Technologies, Institutions, and Social Issues in Arms Control and Transbounary Water-Resources Agreements

The world of environmental security is bringing the science of natural resources in ever-closer contact with the policy issues of international stability and foreign affairs. Many U.S. and international agencies—including the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Southern African Development Community— now analyze foreign policy in part through the lens of environmental resources. In October 2001, three organizations—the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security; the Department of Geosciences of Oregon State University; and the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories—sponsored a workshop designed to highlight the closeness of national security and environmental concerns through explicitly comparing the technologies, institutions, and social issues in two seemingly disparate fields: arms control and transboundary water resources. With generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, “Fire & Water” workshop participants compared and contrasted these two fields and then identified questions for further analysis. Workshop sessions focused on three specific topics: (a) scientific and technological advances, (b) treaties and institutions, and (c) social and cultural issues

Fire & Water: An Examination of the Technologies, Institutions, and Social Issues in Arms Control and Transboundary Water Resources Agreements

The world of environmental security is bringing the science of natural resources in ever-closer contact with the policy issues of international stability and foreign affairs. Many U.S. and international agencies-including the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Southern African Development Community--­ now analyze foreign policy in part through the lens of environmental resources

Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel/Weapons Cycle

Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies

Policy Paper 09: Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue II Conference Papers

These papers were prepared as background papers for the May 1994 meeting of hte NEACD in Tokyo. They neither represent a consensus of the participants nor a summary of any part of the discussions at any of the meetings. They are presented here in the hopes that other readers outside of the NEACD prcess will find them to be as useful and thought-provoling as did the hosts and participants

Running Out of (Legal) Excuses: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of the Prohibition Treaty

Since the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), States that rely on extended nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of their security policy are now in a less legally defensible position with respect to their obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Using Australia as the primary example, this chapter argues that the hostility of nuclear umbrella States towards the TPNW undermines their contention that they remain committed to nuclear disarmament under Article VI. It demonstrates that Australia's main criticism of the TPNW-that banning nuclear weapons is not an effective measure for disarmament is a weak legal justification designed to mask the fact that it is prioritising nuclear deterrence over nuclear elimination