Preventing Phosphorylation of Sterol Regulatory Element-Binding Protein 1a by MAP-Kinases Protects Mice from Fatty Liver and Visceral Obesity

The transcription factor sterol regulatory element binding protein (SREBP)-1a plays a pivotal role in lipid metabolism. Using the SREBP-1a expressing human hepatoma cell line HepG2 we have shown previously that human SREBP-1a is phosphorylated at serine 117 by ERK-mitogen-activated protein kinases (MAPK). Using a combination of cell biology and protein chemistry approach we show that SREBP-1a is also target of other MAPK-families, i.e. c-JUN N-terminal protein kinases (JNK) or p38 stress activated MAP kinases. Serine 117 is also the major phosphorylation site in SREBP-1a for JNK. In contrast to that the major phosphorylation sites of p38 MAPK family are serine 63 and threonine 426. Functional analyses reveal that phosphorylation of SREBP-1a does not alter protein/DNA interaction. The identified phosphorylation sites are specific for both kinase families also in cellular context. To provide direct evidence that phosphorylation of SREBP-1a is a regulatory principle of biological and clinical relevance, we generated transgenic mice expressing mature transcriptionally active N-terminal domain of human SREBP–1a variant lacking all identified phosphorylaton sites designed as alb-SREBP-1aΔP and wild type SREBP-1a designed as alb-SREBP-1a liver specific under control of the albumin promoter and a liver specific enhancer. In contrast to alb-SREBP–1a mice the phosphorylation–deficient mice develop no enlarged fatty livers under normocaloric conditions. Phenotypical examination reveales a massive accumulation of adipose tissue in alb-SREBP-1a but not in the phosphorylation deficient alb-SREBP-1aΔP mice. Moreover, preventing phosphorylation of SREBP-1a protects mice also from dyslipidemia. In conclusion, phosphorylation of SREBP-1a by ERK, JNK and p38 MAPK-families resembles a biological principle and plays a significant role, in vivo

Credit Rationing with Symmetric Information

Without denying the importance of asymmetric information, this article purports the view that credit rationing may also originate from a lender's inability to classify loan applicants in proper risk categories. This effect is particularly strong when novel technologies are involved. Furthermore, its relevance may increase with the importance assigned to internal rating systems by the Basel accord. This article presents a measure of the inadequacy of a lender's classification criteria to the qualitative features of prospective borrowers. Even without information asymmetries, credit rationing may occur if this quantity reaches too high a value. Furthermore, some general principles are outlined, that may be used by lenders in order to change their classification criteria