6,752 research outputs found
Information Congestion: open access in a two-sided market
Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. âJunkâ mail, âspamâ e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.information overload, congestion, advertising, common property resource, two-sided markets, junk mail, email, telemarketing, Do Not Call List, message pricing policy.
MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit and Stiglitz when firms sell several products. Both products and firms are envisaged as di?erentiated. We propose a nested demand model where consumers decide upon a firm then which variant to buy, and use it to determine the marketâs biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates overentry. The results extend to generalized nested CES models.Multiproduct firms, excess variety, nested demand, product line competition
Information Congestion
Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. ?Junk? mail, ?spam? e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message beneĂt. Senders are motivated by proĂts. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs are moderate. The medium is the message with multiple channels, and there is excessive indiscriminate mailing.information overload, congestion, advertising, common property resource, overĂshing, two-sided markets, junk mail, email, telemarketing, Do Not Call List, message pricing, the Medium is the Message, market research.
Information Congestion
Advertising messages vie for scarce attention. âJunkâ mail, âspamâ e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.
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