Caretaker conventions in Australasia: minding the shop for government

In this monograph, Anne Tiernan and Jennifer Menzies capably chart the often hazardous terrain of the \u27caretaker period\u27 that ensues from the time an election is called until a new government is formed. This is a landscape fraught with political and administrative dangers - particularly for public servants who are required to \u27mind the shop\u27 and keep the basic machinery of government going. The conventions represent an historical accretion of custom, practice and rules, often leavened with uncertainty. In tackling their subject, Tiernan and Menzies draw upon their shared past experiences as public servants and ministerial \u27staffer\u27 as well as the highest standards of academic scholarship - this is a \u27must read\u27 for politicians, public servants and students of government

Caretaker conventions in Australasia: minding the shop for government

In this monograph, Anne Tiernan and Jennifer Menzies capably chart the often hazardous terrain of the ‘caretaker period’ that ensues from the time an election is called until a new government is formed. This is a landscape fraught with political and administrative dangers – particularly for public servants who are required to ‘mind the shop’ and keep the basic machinery of government going. The conventions represent an historical accretion of custom, practice and rules, often leavened with uncertainty. In tackling their subject, Tiernan and Menzies draw upon their shared past experiences as public servants and ministerial ‘staffers’ as well as the highest standards of academic scholarship – this is a ‘must read’ for politicians, public servants and students of government

Integrating Recovery within a Resilience Framework: Empirical Insights and Policy Implications from Regional Australia

"Within Australia's federal system, responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from natural disasters is shared between the three tiers of government. Intergovernmental policy and funding arrangements are premised on shared responsibility and aim to foster individual, business and community resilience. These arrangements underpin Australia's international reputation for effectiveness in its management of natural disasters. The capacity of the diverse networks that comprise the disaster management system to coordinate and deliver in the preparedness and response phases of a disaster, and to provide relief in the immediate aftermath, has been developed over time and tested and refined through the experience of frequent, severe disaster events over recent decades. Less well developed is the system's ability to support economic recovery in disaster-affected communities over the longer term. This paper presents case studies of regional communities affected by two of Australia's most expensive and deadly natural disasters - the 2009 Victorian bushfires and the cyclones and floods that struck the state of Queensland in 2010-2011. It highlights significant gaps in policy and funding arrangements to support recovery and offers lessons for aligning recovery within a resilience framework." (author's abstract

Exploring the relationship between groundwater geochemical factors and denitrification potentials on a dairy farm in southeast Ireland

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the journal Ecological Engineering. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Ecological Engineering, volume 37, issue 9, September 2011, 1304-1313. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoleng.2011.03.025peer-reviewedNitrate (NO3−) loss from agriculture to shallow groundwater and transferral to sensitive aquatic ecosystems is of global concern. Denitrifying bioreactor technology, where a solid carbon (C) reactive media intercepts contaminated groundwater, has been successfully used to convert NO3− to di-nitrogen (N2) gas. One of the challenges of groundwater remediation research is how to track denitrification potential spatially and temporally within reactive media and subsoil. First, using δ15N/δ18O isotopes, eight wells were divided into indicative transformational processes of ‘nitrification’ or ‘denitrification’ wells. Then, using N2/argon (Ar) ratios these wells were divided into ‘low denitrification potential’ or high denitrification potential’ categories. Secondly, using falling head tests, the saturated hydraulic conductivity (Ksat) in each well was estimated, creating two groups of ‘slow’ (0.06 m day−1) and ‘fast’ (0.13 m day−1) wells, respectively. Thirdly, two ‘low denitrification potential’ wells (one fast and one slow) with high NO3− concentration were amended with woodchip to enhance denitrification. Water samples were retrieved from all wells using a low flow syringe to avoid de-gassing and analysed for N2/Ar ratio using membrane inlet mass spectrometry. Results showed that there was good agreement between isotope and chemical (N2/Ar ratio and dissolved organic C (DOC)) and physio-chemical (dissolved oxygen, temperature, conductivity and pH) parameters. To explain the spatial and temporal distribution of NO3− and other parameters on site, the development of predictive models using the available datasets for this field site was examined for NO3−, Cl−, N2/Ar and DOC. Initial statistical analysis was directed towards the testing of the effect of woodchip amendment. The analysis was formulated as a repeated measures analysis of the factorial structure for treatment and time. Nitrate concentrations were related to Ksat and water level (p < 0.0001 and p = 0.02, respectively), but did not respond to woodchip addition (p = 0.09). This non-destructive technique allows elucidation of denitrification potential over time and could be used in denitrifying bioreactor technology to assess denitrification hotspots in reactive media, while developing a NO3− spatial and temporal predictive model for bioreactor site specific conditions

