From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure

Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers.

Specialisation : pro and anti-globalizing 1990-2002

Specialization alters the incidence of trade costs to buyers and sellers, with pro-and anti-globalizing effects on 76 countries from 1990-2002. The structural gravity model yields measures of Constructed Home Bias and the Total Factor Productivity effect of changing incidence. A bit more than half the world's countries experience declining constructed home bias and rising real output while the remainder of countries experi- ence rising home bias and falling real output. The effects are big for the outliers. A novel test of the structural gravity model restrictions shows it comes very close in an economic sense

Political Pressure Deflection

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias: An Empirical Investigation

Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce trade. This paper estimates the reduction, using a structural model of import demand in which transactions costs impose a price markup on traded goods. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade far more than tariffs do. We also find that omitting indexes of institutional quality from the model leads to an underestimate of home bias. Using a broad sample of countries, we find that the traded goods expenditure share declines significantly as income per capita rises, other things equal. Cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions offers a simple explanation of the observed global pattern of trade, in which high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with one another.

Specialisation: Pro and Anti-Globalizing 1990-2002

Specialization alters the incidence of trade costs to buyers and sellers, with pro-and anti-globalizing effects on 76 countries from 1990-2002. The structural gravity model yields measures of Constructed Home Bias and the Total Factor Productivity effect of changing incidence. A bit more than half the world's countries experience declining constructed home bias and rising real output while the remainder of countries experience rising home bias and falling real output. The effects are big for the outliers. A novel test of the structural gravity model restrictions shows it comes very close in an economic sense.

Evaluating public expenditures when governments must rely on distortionary taxation

Anderson and Martin provide simple, robust rules for evaluating public spending in distorted economies. Their analysis integrates, within a clean unified framework, previous treatments of project evaluation as special cases. In this paper, the authors use a general system of fiscal accounting for marginal changes in the provision of public that allows them to account for various approaches to the funding of government projects. They obtain two key results that seem likely to be useful for project evaluation. Firstly, the shadow prices of traded (as well as non-traded) goods are not generally equal to their world prices, but differ from world prices by an amount that depends upon the impact of the project on government revenues and on the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF). Secondly, the costs of a government project need to be adjusted by the Marginal Cost of Funds before being compared with the benefits accruing from the project. The analysis leads to operational rules for project evaluation that are only slightly more complex than the border pricing rule. To conduct the analysis, the authors utilize a framework that makes explicit the role of government in providing public goods and services subject to a budget constraint. They consider first in Section 1 a general welfare analysis of the provision of a public good which is purchased from the rest of the world and paid for out of distortionary tax revenue. In Section 2 they consider the nature of the resulting shadow prices in more detail. In Section 3 the authors consider the role of the MCF in evaluating the cost of project inputs. Section 4 deals with user charges for public goods, which are of course only feasible when such goods are excludable. Section 5 places the results in the context of the earlier literature in order to clarify the relationship between their results and those obtained by earlier authors. Section 6 provides some simple numerical examples to highlight the potential importance allowing for the costs of raising funds.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Welfare vs. Market Access: The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

We show that the effects of tariff changes on welfare and import volume can be fully characterized by their effects on the generalized mean and variance of the tariff distribution. Using these tools, we derive new results for welfare- and market-access-improving tariff changes, which imply two 'cones of liberalization' in price space. Because welfare is negatively but import volume positively related to the generalized variance, the cones do not intersect, which poses a dilemma for trade policy reform. Finally, we show that generalized and trade-weighted moments are mutually proportional when the trade expenditure function is CES.

Domestic distortions and international trade

Trade is affected not only by taxes and subsidies that affect producers and consumers of goods, but also, indirectly, by taxes and subsidies that affect nontraded goods or factors of production. The authors show how the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) may be extended to incorporate these types of distortions. Again, the value of the TRI gives the equiproportionate change in the prices of traded goods, which would compensate for a given change in all distortions, both in traded and nontraded goods and in factor markets. The authors, who developed the theory of the TRI, show how to apply it in practice, drawing on a larger study by Anderson and Bannister of changes in Mexican agricultural policy between 1985 and 1989. Adapting the TRI to a partial equilibrium context allows existing estimates of key demand and supply elasticities to be incorporated into the Index; and the basic formula is adapted to take account of some special features of Mexican agricultural markets. The TRI shows a great increase in restrictiveness in 1986 and especially 1987, followed by major reductions in restrictiveness in 1988 and 1989. The cumulative effect: a 49.9 percent fall in trade restrictiveness over the four years. The major, although not the only, source of changes in trade restrictiveness were changes in producer subsidies, especially for maize. These trends are not captured by changes in indices for consumer and producer subsidy equivalents, which the authors also present. Indeed, in a number of years at least one of the ad hoc indices changed in the opposite direction to the change in the corresponding welfare-based index.Access to Markets,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Markets and Market Access,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

Trade Costs

This paper surveys the measurement of trade costs --- what we know, and what we don't know but may usefully attempt to find out. Partial and incomplete data on direct measures of costs go together with inference on implicit costs from trade flows and prices. Total trade costs in rich countries are large. The ad valorem tax equivalent is about 170% when pushing the data very hard. Poor countries face even higher trade costs. There is a lot of variation across countries and across goods within countries, much of which makes economic sense. Theory looms large in our survey, providing interpretation and perspective on the one hand and suggesting improvements for the future on the other hand. Some new results are presented to apply and interpret gravity theory properly and to handle aggregation appropriately.