Post-strukturalistlik legitiimsuse „kontseptsioon”

Käesolev väitekiri käsitleb legitiimsuse kontseptsiooni. Töö eesmärgiks on jõuda dekonstruktiivse analüüsi kaudu nn. post-strukturalistliku legitiimsuse „kontseptsiooni“ sõnastamiseni. Põhitähelepanu koondub Jacques Derrida ja Hannah Arendti käsitlustele vabariikliku asutamisaktiga seonduvast „nõiaringi“ paradoksist. Võttes vaatluse alla teemad nagu vabariikliku asutamisakti loogika, performatiivide-konstatiivide eristus, vägivald, dekonstruktsiooni eetika ning analüüsides autorite nagu Hannah Arendt, John Austin, Jacques Derrida, Bonnie Honig, Walter Benjamin, Ernesto Laclau asjakohaseid tekste, näitab käesolev väitekiri, et legitiimsus töötab ühiskondlikul väljal nagu derridalik infrastruktuur – resigneerimine.This thesis is an investigation into the concept of legitimacy. It aims at formulating a post-structuralist concept of legitimacy by following a deconstructive analysis of two accounts of the “vicious circle” of the republican founding act of a state. These accounts belong to Jacques Derrida and Hannah Arendt. Addressing themes like the republican founding act, the performative-constative distinction, violence, ethics of deconstruction and analysing relevant texts of authors like Hannah Arendt, John Austin, Jacques Derrida, Bonnie Honig, Walter Benjamin, Ernesto Laclau, and others the thesis arrives at a “concept” of legitimacy that functions as a Derridean infrastructure – resigning

Legitimacy, Signature and Sovereignty in Derrida

Legitimacy is a concept that has been largely forgotten by the deconstructive discourse on law and politics. This article seeks, on the one hand, to reassess the role of legitimacy in deconstruction and, on the other hand, to bring deconstructive thinking to bear on the concept of legitimacy. By re-reading Derrida’s “Declarations of Independence” through the lenses of his later texts on sovereignty and (counter)signature, it is argued that, rather than being deconstructible, legitimacy is deconstructing any self-founding of law and power. As such, legitimacy functions not as an evaluative concept of law and order but as a constantly insisting demand that facilitates the principles of responsibility and responsiveness

Founding acts: Constitutional origins in a democratic age

Archived content may not be used for purposes that are intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation by means of sale, resale, licence, loan, transfer or any other form of commercial exploitationThe writing of this review was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 704479