Estimation of Several Political Action Effects of Energy Prices

One important effect of price shocks in the United States has been increased political attention paid to the structure and performance of oil and natural gas markets, along with some governmental support for energy conservation. This paper describes how price changes helped lead the emergence of a political agenda accompanied by several interventions, as revealed through Granger causality tests on change in the legislative agenda.Comment: 25 pages, 2 figures, 2 table

Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI

Few issues are more contentious for local communities than industrial pollution. When local industries pollute, lawmakers and regulators must balance two primary concerns: economic prosperity and the environment. The role of political pressure is well-documented in environmental policy. What is less clear is the role jurisdictional or boundary considerations play in determining the implementation of environmental laws. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local regulators are more lenient in their treatment of polluters when the incidence of pollution falls partially on those outside the state. One explanation for such behavior is that regulators take actions to maximize political support. This paper tests this jurisdictional model using Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data from 1987 to 1996. We find that facilities’ emissions into the air and water are systematically higher in counties that border other states. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that jurisdictional considerations are an important determinant of pollution incidence.

Multiparty Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A Model Based on Multinomial Probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and postelection coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/116246/1/pc98.pd

The Ratio of Total to Selective Extinction Toward Baade's Window

We measure the ratio of total to selective extinction, R_{VI}=A_V/E(V-I), toward Baade's Window by comparing the VIK colors of 132 Baade's Window G and K giants from Tiede, Frogel, & Terndrup with the solar-neighborhood (V-I),(V-K) relation from Bessell & Brett. We find R_{VI}=2.283 +/- 0.016, and show that our measurement has no significant dependence on stellar type from G0 to K4. Adjusting the Paczynski et al. determination of the centroid of the dereddened Baade's Window clump for this revised value of $R_{VI}$, we find I_{0,RC}=14.43 and (V-I)_{0,RC}=1.058. This implies a distance to the Baade's Window clump of d_{BW} = 8.63 +/- 0.16 kpc, where the error bar takes account of statistical but not systematic uncertainties.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure, submitted to Ap