Focus groups as ethnography: the case of Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff

The purpose of this paper is to outline the current state of political and administrative ethnography in political science and public administration before suggesting that focus groups are a useful tool in the study of governing elites. They provide an alternative way of “being there” when the rules about secrecy and access prevent participant observation. Briefly, it describes the job of Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff before explaining the research design, the preparations for the focus group sessions, and the strategies used to manage the dynamics of a diverse group that included former political enemies and factional rival

The Rudd transition

ANNE TIERNAN looks at what we can learn from that comparatively rare phenomenon, a change of federal government, in this extract from her Senate Occasional Lecture TRANSITIONS occur only occasionally in Australian politics. Federal governments have changed only six times since World War Two. For political scientists these rare events are a great opportunity. They offer a window into how the system of government is operating, how key institutions have been shaped or changed by the former government and how this compares with their historical trajectory. The arrival of a new administration offers opportunities to distinguish the idiosyncratic from the systemic; to identify the larger forces at work within the political system. It is generally recognised that the few first weeks of a new government&rsquo;s life are crucial. Its early days in power &ldquo;set the tone for how it will govern.&rdquo; Thus we can learn a great deal from the early decisions of a new government - what it changes and what it keeps; what lessons it has drawn from prior experience and from predecessors on its own side as well as from its opponents. In Australia, a transition to government begins when the election result is known and lasts until the new prime minister and ministry are officially sworn in. In reality, of course, the period is much longer. It lasts for as long as it takes to get the necessary arrangements in place in terms of people, process, politics and policy. I will argue that the Rudd transition has been successful because of its attention to these four &ldquo;p&rsquo;s&rdquo; and because it was underpinned by detailed planning, both in terms of Labor&rsquo;s policy priorities and also about how it intended to take the reins of government. Transitions Much of what we know about transitions of government is drawn from the United States, where a change of president brings a seismic shift in government structures and personnel. There, not surprisingly, transition planning is regarded as &ldquo;essential to ensure continuity in the working affairs of government&rdquo; and for governmental effectiveness. For incoming governments in the US, the formal transition period runs from the day after the November general election until 30 days after the inauguration - a period of around three months. Transitions have been extensively studied by scholars of the American presidency, informed by academic and practitioner perspectives. There is a broad consensus that effective transitions require extensive planning, ideally informed by lessons drawn from the experience of previous administrations, be they positive or negative. Things are much less dramatic in Westminster-style political systems. In theory, a professional and impartial career bureaucracy ensures continuity of administration and personnel. There is a seamless transfer of bureaucratic loyalty from one administration to the next. The democratic transfer of power from an outgoing to an incoming prime minister occurs peacefully, and as Rudd has observed, with great elegance. Like other Westminster traditions, much of this is assumed. Comparatively little has been written about transitions in Australia, but we know from experience that changes of government can go well or go badly. It is generally agreed, for example, that the Whitlam government&rsquo;s transition was rushed and chaotic, due mainly to the inexperience of the incoming ministry and its difficulties managing the pent-up ambitions of ALP supporters after 23 years in opposition. In 1983, by contrast, the incoming Hawke Labor government pursued a deliberate but cautious approach, consciously intended to avoid the mistakes of its predecessor. That transition is regarded as having been successful because it was achieved without major disruptions to the public service or the business of government, but also because it launched a program of reforms that would become the hallmark of the government. In 1996 the new government drew criticism for sacking six departmental secretaries when it took office. While the move asserted the the government&rsquo;s authority over the public service, it had a detrimental impact on relationships and performance. Its negative consequences hampered the Howard government throughout its first term, and became a potent symbol in Labor&rsquo;s critique of its lack of respect for public institutions. Transitions of government offer unrivalled