Imminent Prospects for Additional Finance: What Might Be Done Now or Soon and Under What Conditions

foreign aid, taxation, subsidies, revenue, international economic order

Political Economy of Additional Development Finance

The paper considers the political obstacles and supports for additional development finance and a number of possible devices through which advantage may be taken of the supports and the obstacles circumvented. It emphasizes the need for effective negotiating alliances among developing-country governments that will draw on support from outside their own ranks. It gives particular attention to the 'innovative' methods by which funds might be mobilized by transnational activity for global disposal within a strategy for the progressive reduction of poverty. In order to eliminate one difficulty it outlines a possible arrangement through which funds so raised might be allocated.development finance, aid, Tobin Tax, global governance

Development Finance: Beyond Budgetary Official Development Assistance

Budgetary appropriations by rich-country governments constitute the standard method of providing external funds for welfare and growth in developing countries. This source seems likely, however, to prove inadequate to meet the estimated external finance needed to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals

The United Kingdom's Experience with North Sea Oil and Gas

SUMMARY Oil has been important but not dominant in the UK economy. Extraction has been done mainly by private firms. Allocation of leases has been discretionary, and there has been little obvious attempt to slow the release of blocks. Oil taxation has been complex, mainly profit?based, and frequently changed, but not unsuccessful. Stabilisation, however, has failed; the country went into slump and high unemployment as oil sales and revenue boomed. The mistake was a failure to ‘lean against’ the factors producing a great rise in real effective exchange rate between 1977 and 1980. RESUME L'Expérience de la Grande Bretagne avec le Pétrole et le Gaz de la Mer du Nord Le pétrole a été important mais pas dominant dans l'économie de la Grande Bretagne. L'extraction a été effectuée essentiellement par des compagnies privées. L'allocation des bails s'est fait à discrétion et il y a eu très peu de tentative évidente de ralentir la vente de tranches d'actions. L'imposition du pétrole a toujours été très complexe essentiellement basée sur profit, et fréquemment changée, mais elle n'a pas été néanmoins sans succès. La stabilisation néanmoins a échoué. Le pays est retombé dans le marasme avec un haut niveau de chômage tandis que les ventes et revenus pétroliers montaient en flèche. L'erreur, c'était d'avoir manqué de ‘prendre appui’ sur les facteurs qui avaient produit la considérable hausse dans le taux d'échange réel effectif entre 1977 et 1980. RESUMEN La experiencia del Reino Unido con el petróleo y el gas del Mar del Norte En la economia del Reino Unido, el petróleo ha sido importante, pero no dominante. La extracción la han realizado principalmente firmas privadas. La concesión de usufructos ha sido discrecional y ha habido pocos intentos obvios para disminuir la liberación de obstáculos La tributación al petróleo ha sido compleja, principalmente basada en las utilidades, frecuentemente modificada, pero no carente de éxito. Sin embargo, la estabilización ha fracasado, el país cayó en una depresión y alto desempleo a medida que las ventas y utilidades del petróleo florecian. El error fue una falla en apoyarse en los factores que produjeron una gran alza an la tasa real de cambio efectiva entre 1977 y 1980

Sombre reflections on the North Sea oil tax system

The tax system on British North Sea oil and gas has altered in each of the five years since 1979. It was stiffened considerably in that year, further in 1980, and again quite considerably in 1981 when a whole new tax with its own rules added further complications to the existing maze. Then in 1982 the new tax was dropped from the end of that year, some other rearrangements were made, and again this year there was a further relaxation, though mainly relating to new leases. The general outline of the system was established only in 1975 as the first oil was due to start flowing. So there have altogether been six changes in nine years. If certainty in the fiscal treatment is to be desired as an encouragement to investors, then this record is a rather gloomy one. Admittedly other oil-producing nations also changed the rules repeatedly in the 1970's. Such was the case with the United States and Australia. The Americans also introduced a new oil tax in 1981. Yet the United Kingdom starting virtually afresh after the shock of the first oil crisis, and, since it was free of many of the political constraints that hamstrung oil policy in America, might have hoped to build a set of arrangements that could last. The immediate reason for the frequent changes was obvious: the erratic course of world oil prices since the early 1970's. But is it inevitable that the rules should change each time the prices change, with new taxes coming out like new models of cars? Is there not some way of making rules that themselves take account of changes in the price of the product? This article will suggest that the solution to the puzzle lies in a combination of indexation and a discounted-cash-flow basis for the tax, while auctioning of extraction rights would provide a very useful supplement. A brief discussion of principles is needed to make the point clear