29 research outputs found
Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability
Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered as the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability. Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that shareholder primacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly responsible for the multiplication of accounting irregularities and the dramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend this thesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing the logical failure of a control of the business firm provided for by stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical evidence mostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates our argument
Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability
Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered as the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability. Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that shareholder primacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly responsible for the multiplication of accounting irregularities and the dramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend this thesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing the logical failure of a control of the business firm provided for by stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical evidence mostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates our argument
Financial Disclosure and the Board: Is Independence of Directors Always Efficient
In listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of information disclosure. The "conventional wisdom" considers independence of directors as the essential attribute to improve the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. However, effective certification may require finn-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. We show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the magnitude of intangible resources.Board of directors; information disclosure; accounting; intangible resources
Financial disclosure and the Board: a case for non-independent directors
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates
expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated.
Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources
Efficient monitoring and control in intangibles-driven economies: is full independence always required?
The current crisis puts at issue the self-regulated market system of
monitoring and control. Claims for restoring the proper functioning of
market economies in general, and financial markets in particular, call for
either establishing new sets of rules or creating new supervising authorities.
Both claims rely on the received mantra of full independence that applies
whenever control is concerned. However, our analysis pays attention to a
neglected aspect of monitoring and control, which requires the capability to
discovering and understanding flaws in and dangers from the inner
congeries of the business affair under examination. Arguably, this businessspecific
expertise and independence trade off. To overcome this problem, an
optimal share of non-independent controllers may be chosen from or
appointed by stakeholding constituencies of the business affair. They can
provide proficient monitoring and control without colluding, in principle,
with executive managers of the activity to be controlled
Independent directors: less informed, but better selected? New evidence from a two-way director-firm fixed effect model
This paper develops a two-way director-firm fixed effect model to study the relationship between independent directorsâ individual heterogeneity and firm operating performance, using French data. This strategy allows considering and differentiating in a unified empirical framework mechanisms related to board functioning and mechanisms related to director selection. We first show that the independence status, netted out unobservable individual heterogeneity, is negatively related to performance. This result suggests that independent board members experience a strong informational gap that outweighs other monitoring benefits. However, we show that industry-specific expertise as well as informal connections inside the boardroom may help to bridge this gap. Second, we provide evidence that independent directors have higher intrinsic ability as compared to affiliated board members, consistent with a reputation-based selection process
Le conseil dâadministration : enjeux de gouvernance et de responsabilitĂ©
International audienc
The Role of Rookie Female Directors in a PostâQuota Period: Gender Inequalities within French Boards
International audienc
La participation des salariés. Du partage d'information à la codétermination
International audience"Promu par les innovations managĂ©riales, l'engagement des salariĂ©s au travail trouve une issue logique dans leur participation aux dĂ©cisions de l'entreprise. Cette participation rĂ©pond en outre Ă lâaspiration des salariĂ©s et de leurs reprĂ©sentants Ă intervenir sur les conditions de travail, Ă discuter des questions dâemploi et de rĂ©munĂ©ration, ainsi que des choix stratĂ©giques de leur entreprise.Certains Ă discrĂ©tion des directions, dâautres obligatoires, les dispositifs de participation que recense et analyse cet ouvrage revĂȘtent des formes diverses : droit Ă©conomique du comitĂ© dâentreprise, nĂ©gociation collective, reprĂ©sentation au conseil dâadministration, etc.Comment ces canaux sâarticulent-ils ? Comment contribuent-ils Ă lâamĂ©lioration des conditions de travail, Ă la transition Ă©cologique, Ă la responsabilitĂ© sociale des entreprises ? Que peut-on en attendre, en termes de compĂ©titivitĂ© ?Un tour dâhorizon synthĂ©tique et critique, alors que la loi PACTE du 22 mai 2019 prescrit une plus grande participation des salariĂ©s au capital et aux dĂ©cisions stratĂ©giques des entreprises." (source Ă©diteur