

This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy

Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Baldwin, editor

Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press, 1991

Volume ISBN: 0-226-03569-7

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/bald91-1>

Conference Date: March 16-17, 1990

Publication Date: January 1991

Chapter Title: The Coefficient of Trade Utilization: The Cheese Case

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Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6716>

Chapter pages in book: (p. 221 - 244)

The Coefficient of Trade Utilization: The Cheese Case

James E. Anderson

It has long been recognized that the opportunity to trade is a technology, but it has not been possible to compare trading efficiency across time and space in the manner of the productivity literature. Anderson and Neary (1989) provide a rigorous general equilibrium theory of index numbers for quotas, the coefficient of trade utilization, which is the basis for intertemporal (and international) comparisons of trade restrictiveness. This paper further develops the new index and demonstrates its operation and significance to the partial equilibrium evaluation of U.S. cheese import policy from 1964 to 1979.

There are three accomplishments. First, the operationality of the new index is established. Second, the time-series analysis of restrictiveness of the quota system reveals that the coefficient of trade utilization and the standard average tariff-equivalent measure of restrictiveness yield opposite implications in over half the observations. The coefficient of trade utilization reveals wide fluctuations in restrictiveness dominated by a significant reduction in the coefficient of trade utilization (a tightening of the average effective quota), at an average annual rate of (minus) 14 percent per year. The conventional measure, a trade-weighted average of tariff equivalents, rises by an average of 4 percent per year, which is very roughly consistent with the average quota change and the aggregate price elasticity of -3.5 reported in Anderson (1983). In contrast, in eight out of the fifteen years, the average tariff equivalent moved in the same direction as the coefficient of trade utilization; that is, it had opposite implications for the direction of restrictiveness. Third, the use of the new index is shown to make a considerable difference to the interpretation of quota reform. The new method reveals a different structure than was shown in the Anderson (1985) study of the inefficiency of the U.S. cheese quota allocation

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policy, which distributes imports on a by-commodity-by-country basis.¹ The reform reallocates the quota to equalize the unit rent subject to the same aggregate import of cheese. In the earlier study, the gain from an efficient policy was calculated to be about 15 percent of base expenditure on imported cheese, which was about 30 percent of the total gain possible from a move to free trade. Using the new method of evaluation, the reform is equivalent to a 90 percent increase in the average quota, which in turn is about 25 percent of the increase implied by a return to free trade. Also, using evaluation methods ill-suited to the comparison, the earlier study showed that the efficiency gain from a commodity reallocation with country allocations frozen was 1.8 percent of the gain from a reallocation over both commodities and countries. In the present study, commodity reallocation alone picks up 15.6 percent of the gain from a full reallocation, nearly an order of magnitude more.

In a world where the only trade distortions are tariffs or subsidies, comparisons of protection levels over time and space appear simple. A rough measure of the trend in protectionism or liberalization is seen in the time series of the trade-weighted average tariff or subsidy, while a cross section of average tariffs compares national distortions. Despite the common use of such measures, economists have long realized that their comparability is unfounded, as is the use of trade weights. The proliferation of nontariff barriers in the past twenty years has made it especially important to arrive at a full theory of index numbers for trade distortions, since the methods to be used when new distortions are introduced are unknown, as are the appropriate weights. Using the methods illustrated below, proper indices of partial and overall trading efficiency can be constructed for use in international trade negotiations and reform evaluations. The present paper is confined to quota evaluation albeit in the presence of tariffs (but see Anderson and Neary (1991) for development of tariff and tariff cum quota indices).

If a single quota is to be evaluated, its restrictiveness could be measured by the rate of contraction of quantity below the free trade level or by the rate of increase of price above the free trade level (the tariff equivalent of the quota). With several quotas, the index number problem arises: What average quantity restriction or price increase represents the restrictiveness of the system? The coefficient of trade utilization is a solution to the index number problem. It is defined to be the *uniform* contraction factor applied to free trade quantities which is equivalent in welfare to the actual quota vector. The general equilibrium structure of the trading economy provides the weights to be used in constructing this index, and these turn out to be operational.

Current methods of evaluation require information on quota premia, an elasticity of import demand, and the trade data. The new method uses only these data and a new variable indicating the share of quota rents transferred to

1. In 1980, a partial reform allowed national cheese quotas to be shifted across cheese categories.

foreigners. Quota rents are usually shared, and the rent retention rate is important; the cheese results show that including it alters the reform evaluation measure by 40 percent. Since rent retention will be needed in any correct analysis, the new measure places no added burden on the empirical worker; it is a practical measure. However, to evaluate quotas, it is critical to obtain information on the notoriously elusive quota premia.

Section 8.1 reviews the coefficient of trade utilization concept, following Anderson and Neary (1989, 1991), and presents some extensions. Section 8.2 reviews the structure of U.S. cheese imports, very closely following Anderson (1985). Section 8.3 presents the results of applying the new concept to the U.S. cheese market. Section 8.4 concludes with suggestions for further work.

8.1 The Coefficient of Trade Utilization

This section reviews the coefficient of trade utilization concept of Anderson and Neary in 8.1.1, and applies it by (1) spelling out a partial equilibrium version and (2) extending its use to time-series evaluations in the manner of the productivity literature. Section 8.1.2 makes clear the relative advantage of the coefficient of trade utilization over previous methods.

