Constructively tough? Neither side has committed to fully adopting perhaps the most important recommendation of the banking royal commission

Among the many recommendations of the banking Royal Commission was a Board of Oversight for the two regulators in charge of financial institutions; the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority: ASIC and APRA. Since then APRA\u27s own internal review conducted by deputy chairman John Lonsdale and NSW Supreme Court Judge Robert Austin, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission commissioner Sarah Court and UNSW professor Dimity Kingsford-Smith has found APRA to be soft on enforcement and timid by comparison to its international peers. Nonetheless, and to demonstrate that APRA still doesn\u27t get what it doesn\u27t get, its chairman used Tuesday\u27s release of the review to announce a new mantra. From now on, APRA is to be: constructively tough

The four methods of financial system regulation: An international comparative survey

This article provides a description of the four methods of financial system regulation currently in use internationally, with case studies illustrating each system. Analysis is provided of the strengths and weaknesses of each. Research indicates that the Twin Peaks system is superior to its peers. However, this article also concludes, by reference to failings observed in Twin Peaks arrangements to date, that Twin Peaks alone is no panacea against financial crises, or market and consumer abuse. It is merely the best form of regulatory architecture. Other factors, such as the capacity and willingness of the regulators to discharge their mandate, even within a sound regulatory architecture, are as important to the success of financial system regulation, as evidenced by the failures in the United Kingdom around the time of the global financial crisis, and as evidenced by the success of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, despite Singapore\u27s sub-optimal regulatory structure

Financial services need to wake up to fact that treating customers well is good business

South Africa\u27s regulatory regime for the financial services sector is going through major changes. The question is whether companies can adapt to a principles-based approach. Or will they default back to rules-based compliance during the implementation of the Conduct of Financial Institutions Act? The aim of the new law is to improve financial sector conduct and ensure fairer outcomes, particularly for customers

Financial Regulatory Governance in South Africa: The Move towards Twin Peaks

The Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation calls for the establishment of two, independent, peak regulatory bodies, one charged with ensuring safety and soundness in the financial system, the other with preventing market misconduct and the abuse of consumers in the financial sector. For reasons discussed elsewhere,\u27 of the four models of financial system regulation,2 Twin Peaks is regarded as best suited to this task. The Twin Peaks model in general-and elements of the Australian version of Twin Peaks in particular-is currently undergoing implementation in South Africa. This article explores issues related to that implementation from the perspective of governance as it is employed in Australia. The article commences with a discussion and an analysis of the historical development of Twin Peaks, followed by a discussion of governance. Next is an analysis of key differences between Twin Peaks in Australia and Twin Peaks as it is to be deployed in South Africa. Finally there are concluding observations

Twin Peaks: An Analysis of the Australian Architecture

This article provides an analysis of the Australian \u27Twin Peaks\u27 model of financial system regulation. It does so by examining the theoretical underpinnings of Twin Peaks, and investigates the crucial question of the jurisdictional location of the prudential regulator. This includes a description of how Twin Peaks functions and its strengths and weaknesses. The article argues that while Twin Peaks is the best solution to the problem of regulating for financial system stability and consumer protection, it is nonetheless imperfect to the task, and susceptible to failures

Curbing reckless and predatory lending: A statutory analysis of South Africa\u27s National Credit Act

This article provides a statement and an analysis of South Africa\u27s statutory provisions aimed at curbing reckless lending, and preventing predatory lending, to financial consumers. The focus of the article is on the statutory mechanisms for combatting reckless and predatory lending, including a critique of the success or otherwise of the implementation of the relevant legislation. The article aims to provide a comparative analysis of what is, overall, an innovative and effective regime, the aim of which is to protect vulnerable financial consumers from reckless and predatory lending practices. As such, it is hoped, that the article will provide useful techniques for the protection of borrowers in other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, or indeed wherever vulnerable consumers of finance are liable to be exploited

AMP doesn\u27t just have a women problem. It has an everyone problem

The sexual harassment scandal enveloping AMP is another graceless turn in what looks like the death spiral of one of Australia\u27s oldest and formerly most trusted companies

Retail market conduct reforms in South Africa under Twin Peaks

This article examines retail market regulatory reforms currently underway, as part of the implementation of a Twin Peaks regulatory model in South Africa. A brief account is provided of the history of these reforms, followed by an analysis of the normative goals put in place for a new market conduct and consumer protection regime; and the developmental needs that inform those goals. Thereafter the article explores the inter-relationship between the existing credit regulator and the soon to be established Financial Sector Conduct Authority. An analysis is then provided of accountability mechanisms, as well as failures exhibited by those mechanisms in the UK and Australia. Finally an argument is made for a regulator for the regulators , in order to address past regulatory failures

Financial Sector Regulation Bill in South Africa, Second Draft: Lessons from Australia

The proposed reforms to financial regulation in South Africa, as embodied in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (second draft, 10 December 2014) (\u27the FSR Bill\u27), available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/2014%2012%2011%20FSRB%20including%20Consequential%20Amendments%20and%2OMemo%20ofo200bjects.pdf), represent the most important reforms to South Africa\u27s financial regulatory architecture since the 1987 De Kock Commission. The degree to which these reforms succeed will determine the extent to which South Africa can maintain financial stability, and manage the effects of a future financial crisis

Protection of Financial Consumers in Australia

Financial consumers are defined by s 12BC of the ASIC Act (Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No. 51 of 2001, (Australia).) as consumers of services worth less than AUD 40,000.00, (S 12BC (1)(a)) or if worth more, then ‘of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption’ (S 12BC (1)(b)); or if the services are for use or consumption in connection with a small business, (Defined in s 12BC (2) as employing less than 100 people if it engages in manufacturing, or otherwise less than 20 people.) and cost more than AUD 40,000.00, ordinarily acquired for business use or consumption (S 12BC (1)(c).)