Kualitas Auditor Ekstern Dalam Membatasi Kesempatan Manajemen Untuk Melakukan Manajemen Laba

Earnings management practice related to a variety incentives to maximize fi rms' value orto increase manager welfare. Many researchers focused on 3 main incentives for earnings managementpractice, as explained in positive accounting theory, that were incentive to decrease cost ofdebt covenant default, maximize bonus and reduce political cost (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). However,the earnings management would exist if management had incentive and opportunity to do so(Trueman & Titman, 1988; Christensen, et al., 1999). The objectives of this research was to investigateexternal auditor quality as factor to constraining earnings management by managers. Analysis wasbased on 111 publicly manufacturing fi rms in Indonesian Stock Exchange period 2005 up to 2008.The result showed that the high level of fi rms' debt motivated manager to practice more earningsmanagement. However, the level of earnings management was lower when the quality of auditorexternal work was higher. The results of these research contributed to accounting literature developmentespecially in corporate governance. Qualifi ed auditor, one of monitoring aspects, had functionas good corporate governance mechanism for reducing management practice to manage earningswhich would be costly for fi nancial statement users

The Effect of Investment Opportunity Set on the Association Between Incentives and Earnings Management Level

The objective of this research is to investigate the effect of investment opportunity set on the association between managers' incentives to manage earnings and the level of earnings management. The incentives to engage in earnings management in this research measured by financial leverage level. firm's size, and public ownership or firm‘s common stock. Discretionary accrual is used to measure level of earnings management. Result show that there are positive discretionary accruals and evidence support argument that the liigher of investment opportunity set the greater positive effect of financial leverage and public ownership on the level of carnmgs management. Manager of firms with relatively more investment opportunity set would have wider opportunity or more discretion to manage reported earnings

Laba Akuntansi dan Klasifikasi Akuntansi untuk Menaksir Profitabilitas Perusahaan

Earnings have information content to predict two benefits of equity investment earnings and cash flow from operation. And disaggregation earnings or net income into spesific components that the accounting profession's requires is important for assessing firm profitability. This study examine the predictive content of earnings and earnings disaggregations. The results demonstrate that earnings are a significant predictor of future earnings but does not a significant predictor of future cash flow, and does not support that earnings disaggregation improves profitability forecasts

Pengaruh Manajemen Laba Pada Nilai Dan Kinerja Perusahaan

Managers manage their earnings because they want to influence the investors perception about firm s performance, subsequently the firms could extract low cost exsternal fund. Managers have incentive to practice income-increasing earnings mangemsnt before they make initial public offerings (IPO) in order to get high offering price. However, these practice could decrease the opportunity o f managers to manage their earnings in the future periods. I f earnings management before public offering cause investors to be over optimistic about future earnings, investors will be disappointed with firm 's performance after IPO and the firm value tend to decrease in the periods after the IPO. This study investigates the effect ofearnings management on the firm s value and performance in the periods before and after the initial public offering. Results o f this study show that managers practice income-increasing earnings management before their initial public offerings. Earnings management have positive impact on firm value in the initial public offering period, but this has negative impact in the periods after IPO. Firms 'values in the end o f IPO are lower than firms 'values in the IPO period. Firms 'performances in the years after the initial public offering were higher than firms 'performances in the year o f IPO, but the average o f return o f asset decreases in the periods after IPO