. Some have seen barter as a symbol of passive resistance to reforms while others have blamed reformist policies for its development. We argue that non-monetary trade is best understood as a natural response of companies to market imperfections remaining from Soviet times. We provide an overview of market institutions that existed at the onset of the transition and conclude that market infrastructure was under-developed (especially trade and finance-related institutions). This fact became obvious after the liberalisation of trade in 1992. When the Central Bank of Russia stopped issuing direct credit to enterprises, newly established commercial banks were unable to fill the gap. Firms had to develop alternative means of financing trade and non-monetary trade was one of them. In our opinion barter, while an inefficient mode of trade, also played a positive role in the transition. Its high transaction costs offered ample opportunities to earn profits from trade and financial intermediation. The latter mushroomed as a result and at the time of the 1998 default the Russian economy had sufficiently developed trade, financial and legal systems to afford a switch from barter to money trade.

Debt overhang and barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

In this Paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence from two independent surveys is consistent with the model's predictions