Reconstruction in Syria: challenges and policy options for the EU and its member states

Syria’s civil war has long since been decided in favour of the regime. There is no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation or lasting stabilisation. Syria faces enormous challenges, well beyond the rebuilding of infra­structure and housing. It will also need assistance to restart its economy, stabilise its currency and renew its public services, in particular education, health, electricity and water. The funds required for comprehensive reconstruction are extremely un­likely to become available, given the attitude of the Syrian leadership, the economic ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical interests of regional and global powers. Nor are resources likely to be deployed in line with the needs of the population. The EU and its member states have made engagement in Syria's reconstruc­tion conditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict settle­ment and a political opening. They should adapt their approach to align better with the current realities and challenges on the ground. That means in particular targeting humanitarian aid more effectively, dismantling certain sectoral sanctions and supporting the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure - even in areas controlled by the Syrian government. This would represent a more effective contribution to improving living conditions and avoiding further erosion of public services. Lasting stabilisation will require fundamental reforms. In this vein, Brus­sels should spell out its "more for more" approach. Europe should refrain from normalising relations with the top leaders of the Assad regime and instead step up its support for prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights violations and the use of internationally banned weapons. (author's abstract

A Bayesian approach to modelling field data on multi-species predator prey-interactions

Multi-species functional response models are required to model the predation of generalist preda- tors, which consume more than one prey species. In chapter 2, a new model for the multi-species functional response is presented. This model can describe generalist predators that exhibit func- tional responses of Holling type II to some of their prey and of type III to other prey. In chapter 3, I review some of the theoretical distinctions between Bayesian and frequentist statistics and show how Bayesian statistics are particularly well-suited for the fitting of functional response models because uncertainty can be represented comprehensively. In chapters 4 and 5, the multi- species functional response model is fitted to field data on two generalist predators: the hen harrier Circus cyaneus and the harp seal Phoca groenlandica. I am not aware of any previous Bayesian model of the multi-species functional response that has been fitted to field data. The hen harrier's functional response fitted in chapter 4 is strongly sigmoidal to the densities of red grouse Lagopus lagopus scoticus, but no type III shape was detected in the response to the two main prey species, field vole Microtus agrestis and meadow pipit Anthus pratensis. The impact of using Bayesian or frequentist models on the resulting functional response is discussed. In chapter 5, no functional response could be fitted to the data on harp seal predation. Possible reasons are discussed, including poor data quality or a lack of relevance of the available data for informing a behavioural functional response model. I conclude with a comparison of the role that functional responses play in behavioural, population and community ecology and emphasise the need for further research into unifying these different approaches to understanding predation with particular reference to predator movement. In an appendix, I evaluate the possibility of using a functional response for inferring the abun- dances of prey species from performance indicators of generalist predators feeding on these prey. I argue that this approach may be futile in general, because a generalist predator's energy intake does not depend on the density of any single of its prey, so that the possibly unknown densities of all prey need to be taken into account

Middle East peace talks at the end of the road? One-state reality consolidating

The nine months of negotiations agreed last summer by the US mediators and the two parties ended on 29 April 2014. US Secretary of State John Kerry has since announced a pause in US facilitation activities. Yet, a definitive breakdown or failure of the Middle East peace talks bears far-reaching risks. Even if the mediators were to succeed in effecting a restart of talks, there is scant hope of bridging the rifts within the year envisaged – at least if the previous approach were to be maintained. That will lead to a further consolidation of the one-state reality that has long since emerged between the Mediterranean and River Jordan. Germany and its partners in the European Union must face up to the alternatives: either a much more robust approach to propel the talks to a two-state solution, or insistence on equal political, economic and cultural rights for all in the territories controlled by Israel. (author's abstract

Amnesty International and the apartheid claim against Israel: political and legal relevance

On 1 February 2022, Amnesty International released a comprehensive report claiming that Israel is engaged in apartheid against the Palestinians and is thereby committing a crime against humanity. The Amnesty report is one in a series of publications by Pales­tinian, Israeli and international human rights organizations that see the thresh­old to apartheid having been crossed in Israel and/or the Palestinian territories, although it should be noted that opinions about where such crimes are being com­mitted differ from report to report. The EU and its member states should not adopt the apartheid claim without legal scrutiny. At the same time, they should take the grave human rights violations documented in the Amnesty report (and elsewhere) seriously. Under the Geneva Conventions, all signatory states incur direct legal obli­gations to enforce compliance. (author's abstract

The "deal of the century" for Israel-Palestine: US proposals are likely to speed demise of two-state settlement

