Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons

In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p

Why responsible belief is blameless belief

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Advice for infallibilists: DIVORCE & RETREAT!

This paper comprises a defence of Infallibilism about knowledge. In it, I articulate two arguments in favour of Infallibilism, and for each argument show that Infallibilism about knowledge does not lead to an unpalatable Scepticism if justified belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge, and if Fallibilism about justified belief is true

Trust in the guise of belief

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state (cf. Adler 1994, Baier 1986, Hieronymi 2008, Keren 2014, McMyler 2011) but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state (cf. Baker 1987, Faulkner 2011, Jones 1996, McLeod 2011). This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit (Holton 1996), or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had (Hardin 2004, Simpson 2012). Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental

Belief is contingently involuntary

The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non-contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs)

Epistemic justification as a normative concept

There is a way of talking about epistemic justification that involves the notion of our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply with makes us blameworthy, called the deontological conception. In this thesis, I defend the deontological conception against criticisms first levied by William Alston that it (a) implies doxastic voluntarism which is false and thereby violates the principle that ought implies can, and (b) is in tension with what is distinctive about the epistemic domain, namely its connection with the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. I argue that the extent to which (a) is problematic depends on the extent to which (b) is problematic. Further, that (b) IS not problematic to the deontological conception if we view it not as a way to cash out epistemic justification, but as a way to understand normativity in general. I do this by making a distinction between merely evaluative and deontological levels of appraisal and that it is only in the latter that the notion of an obligation functions. I argue that it is nonsensical to use sortal terms at the level of obligations, (where obligations carry the notion of blameworthiness), i.e. that there cannot be obligations from an epistemic point of view anymore than there can be obligations from an ethical point of view. However, sortal terms can be used to distinguish between differing types of reasons (which, on their own, operate at the merely evaluative level)" but because obligations only emerge out of a network of differing sorts of reasons, it does not make any sense to talk about different sorts of obligation. I strengthen that last claim up by arguing, against the evidentialist, that there are such things as non-epistemic reasons for belie

Some objections to Peels' combinatorial analysis of belief

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Ought to believe, simpliciter

According to many philosophers there are only pro tanto oughts to believe relative to a standard of assessment: there are epistemic oughts to believe, moral oughts to believe, prudential oughts to believe etc. But there are no oughts to believe simpliciter. Many of the same philosophers who hold this view, also hold that ought to believe is to be understood deontologically – such that if S violates such an ought without excuse, S is blameworthy for doing so. I here argue that on a deontological understanding of ought to believe there must be ought to believe simpliciter and that it is the violation of this ought that determines whether we are to blame for our beliefs

Quantifying the annual fish harvest from South Africa’s largest freshwater reservoir

South African inland fisheries are poorly developed and their contribution to near-shore communities is poorly understood. This study is the first comprehensive assessment of recreational and subsistence angling undertaken in an inland fishery in South Africa. The study was conducted on the 360 km2 Lake Gariep, South Africa’s largest freshwater reservoir. A total of 508 anglers were interviewed between February 2007 and January 2008. Of those interviewed, 67% were subsistence anglers and 33% recreational anglers. Catch per unit effort (CPUE) did not differ significantly between sectors. CPUE fluctuated seasonally, ranging between 0.37 (95% CI= 0.26 to 0.51) kg·angler-1·h-1 in winter and 0.88 (0.67 to 1.17) kg·angler- 1·h-1 in summer. The duration of a fishing day ranged from 5.99 (5.24 to 6.74) h in mid-winter to 7.26 (6.88 to 7.63) h in early summer. Expected end-of-day catch (CPUE × fishing-trip duration) ranged from 2.2 to 6.4 kg·angler-1·d-1 depending on the season. The number of anglers ranged from 22 (8 to 53) anglers·d-1 in June/July to 74 (25 to 176) anglers·d-1 in April. Total annual catch from the roving creel survey was estimated at 71.4 (57.4 to 91.4) t·yr-1. Another 7.5 t∙yr-1 were landed during recreational angling competitions. The resultant total catch divided by the lakeshore population equated to a per capita fish supply of 11.1 kg·yr-1. More than 70% of the catch was the alien invasive carp Cyprinus carpio and there was no evidence of overfishing. The fish resource of Lake Gariep is of significant recreational and subsistence value. As a result of the low fish price (ZAR5.72 ± 2.60·kg-1) subsistence fishing was considered a low-revenue activity that mainly augmented food security in lakeshore communities. The relatively high CPUE indicated that the fishery may be an important safety-net during periods when alternate sources of livelihoods are limited. Consequently, we recommend that the importance of angling to local communities needs to be taken into account when planning fisheries development and developing an inland fisheries polic

The real symbolic limit of markets

Proponents of semiotic arguments against the commodification of certain goods face the following challenge: formulate your argument such that it does not appeal to immoral consequences, nor is really an argument showing 5 that we ought to reform the meaning we give to commodification. I here attempt to meet this challenge via appeal to the notion of what I call protoon- a-par value. Under this construal, the semiotic argument yields that the commodification of certain goods necessarily signals value choice, where value choice ought not to be signaled