opportunities both for change and to achieve policy goals. Newly elected leaders have great reserves of authority and goodwill and face fewer constraints than at subsequent phases of their tenure. Paradoxically, however, their ability to fully exploit these opportunities is constrained by a lack of experience and the need to focus on getting basic arrangements in place. While obviously a greater imperative in the US, where a new president must assemble a cabinet, and arrange more than 7,300 competitive appointments to the White House staff and the federal bureaucracy, developing basic arrangements is becoming increasingly relevant in the Australian context. The transition to government no longer involves only ministers and senior officials, but also large numbers of ministerial staff. Higher rates of turnover in the public service workforce challenge conventional assumptions about the policy content and institutional memory available to incoming ministers. In early 2008, Kevin Rudd observed that two-thirds of the current APS workforce was not employed in the service when the government changed in 1996. Thus 60 per cent of Commonwealth public servants had only ever served Howard government ministers (Rudd 2008). Given changes in structures and relationships within the Australian core executive over the past thirty years, it is pertinent to question whether our assumptions about transitions of government remain valid or whether they should be adapted to reflect new political realities. Taking over: Kevin Rudd&rsquo;s transition Kevin Rudd is unique among incoming Australian prime ministers in that he is the first with previous experience as a senior bureaucrat, a department head and a ministerial chief of staff. Consequently, as he told a group of senior public servants, he knows all the Yes Minister tricks. According to the prime minister, &ldquo;I did remind them that I&rsquo;m probably the first bloke for quite a while who has been at one stage of his life both Humphrey, Bernard and now the minister, and in this case now the prime minister, so there is very little I haven&rsquo;t seen before. In a speech to the APS, Rudd drew attention to his own experience of transition, in Queensland in 1989, where as chief of staff to premier Wayne Goss, he encountered a bureaucracy that had not experienced administrative change in 32 years. Rudd&rsquo;s experience in November 2007 was radically different to that of the Goss government. PM&amp;C had, as is conventional, prepared two sets of briefings for whichever of the parties contesting the 24 November election became the incoming government. At 9am on Sunday 25 November, Dr Peter Shergold, secretary of PM&amp;C, flew to Brisbane to brief the prime minister elect. So too did Dr Ken Henry, secretary to the Treasury, to brief Wayne Swan, who Rudd had confirmed would retain the portfolio he held in Opposition. Rudd has described his government&rsquo;s transition as &ldquo;seamless,&rdquo; noting this was &ldquo;a credit to the APS.&rdquo; This echoed the outgoing PM&amp;C secretary&rsquo;s observation that &ldquo;in some ways the value of professional public service is fully appreciated only at the moments of transition when Prime Ministers or governments change.&rdquo; The Rudd government came to office with a well developed plan for taking over the machinery of government and reshaping the system of advice. For the most part it got people (ministers and ministerial staff) quickly and efficiently in place and established positive relationships with the public service. It affirmed the government&rsquo;s commitment to contestable policy advice drawn from a wide range of sources, and asserted the primacy of cabinet and its committees in policy and decision-making. Labor also had a comprehensive program of election promises, which the prime minister declared he was determined would be delivered. Progress towards that achievement was reported in a 100 Days report, a model imported from state governments. By establishing what presidential studies scholars would describe as &ldquo;discipline and effectiveness,&rdquo; the new government was able to &ldquo;hit the ground running.&rdquo; It exploited the opportunities of the transition period to achieve some important and symbolic policy goals, and harnessed popularity and goodwill to frame a new and distinctive narrative of governance. It is hardly surprising then that commentators, including some of Rudd&rsquo;s political opponents, agree that Labor has made a comparatively smooth transition to government. But six months is as much of a honeymoon as any modern leader can expect. Since the budget things have been getting very much harder for the prime minister and his ministers and some of the strains are beginning to show. Labor has made a successful transition from Opposition to government, but questions remain about whether it has made the more difficult and profound shift from campaigning to governing. American scholar Matthew Dickinson identifies a &ldquo;growing disjunction&rdquo; between what is required to win elections and what is required to govern in an increasingly complex and contested policy and political environment. Campaigns