Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods

The paper examines a significant phenomenon overlooked by the trade literature: internationally regulated goods. Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods, such as drugs, small arms, and antiquities, have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of global regulatory agreements. I argue that these goods are unique in that they involve transnational negative externalities. Whereas certain countries benefit from the trade in these goods, the trade inflicts negative effects on other countries. Examples of such negative externalities include fatalities and refugee flows resulting from rampant gun violence, high crime rates associated with widespread drug abuse, and archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting. The paper develops a theory that first explains why national regulation is insufficient and why international regulation is necessary for curbing these negative externalities. The theory then analyzes why certain governments are strongly in favor of international regulation while others wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. My analysis locates the sources of governments’ conflicting preferences in the domestic political arena and considers how exporters, consumers, and civil society shape governments’ views. The final part of the theory examines how the distribution of state power affects the establishment of the regulatory agreements. The paper makes several theoretical contributions by bridging rationalist and non-rationalist accounts of international law and by focusing on international cooperation in the absence of shared interest

Protecting against Plunder: The United States and the International Efforts against Looting of Antiquities

In 1970 UNESCO adopted a convention intended to stem the flow of looted antiquities from developing countries to collections in art-importing countries. The majority of art-importing countries, including Britain, Germany, and Japan, refused to join the Convention. Contrary to other art-importing countries, and reversing its own traditionally-liberal policy, the United States accepted the international regulation of antiquities and joined the UNESCO Convention. The article seeks to explain why the United States chose to establish controls on antiquities, to the benefit of foreign countries facing archaeological plunder and to the detriment of the US art market. I argue that the concern of US policymakers about looting abroad resulted from a series of scandals which exposed the involvement of American museums and collectors with looted material. Advocacy efforts of American archaeologists also played a key role in educating policymakers about the loss of historical knowledge caused by looting and the necessity of regulation. The article further analyzes how antiquities dealers and certain museums lobbied Congress against implementing the UNESCO Convention and why Congress decided in favor of implementation as an act of international moral leadership. Following the analysis of the Congressional battle, I examine how the US debate over looted antiquities has evolved to the present. The article concludes with implications for the role of values versus interests in international law

Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods

The paper examines a significant phenomenon overlooked by the trade literature: internationally regulated goods. Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods, such as drugs, small arms, and antiquities, have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of global regulatory agreements. I argue that these goods are unique in that they involve transnational negative externalities. Whereas certain countries benefit from the trade in these goods, the trade inflicts negative effects on other countries. Examples of such negative externalities include fatalities and refugee flows resulting from rampant gun violence, high crime rates associated with widespread drug abuse, and archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting. The paper develops a theory that first explains why national regulation is insufficient and why international regulation is necessary for curbing these negative externalities. The theory then analyzes why certain governments are strongly in favor of international regulation while others wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. My analysis locates the sources of governments’ conflicting preferences in the domestic political arena and considers how exporters, consumers, and civil society shape governments’ views. The final part of the theory examines how the distribution of state power affects the establishment of the regulatory agreements. The paper makes several theoretical contributions by bridging rationalist and non-rationalist accounts of international law and by focusing on international cooperation in the absence of shared interest

Protecting against Plunder: The United States and the International Efforts against Looting of Antiquities

In 1970 UNESCO adopted a convention intended to stem the flow of looted antiquities from developing countries to collections in art-importing countries. The majority of art-importing countries, including Britain, Germany, and Japan, refused to join the Convention. Contrary to other art-importing countries, and reversing its own traditionally-liberal policy, the United States accepted the international regulation of antiquities and joined the UNESCO Convention. The article seeks to explain why the United States chose to establish controls on antiquities, to the benefit of foreign countries facing archaeological plunder and to the detriment of the US art market. I argue that the concern of US policymakers about looting abroad resulted from a series of scandals which exposed the involvement of American museums and collectors with looted material. Advocacy efforts of American archaeologists also played a key role in educating policymakers about the loss of historical knowledge caused by looting and the necessity of regulation. The article further analyzes how antiquities dealers and certain museums lobbied Congress against implementing the UNESCO Convention and why Congress decided in favor of implementation as an act of international moral leadership. Following the analysis of the Congressional battle, I examine how the US debate over looted antiquities has evolved to the present. The article concludes with implications for the role of values versus interests in international law

Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods

The paper examines a significant phenomenon overlooked by the trade literature: internationally regulated goods. Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods, such as drugs, small arms, and antiquities, have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of global regulatory agreements. I argue that these goods are unique in that they involve transnational negative externalities. Whereas certain countries benefit from the trade in these goods, the trade inflicts negative effects on other countries. Examples of such negative externalities include fatalities and refugee flows resulting from rampant gun violence, high crime rates associated with widespread drug abuse, and archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting. The paper develops a theory that first explains why national regulation is insufficient and why international regulation is necessary for curbing these negative externalities. The theory then analyzes why certain governments are strongly in favor of international regulation while others wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. My analysis locates the sources of governments’ conflicting preferences in the domestic political arena and considers how exporters, consumers, and civil society shape governments’ views. The final part of the theory examines how the distribution of state power affects the establishment of the regulatory agreements. The paper makes several theoretical contributions by bridging rationalist and non-rationalist accounts of international law and by focusing on international cooperation in the absence of shared interest

Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons

Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods—such as small arms, drugs, and antiquities—have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of international regulatory agreements. This article offers a theoretical framework of government preferences on the international regulation of these goods. Departing from conventional models of trade policy, the theoretical framework introduces negative externalities, rather than protection, as the motivation for restricting trade; it also takes moral concerns into account. I test this framework empirically through an original survey of government views on international small-arms regulation. Based on interviewing officials from 118 countries, the survey reveals a large variation in government preferences that conforms to the theoretical expectations. I employ this variation to explain why the international regulation of small arms is weak, despite the fact that these are the deadliest weapons of all in terms of actual death toll

Replication data for: Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: The Politics of Internationally Regulated Goods

Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods – such as small arms, drugs and antiquities – have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of international regulatory agreements. The motivation for international regulation has been the negative externalities that these goods involve, such as fatalities and refugee flows stemming from rampant gun violence, crime associated with widespread drug abuse, and archaeological destruction ca used by antiquities looting. Yet despite the severity of the problems it addresses, international regulation has been extremely controversial. The dissertation seeks to account for the highly-divergent preferences of governments over the extent of – and even need for – the international control of these goods. I argue that governments that face the trade’s negative effects upon their own countries favor strong international regulation. So do governments that are concerned about secondary externalities – the trade’s negative effects on foreign countries. Concern about secondary externalities may result from pressure of principled actors committed to worldwide suppression of trade that they deem harmful. Pro-regulation governments, however, meet with resistance from governments guarding the interests of exporters or consumers who wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. Given the absence of shared interest in cooperation, the resulting international regulation typically reflects the preferences of the powerful actors. Empirically, the dissertation examines the international regulation of small arms and antiquities as well as the international efforts against human trafficking. The small arms chapter tests the theoretical model of cross-national preference variation using original survey data, gathered through interviews with officials from 118 countries. The antiquities chapter explains why the United States has supported the international regulation of antiquities since the late 1960s, to the benefit of foreign countries facing archaeological plunder and to the detriment of the US art market. The chapter also explores why Britain reversed its long-standing opposition to international antiquities regulation in the early 2000s. The human trafficking chapter investigates the origins of the American worldwide efforts against human trafficking since 2000. The chapter also examines how the American pressure motivated the Israeli government to curb sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The dissertation concludes with implications for international relations, for international law and for policy. <br /

Legal Traditions and Nonbinding Commitments: Evidence From the United Nations' Model Commercial Legislation

Non–legally binding agreements provide an important tool for establishing international cooperation. We know little, however, about the variation in the implementation of such agreements. This article identifies a major cause of this variation: legal tradition. Nonbinding agreements, which may be adapted to local needs and circumstances, are consistent with the gradual, organic evolution of common law; by contrast, they are an uneasy fit with the civil-law tradition that neatly distinguishes between “law” and “nonlaw.” Consequently, common-law countries are more likely to implement nonbinding agreements than civil-law countries. Survival analysis of three nonbinding instruments—United Nations model laws aimed at harmonizing commercial legislation—finds strong support for this argument: common-law countries prove significantly more likely to implement these model laws

Assessing mutual trust among EU members: evidence from the European Arrest Warrant

<p>International cooperation on criminal justice requires mutual trust: a belief that the partner's legal system functions adequately and adheres to fundamental norms. The European Union builds its judicial-cooperation efforts on a presumption of mutual trust: EU members are assumed to trust each other's justice system since they share a commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Skeptics argue, however, that such trust does not really exist given the wide variation in legal standards and practices across Europe. Yet such skepticism has not been supported by systematic evidence. This article seeks to offer such evidence and to quantify the impact of the lack of mutual trust. It does so by examining the record of British and Irish participation in the European Arrest Warrant: a fast-track process of surrender of fugitives between Member States. We find that judicial authorities in Britain and Ireland deviate from the mutual-trust presumption: they accord a more favorable treatment to Member States with a stronger rule of law or a better human-rights record – and this considerably affects the rate of surrenders. This finding offers important implications for the EU's justice policy and for understanding cooperation against crime more broadly.</p

sj-docx-1-psx-10.1177_00323217241232933 – Supplemental material for Foreign Agents? Public Attitudes Toward Nongovernmental Organizations in a Backsliding Democracy

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-psx-10.1177_00323217241232933 for Foreign Agents? Public Attitudes Toward Nongovernmental Organizations in a Backsliding Democracy by Asif Efrat and Omer Yair in Political Studies</p