Is housing the business cycle? evidence from U.S. cities

We analyze the relationship between housing and the business cycle in a set of 36 US cities. Most surprisingly, we find that falls in house prices are often not followed by declines in employment. We also find that the leading indicator property of residential investment is not consistent across cities and that, at the national level, the leading indicator property of residential investment is not robust to including financial factors as control variables.Housing ; Housing - Prices ; Business cycles

Differences in subprime loan pricing across races and neighborhoods

We investigate whether race and ethnicity influenced subprime loan pricing during 2005, the peak of the subprime mortgage expansion. We combine loan-level data on the performance of non-prime securitized mortgages with individual- and neighborhood- level data on racial and ethnic characteristics for metropolitan areas in California and Florida. Using a model of rate determination that accounts for predicted loan performance, we evaluate the differences in subprime mortgage rates in terms of racial and ethnic groups and neighborhood characteristics. We find evidence of adverse pricing for blacks and Hispanics. The evidence of adverse pricing is strongest for purchase mortgages and mortgages originated by non-depository institutions.Subprime mortgage; Housing policy; Discrimination in mortgage loans

Deterring default: why some state laws decrease the probability of mortgage foreclosures

Many states give mortgage lenders strong legal means by which to pursue debt collection in the event of a mortgage default. In those states, probability of default is lower and the forms the default takes are often quite different from a costly conventional foreclosure.Consumer finance ; Financial institutions ; Mortgage loans

Securitization and Mortgage Renegotiation: Evidence from the Great Depression

We use loan-level data from the New York City metropolitan area to examine the extent to which lenders attempted to prevent foreclosures with concessionary modifications during the Great Depression. We find no principal forgiveness in the sample and only a handful of concessionary mortgage modifications of other types. Far more mortgages terminated through foreclosure than received any sort of concessionary modification. The results indicate that there are significant impediments to renegotiation of residential mortgages beyond securitization. As such, less renegotiation seems unlikely to be a major cost of securitization of residential mortgages. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Essays in monetary economics

In chapter 1, I generate priors for a VAR from a standard RBC model, an RBC model with capital adjustment costs and habit formation, and a sticky price model with an unaccommodating monetary authority. The response of hours worked to a TFP shock differs sharply across these models. I compare the accuracy of the forecasts made with each of the resulting VARs. The economic models generate similar forecast errors to one another. However, the models generally yield forecasts that are quite competitive both with those made using an unrestricted VAR and with those made using a VAR with shrinkage from a Minnesota prior. In chapter 2, I look at the reaction of stock markets to macroeconomic news. It is well known that U.S. monetary policy is well-approximated by a Taylor rule. This suggests a reason why good macroeconomic news sometimes depresses equity returns: good news about the real side of the economy implies tighter future monetary policy. I test this hypothesis by assessing the effect of news on equity returns after controlling for changes in expectations of future monetary policy using Fed Funds Futures data. The results do not support the theory. Furthermore, the negative response of stock markets to unanticipated inflation is unchanged by controlling for changes in monetary policy expectations. In chapter 3, I ask why monetary contractions have strong effects on the housing market. The chapter presents a model with staggered housing adjustment in which monetary policy has real effects in the absence of any rigidity in producer pricing or wages. Limited participation in financial markets leads to a rise in the real mortgage rate following an increase in the nominal short rate. Since households must take on a mortgage to consume housing, the rise in the real interest rate reduces the share of residential investment in outpu

Recourse and residential mortgage default: theory and evidence from U.S. states

We analyze the impact of lender recourse on mortgage defaults theoretically and empirically across U.S. states. We study the effect of state laws regarding deficiency judgments in a model where lenders can use the threat of a deficiency judgment to deter default or to shorten the default process. Empirically, we find that recourse decreases the probability of default when there is a substantial likelihood that a borrower has negative home equity. We also find that, in states that allow deficiency judgments, defaults are more likely to occur through a lender-friendly procedure, such as a deed in lieu of foreclosure.Mortgage loans

Is housing the business cycle? Evidence from US cities

In a recent paper, Leamer (2007) identified housing as an important precursor of the national business cycle. Previous work, on the other hand, has shown that regional cycles may not be synchronous with the aggregate cycle. In this paper, we analyze the relationship between housing and the business cycle at the MSA-level for a set of 51 US cities. We find that declines in house prices are often not followed by declines in that city's employment. While the growth rates in housing variables appeared to slow ahead of city-level peaks, we find no consistent statistical relationship suggesting a city's permits or prices influences its business cycle. In fact, we find that national permits are a better leading indicator for a city's employment than a city's own permits. This suggest the possibility that housing is merely a proxy for other consumption or wealth indicators.Markov switching Time varying transition probabilities Leading indicator Recession

cleared with the author or authors. Differences in Subprime Loan Pricing Across Races and Neighborhoods ˚

The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should b