Signaling strategic commitment for organizational transition: how to manage potential M&As through voluntary disclosures

To ‘transit or not’ often depends upon winning over investor opinion to large strategic initiatives. M&A is one such major realignment of an organization and yet once a bid for a company has been announced there is a period of uncertainty when the bid may not be completed. This depends on share price movements determined more by investor perceptions than fundamental values. This paper investigates whether these perceptions may be influenced by ‘voluntary’ corporate communications and so link managerial practices to strategic outcomes. Drawing upon two very large M&A data sets (USA and UK) (57,000 deals; 30,000 communications) we argue managerial practice (signaling strategic commitment) shapes market response and demonstrate communication characteristics, and the use of high-reputation intermediaries, play an important role in determining share price reaction

Bearing the risk : learning to be drier mid-river

This paper investigates learning related to the phenomena of drying over the past decade in the southern Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, as perceived in a mid-river site within the western Riverina of New South Wales, Australia. The insights from audio-recorded interviews, with a wide range of adults across the water-dependent community, mostly relate to the catchment of the&nbsp; Murrumbidgee River in the Shire of Hay. Our overarching theme is about how&nbsp; people are learning about, understanding and bearing the risks, of what is widely regarded as a prolonged drought. For some, the learning is about how to cope with less water in the Basin, and particularly from the river, as predicted in the climate change literature. Our narrative-based, empirical research registers the felt experience of those located, in situ, as a severe &lsquo;irrigation drought&rsquo; extends into 2009. The paper dramatises the many obstacles to learning how to think and act differently, in difficult and rapidly changing ecosocial circumstances.<br /

Why good things don’t happen:the micro-foundations of routines in the M&A process

Why do organizations reject favorable opportunities - why don't good things happen? To address this question, we examine companies that fail to proceed with major opportunities for strategic renewal. By focusing upon routines in 28 cases of reverse mergers and acquisitions decisions across three continents, the research uncovers the centrality of a hitherto overlooked process, the authorization routine. The characteristics of this routine, and its nested nature, are shown to be critical to whether favorable opportunities are progressed. These findings contribute to the mergers and acquisition literature by extending prior process models and to the routines literature by showing how links and interactions between different layers of routines, and the nature of the routine enactment itself, are important in affecting strategic outcomes

The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation

When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the interaction between a learner and agents in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to "trick" a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent's ability to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a positive classification, but is bound up in a complex web of social factors that affect her ability to pursue certain action responses. In this paper, we adapt models of strategic manipulation to capture dynamics that may arise in a setting of social inequality wherein candidate groups face different costs to manipulation. We find that whenever one group's costs are higher than the other's, the learner's equilibrium strategy exhibits an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon wherein the learner erroneously admits some members of the advantaged group, while erroneously excluding some members of the disadvantaged group. We also consider the effects of interventions in which a learner subsidizes members of the disadvantaged group, lowering their costs in order to improve her own classification performance. Here we encounter a paradoxical result: there exist cases in which providing a subsidy improves only the learner's utility while actually making both candidate groups worse-off--even the group receiving the subsidy. Our results reveal the potentially adverse social ramifications of deploying tools that attempt to evaluate an individual's "quality" when agents' capacities to adaptively respond differ.Comment: 29 pages, 4 figure