Wages, Implicit Contracts, and the Business Cycle: Evidence from a European Panel

This paper examines the cyclical behavior of hours and wages in a unique panel of 11 European countries, and documents signi?cant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job, have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-speci?c productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with onesided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts.Business Cycles; Wage Rigidity; Implicit Contracts

Real wage growth over the business cycle:contractual versus spot markets

We study the wage growth of job stayers over the business cycle, and show that wage adjustments within a job spell display significant history dependence. This is at odds with the spot market model, which implies that the wage growth of a worker within a job spell depends solely on the change in the contemporaneous economic conditions. Instead, we find that workers hired during recessions, or those who experienced unfavorable economic conditions since they were hired, receive larger wage raises during expansions, and are subject to smaller wage cuts during downswings. The change in the contemporaneous conditions, on the other hand, is not a significant determinant of wage growth. Our findings are consistent with a model of implicit insurance contracts where neither the employer nor the worker can fully commit to the contract.Business Cycles,Wage Rigidity, Implicit Contracts, Cyclical Selection

Baby-boom, baby-bust and the Great Depression

The baby-boom and subsequent baby-bust have shaped much of the history of the second half of the 20th century; yet it is still largely unclear what caused them. This paper presents a new unified explanation of the fertility Boom-Bust that links the latter to the Great Depression and the subsequent economic recovery. We show that the 1929 Crash attracted young married women 20 to 34 years old in 1930 (whom we name D-cohort) in the labor market possibly via an added worker effect. Using several years of Census micro data, we further document that the same cohort kept entering into the market in the 1940s and 1950s as economic conditions improved, decreasing wages and reducing work incentives for younger women. Its retirement in the late 1950s and in the 1960s instead freed positions and created employment opportunities. Finally, we show that the entry of the D-cohort is associated with increased births in the 1950s, while its retirement turned the fertility Boom into a Bust in the 1960s. The work behavior of this cohort explains a large share of the changes in both yearly births and completed fertility of all cohorts involved

Real wage growth over the business cycle:contractual versus spot markets

We study the wage growth of job stayers over the business cycle, and show that wage adjustments within a job spell display significant history dependence. This is at odds with the spot market model, which implies that the wage growth of a worker within a job spell depends solely on the change in the contemporaneous economic conditions. Instead, we find that workers hired during recessions, or those who experienced unfavorable economic conditions since they were hired, receive larger wage raises during expansions, and are subject to smaller wage cuts during downswings. The change in the contemporaneous conditions, on the other hand, is not a significant determinant of wage growth. Our findings are consistent with a model of implicit insurance contracts where neither the employer nor the worker can fully commit to the contract

2011] Wages, Implicit Contracts, and the Business Cycle: Evidence from a European Panel, CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper

► We study the cyclical co-movement of hours and wages in Europe. ► Their behavior is consistent with the presence of implicit insurance contracts. ► The nature of the contracts depends on the country's labor market institutions. ► The elasticity of labor supply is much smaller compared to the U.S. labor market. a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market