20 research outputs found
Why local banking market concentration hinders IPOs and how it can work to issuers’ advantage
General sample evidence conceals the influence of banking market structure on a fraction of IPO issuers with limited financing options: small non-venture-capital-backed firms (SNVC). Using U.S. county-level data, we reveal that concentrated banking markets contract IPO activity, as they cause SNVCs to incur high underpricing at listing. However, when the size of the local banks is small, both the time to IPO and underpricing decrease. Our evidence infers that, unless banks are organizationally capable of tapping into soft information, they generally use market power for rent extraction, which has important spillover effects on the IPO market.PostprintPeer reviewe
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Managing uncertainty in the process of going public
This thesis explores the potential of novel mechanisms towards the reduction of issuers’ ex ante uncertainty in the process of going public: i) the recruitment of directors with exceptional academic backgrounds and ii) obtaining credit ratings. Given the information scarcity in the private domain, IPO firms can use these strategies to provide investors with solid, readily identifiable benchmarks to assess their standing. Notwithstanding whether these informational cues are associated with positive or negative prospects, they cause a significant portion of uncertainty in valuation to subside. Ultimately, this should act to constrain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing causing firms to claim a larger portion of the surplus value created on the issue day.
First, we examine whether CEO educational and professional attainments are associated with short-run IPOs performance. We find that returns are negatively associated with Ivy-League education, the existence of at least one University degree and the total number of qualifications. After controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias, the results show that at the graduate level of education the Master of Arts, the MBA, the Juris and Medical Doctor titles exhibit negative relation with the money left on the table. The same is true for any professional qualification. It is also reported that only in the case of the PhD title the Nobel Elite group of Universities outperforms the rest of the sample.
Second, we examine the effect of multiple credit ratings on IPO performance. The evidence comes from the U.S. and shows that the acquisition of credit ratings constitutes a valid investment decision for the issuing firm as it leaves less money on the table. Both individual as well as any combination of ratings from the three largest agencies associates with lower underpricing. This effect exacerbates with higher grade levels which are also found to decrease initial returns. Additionally, rated IPOs systematically experience negative filing price revisions. The results offer new insight to the facilitation of the going public process.
Finally, we contribute to the large literature associating IPOs with earnings management. In this respect, we explore a special niche, i.e. politically connected firms. A priori, these issuers can be expected to refrain from discretionary accruals manipulation to avoid causing discontent to their contacts. Alternatively, the case may be that the powerful acquaintances fuel managers with overconfidence which permeates the financial statements. Assembling a hand-collected database on firms’ political donations, we come up with strong support for the latter conjecture. In particular lobbying activity and candidate campaign financing are both shown to be among the important determinants of aggressiveness in reporting. Our findings tie in with a growing body of literature showing businesses actively involved in politics to be prone to abuses and professional misconduct
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The value of in-person banking: evidence from U.S. small businesses
We produce the first systematic study of the determinants and implications of in-person banking. Using survey data from the U.S., we show that firms which are informationally opaque or operate in rural areas are liable to contact their primary bank in-person. This tendency extends to older, less educated, and female business owners. We find that a relationship based on face-to-face communication, on average, lasts 17.88 months longer, spans a wider range of financial services, and is more likely to be exclusive. The associated loans mature 3.37 months later and bear interest rates which are 11 basis points lower. For good quality firms, in-person communication also relates to less discouraged borrowing. These results are robust to multiple approaches for endogeneity, including recursive bivariate probits, treatment effect models, and instrumental variables regressions. Overall, our findings offer empirical grounding to soft information theory and a note of caution to banks against suppressing channels of interpersonal communication
Why local banking market concentration hinders IPOs and how it can work to issuers’ advantage
General sample evidence conceals the influence of banking market structure on a fraction of IPO issuers with limited financing options: small non-venture-capital-backed firms (SNVC). Using U.S. county-level data, we reveal that concentrated banking markets contract IPO activity, as they cause SNVCs to incur high underpricing at listing. However, when the size of the local banks is small, both the time to IPO and underpricing decrease. Our evidence infers that, unless banks are organizationally capable of tapping into soft information, they generally use market power for rent extraction, which has important spillover effects on the IPO market
Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change
Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance
Can we trust the accounting discretion of firms with political money contributions? Evidence from U.S. IPOs
Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions (PMC) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns. Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a means of signaling expected political gains
Can we trust the accounting discretion of firms with political money contributions? Evidence from U.S. IPOs
Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions (PMC) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns. Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a means of signaling expected political gains.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Can We Trust the Accounting Discretion of Firms with Political Money Contributions? Evidence from U.S. IPOs
Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions
(PMCs) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and
test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or
truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document
income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least
affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary
accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns.
Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results
support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a
means of signaling expected political gains