place a premium on rhetoric, political symbolism, and skillful and responsible media management aimed at &ldquo;winning&rdquo; the daily news cycle. Governing, as the prime minister and members of his team are learning, is much harder. Certainly far harder than opposition where everything seems possible and there is no responsibility for actually achieving it, let alone any expectation that it will be reconciled within existing priorities and structures. Governing federally is more complex than it was when Labor last held office, and vastly different to state government, where many members of Team Rudd cut their teeth. Governing requires patience, the ability to compromise, and in an environment characterised by uncertainty and power dependence, sensitivity to the needs and interests of other stakeholders. The media and public expect governments to have total command of the details of existing and new policies, as well as of the full gamut of ministers&rsquo; portfolio responsibilities. We expect leaders to respond immediately to new and emerging issues and crises nationally and internationally. Hence the need for advisory systems that are efficient and responsive, which ensure balanced advice, which help to avoid surprises, which capitalise on a leader&rsquo;s strengths and compensate for any weaknesses. Rudd&rsquo;s advisory system will continue to evolve over the course of his prime ministership. Experience suggests it will be shaped by environmental demands and organisational dynamics as much as by his own personality and working style. Labor has established policy and decision-making arrangements, but it will take time to develop structures and routines that fully mesh with the new government&rsquo;s agenda and style. There has been significant instability and turnover within PM&amp;C. Since the election, the department has been recalibrating to meet the needs of the new prime minister in establishing Community Cabinet, managing the Australia 2020 Summit, servicing a complex and wide-ranging COAG reform agenda - all without a permanent secretary until March. At times the advisory system has struggled to keep up with Rudd&rsquo;s ambitions. A key challenge will be to adapt to and assert some control over the &ldquo;rhythms&rdquo; of governing. Echoing presidential scholars, Arthur Sinodinos has argued that &ldquo;most importantly, you need to guard against the urgent crowding out the important.&rdquo; Achieving long-term policy objectives requires an ability to focus beyond the daily media cycle, and to &ldquo;hold firm&rdquo; if required, on changes that may be unpopular. It is also important to develop a sustainable operational tempo. To date Rudd has ignored warnings that his government and advisory system, and importantly, the people who comprise it, can&rsquo;t be expected to run at more than full capacity all of the time. More and better outcomes may be achieved by tempering the pace and by moderating public, and some in the government&rsquo;s own expectations. The leak of two cabinet documents this week has undermined trust between Rudd and the APS. Asked whether he now regretted not purging the public service, he told reporters: &ldquo;Well, the government took a view before the election that there would be no &lsquo;night of the long knives.&rsquo; We accept the consequences of that decision. And, we think that it was the right thing to do in order to restore something which resembles the Westminster system in Australia&rdquo; Veteran journalist Laurie Oakes admitted he had received the cabinet documents from a public servant. He said the leak &ldquo;reflected bureaucratic anger at the non-stop nature of Rudd and his failure to follow their advice.&rdquo; Rudd&rsquo;s response was quick and determined: &ldquo;I understand that there has been some criticism around the edges that some public servants are finding the hours a bit much. Well, I suppose I&rsquo;ve simply got news for the public service - there&rsquo;ll be more. This government was elected with a clear cut mandate. We intend to proceed with that. The work ethic of this government will not decrease, it will increase.&rdquo; As this suggests the prime minister seems unwilling to slow down. But campaigns are a sprint, governing is, most political parties hope, a marathon. The imperatives of governing require a different mix of skills, and also, a different mindset. Kevin Rudd has described the transition to government as a &ldquo;learning experience for everyone.&rdquo; This is true for himself as much as for his ministers, their staff and the public service. I have described the transition process, its key elements and some of the lessons it might hold as the Rudd government confronts the future. But as I noted at the outset, these are preliminary findings. The real test will be how the government learns and adapts through the experience of its first term, particularly its current troubles. We will know far more about the true measure of Rudd as prime minister and about the tenor of his government as Labor approaches its mid-term. &bull; Anne Tiernan is a researcher in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University Photo: Andrew Jeffre