US President Donald Trump has announced a "deal of the century" to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan is to be revealed at an undetermined date some­time after the Israeli parliamentary elections. While the details remain a well-kept secret, the US Administration’s record to date suggests that the initiative will pri­ori­tise Israeli interests over Palestinian rights, ignore fundamental principles of inter­national law, and steer well away from the idea of two sovereign states. The Palestinian leadership's rejection must therefore be expected. The incoming Israeli government is likely to treat that as a green light to implement those elements of the plan that serve to maintain its permanent control over East Jerusalem and strategic areas of the West Bank. This course also risks breakdown of the already precarious Israeli-Pal­es­tinian cooperation on conflict management. The EU and its member states should take the publication of the US plan as an occasion to spell out the principles of the kind of conflict resolution that they could support, and state the consequences for European policy of Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank. (Autorenreferat

Materialsammlung zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten: Anlageband zur Studie "Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten"

Mit der Veröffentlichung der sogenannten road map des Nahost-Quartetts (USA, EU, Rußland und die Vereinten Nationen) und dem Gipfel von Aqaba im Juni 2003 ist Hoffnung auf eine Wiederaufnahme des Friedensprozesses in Nahost geweckt worden. Erste wichtige Schritte zur Beendigung der gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen sind getan: die Verkündung einer dreimonatigen Waffenruhe seitens der militanten palästinensischen Gruppierungen und der Abzug israelischer Truppen aus dem nördlichen Gaza-Streifen und aus dem Stadtgebiet von Bethlehem. Die road map könnte in der Tat ein Instrument darstellen, um den Friedensprozeß wiederzubeleben. Ob dieser erfolgreich sein wird, wird nicht nur vom Verhalten der Konfliktparteien abhängen, sondern auch von einem intensiven und nachhaltigen Engagement der internationalen Gemeinschaft. In diesem Zusammenhang wird es eine Herausforderung für die EU sein, ein nachhaltiges amerikanisches Engagement einzufordern. Gleichzeitig kann die EU direkt zu einer Konfliktlösung beitragen. Dabei sollten die Herbeiführung einer dauerhaften Waffenruhe, die Unterstützung einer Verhandlungslösung und der Aufbau eines lebensfähigen palästinensischen Gemeinwesens im Vordergrund stehen. Die Studie analysiert Zielsetzung, Ansatz und Maßnahmen der EU-Unterstützung für den Friedensprozeß seit 1993, zeigt Problemfelder auf und formuliert auf der Basis der bisherigen Erfahrungen Empfehlungen. Die Studie wird durch eine Materialsammlung ergänzt, die einen Überblick über die finanzielle Unterstützung der EU, Texte wichtiger EU-Deklarationen sowie internationaler Friedensinitiativen enthält. Zudem findet sich im Anlageband ein Rückblick, der die wichtigsten Entwicklungen des mit der Konferenz von Madrid 1991 eingeleiteten Nahost-Friedensprozesses rekapituliert

Shaping the future of Gaza: how Europe could contribute to sustainable stabilisation

In reaction to the mass killings, atrocities, and hostage-taking by Hamas, the Pales­tinian Islamic Jihad and other militant groups on 7 October 2023, Israel declared war, further tightened the closure of the Gaza Strip, and started a military operation. More than four months into the war, there has been limited progress towards fulfilling Israel's war aims. At the same time, Gaza's civilian infrastructure and residential buildings have been largely destroyed, its population has been internally displaced, more than 27,000 Palestinians have been killed, and the humanitarian situation has become ever more horrific. As Israel's representatives have announced elements of a post-war order, and as military operations are increasingly determining facts on the ground, international actors have also started to engage on the topic of the "day after". Yet, the interests, priorities, and capabilities of the main protagonists hardly align. Still, the European Union (EU) and its member states should seek to contribute towards ending the war and sustainable stabilisation. Such efforts will have to ad­dress governance, security, reconstruction, and a political framework. (author's abstract

The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017: an opportunity to end Gaza's humanitarian crisis and permanently overcome the blockade

Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dissolve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the Gaza Strip. In mid-October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Even if there are still major obstacles to merging the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation - the chances of the rapprochement preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. Germany and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions. (author's abstract

The EU in the Middle East and North Africa: helpless bystander rather than effective democracy promoter or stabilizing force

In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. The EU pledged to generously support trans-formation processes initiated in the region with a “3 M” approach, which would combine monetary support, market access, and increased mobility, as well as through a reinvigorated European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Yet, Europeans have not lived up to these promises. Against the backdrop of the Middle East and North Africa descending into ever greater levels of chaos and violence, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Yet, in view of an increasingly reluctant US government to provide regional stability, Europe has no choice but to address instability in its southern neighborhood. To be more effective actors, Europeans should revisit their priorities, underlying assumptions, policy frameworks, and instruments. (Autorenreferat