A Case Study of Case Studies: Scientific Realism and Integrated HPS

Case studies of science concerning the interpretation of specific theories and the nature of theory change over time are often presented as evidence for or against forms of selective realism: versions of scientific realism that advocate belief in connection with certain components of theories as opposed to their content as a whole. I consider the question of how probative case studies can be in this sphere, focusing on two prominent examples of selectivity: explanationist realism, which identifies realist commitment with components of theories that are putatively required to explain their empirical success; and entity realism, which identifies realist commitment with certain putatively causally efficacious entities. I argue that while case studies are essential to debates about these positions, they are not compelling in the way that their intended use suggests. Regarding explanationism, concerns about the “neutrality” of historical evidence are ultimately indefeasible. Regarding entity realism, arguments for and against naturally dissolve into disputes about the reference of theoretical terms which are insulated from the details of cases. I conclude by suggesting that the morals of this discussion extend to other forms of selective realism, namely structural realism and semirealism

The Structuralist Conception of Objects

This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of the relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know - objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that neither of these forms of structuralism succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects. What structural realism implies is not that objects do not exist, but rather that objects should be understood structurally. The question of how we get from the "nodes" of detected structures to a conception of objecthood may have different answers, depending on the putative objects and problems under investigation. Scientific developments shed light on the ontological natures of particulars, but objects in general comprise a heterogeneous kind

What is Scientific Realism?

Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we encounter some profoundly divergent conceptions of the nature of science and of philosophy

Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations from Art

Realists regarding scientific knowledge – those who think that our best scientific representations truly describe both observable and unobservable aspects of the natural world – have special need of a notion of approximate truth. Since theories and models are rarely considered true simpliciter, the realist requires some means of making sense of the claim that they may be false and yet close to the truth, and increasingly so over time. In this paper, I suggest that traditional approaches to approximate truth are insensitive to two crucial features of scientific knowledge, and that for each of these, analogies between representational practices in the sciences and in art prove useful to understanding how this situation can be remedied. First, I outline two distinct ways in which representations deviate from the truth, commonly referred to as ‘abstraction’ and ‘idealization’. Second, I argue that these practices exemplify different conventions of representation, and that for each, the conditions of approximation relevant to explicating the concept of approximate truth must be understood differently. The concept is thus heterogeneous; approximate truth is a virtue that is multiply realized, relative to different contexts of representation. This understanding is facilitated, I suggest, by considering the distinction between realistic and non-realistic representation in art

Case Studies, Selective Realism, and Historical Evidence

Case studies of science concerning the interpretation of specific theories and the nature of theory change over time are often presented as evidence for or against forms of selective realism: versions of scientific realism that advocate belief in connection with certain components of theories as opposed to their content as a whole. I consider the question of how probative case studies can be in this sphere, focusing on two prominent examples of selectivity: explanationist realism, which identifies realist commitment with components of theories that are putatively required to explain their empirical success; and entity realism, which identifies realist commitment with certain putatively causally efficacious entities. I argue that while case studies are essential to debates about these positions, they are not compelling in the way that their intended use suggests. Regarding explanationism, concerns about the “neutrality” of historical evidence are ultimately indefeasible. Regarding entity realism, arguments for and against naturally dissolve into disputes about the reference of theoretical terms which are insulated from the details of cases. I conclude by suggesting that the morals of this discussion extend to other forms of selective realism, namely structural realism and semirealism

Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations from Art

Realists regarding scientific knowledge-those who think that our best scientific representations truly describe both observable and unobservable aspects of the world-have special need of a notion of approximate truth. Since theories and models are rarely considered true simpliciter, the realist requires some means of making sense of the claim that they may be false and yet close to the truth, and increasingly so over time. In this paper, I suggest that traditional approaches to approximate truth pay insufficient attention to an important distinction between two features of scientific knowledge, and that for each of them, analogies between representational practices in the sciences and in art prove useful to understanding how this situation can be remedied. First, I outline two distinct ways in which representations deviate from the truth, commonly referred to as "abstraction" and "idealization". Second, I argue that these practices exemplify different conventions of representation, and that for each, the conditions of approximation relevant to explicating the concept of approximate truth must be understood differently. The concept is thus heterogeneous; approximate truth is a virtue that is multiply realized, relative to different contexts of representation. This understanding is facilitated, I suggest, by considering the distinction between realistic and non-realistic representation in art

Last Chance Saloons for Natural Kind Realism

Traditionally, accounts of natural kinds have run the gamut from strongly conventionalist to strongly realist views. Recently, however, there has been a significant shift toward more conventionalist-sounding positions, even (perhaps especially) among philosophers interested in scientific classification. The impetus for this is a trend toward making anthropocentric features of categories, namely, capacities to facilitate human epistemic (and other) interests via inductive inference, central to an account of kinds. I argue that taking these features seriously is both defensible and compatible with conventionalism, but not compatible with a traditional realism about kinds specifically. Moreover, hopes of achieving compatibility by revising and extending kind realism—into what I call “hyperrealism”—face an insuperable dilemma. The news for realists is not all bad, however: though kind realism proves untenable, closely associated realisms underlying the objectivity of kind discourse may be viable nonetheless