21 research outputs found
You play (an auction) only once
consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies consitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
You play (an action) only once
Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies consitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
You play (an action) only once
SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 1155 (97.10) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman
Gewalt gegen ältere Menschen
Gröning K, Lietzau Y. Gewalt gegen ältere Menschen. In: Aner K, Karl U, eds. Handbuch Soziale Arbeit und Alter. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag; 2010: 361-367