8.1.1 Review

The coefficient of trade utilization is the *uniform* contraction factor applied to free trade quantities (or any reform quantities) which is equivalent in welfare to the actual quota vector (see eq. [5] below). This is also the ratio of the shadow value of the new quota bundle—the free trade bundle—to the shadow value of quotas needed to maintain the initial level of welfare. Anderson and Neary identify the proper weights and thus provide a rigorous foundation for distortion averages, such as have been attempted without an adequate theory in the form of tariff averages.²

It is necessary to be precise about the sense in which the distortion index values are comparable internationally or intertemporally. Ordinal utilities are not comparable. A legitimate comparison of the effect of distortions can nevertheless be made. Suppose a trade reform improves the efficiency of trade utilization by more in country A than country B. Then country B would have a greater real income increase if it reduced trade distortion at the rate of country A, while country A would have a smaller real income increase if it cut trade distortion at the rate of country B.

Anderson and Neary (1989) deal with a general equilibrium measure that incorporates all quotas, but it is possible to restrict the set of instruments to those regarded as feasible to reform in a trade negotiation. The present paper defines a partial coefficient of trade utilization for trade reform in one sector and applies it to cheese. Partial distance measures of distortion are of course

2. Anderson and Neary (1991) provide a version for tariffs as well.

subject to the difficulty that welfare may not always increase with a cut in the distortion.³

The coefficient of trade utilization will be defined in three stages. First, the Dixit and Norman (1980) textbook description of a distorted trading equilibrium is amended to allow quotas with rent sharing. Second, the distorted trading equilibrium implicitly relates a utility level for the representative consumer to the quota levels. This relation is made explicit in the distorted trade utility function. Finally, Deaton's (1979) distance function concept is used to relate a reform value of the quota to the current level of the distorted trade utility function. This is the coefficient of trade utilization.

The foundation is the trade expenditure function $E(p, \tau, u)$, where p is the domestic price vector of quantity-constrained trade, π is the domestic price vector of unconstrained trade, and u is the utility level of the representative consumer. Shepard's Lemma implies that the desired trade quantities (excess demands) are E_p for the constrained goods and $E\pi$ for the unconstrained goods. A fundamental requirement of trade equilibrium is the external budget constraint, with the simplest textbook case arising with free and balanced trade: $E(p, \pi, u) = 0$. For distorted trade, the external budget constraint is in external prices, p^* and π^* , differing from p and π . Thus

$$(1) \quad E(p, \pi, u) - (1 - \omega)[p - p^*]Q - tE_\pi(p, \pi, u) = R,$$

where R is a net deficit or surplus (equal to zero in the textbook case), t is the specific tax vector for the unconstrained goods (equal to $\pi - \pi^*$, where π^* is the foreign price), Q is the quota vector, and ω is the fraction of the quota rent transferred to foreigners. The term $(1 - \omega)[p - p^*]Q$ is the quota rent retained at home, while $tE\pi$ is the tariff revenue. Equation (1) implies that net trade expenditure in domestic price equals the transfer R plus the tariff revenue plus the retained quota rent. The quantity constraints imply market clearing relations

$$(2) \quad E_p(p, \pi, u) = Q.$$

The system of equation (1)–(2) defines the equilibrium domestic price vector p and the equilibrium utility u as functions of the trade distortions Q , ω , and t and of the exogenous net surplus R .

Anderson and Neary (1989) build a general equilibrium basis for reform evaluation setting R equal to zero. The distorted trade utility function is defined implicitly as the level of utility attained when (1)–(2) hold in equilibrium:

$$(3) \quad v(Q; t, \omega, p^*, \pi^*, R) \equiv \{ U \mid E(p, \pi, u) - (1 - \omega)[p - p^*]Q - tE_\pi(p, \pi, u) = R, E_p(p, \pi, u) = Q, \pi = \pi^* + t \}.$$

3. The difficulty is reduced but not eliminated when the full distance measure is used.

The derivatives of this function with respect to the policy variables Q are developed in Anderson and Neary (1989). In particular, v_Q is proportional to the general equilibrium shadow price of a quota, ρ . A very important special case for practical work, illustrated in the application below, is implicit separability:

$$E(p, \pi, u) = \xi(\phi(p, u), \eta(\pi, u), u),$$

where ϕ and η are subexpenditure functions for the quota and nonquota goods, respectively. In this case, Anderson and Neary (1992) show that the shadow price of quotas has the particularly simple form:

$$(4) \quad \rho = (1 - \omega)[p - p^*] - \frac{\omega}{\epsilon} p - \tau p,$$

where ϵ is the aggregate elasticity of demand for the constrained group and τ is the import-weighted average ad valorem tariff on the unconstrained goods.

For the present paper it is not necessary to consider the derivatives v , since “other tariffs” are assumed to be fixed. But it is necessary to extend Anderson and Neary’s (1989) measure to the case where some quotas (such as those on textiles) are not under control or study. This is easy, since under separability (4) continues to hold for any single quota. Let Q denote the focus group of quotas, and let X denote all other quotas; $v(Q \cdot)$ becomes temporarily $v(Q, X, \cdot)$, and the vector ρ has elements restricted to those dual to Q . Thus there is no extra generality in carrying around terms in X . If separability does not hold (i.e., suppose the X goods enter via a subexpenditure function such that there is a difference in the cross-price elasticities between Q and Z on the one hand and between X and Z on the other hand), the formula analogous to (4) contains in addition a composition effect term driven by the difference in cross-price elasticities. This possibility is suppressed below due to lack of information and a belief that it is not a significant source of bias.

Now the coefficient of trade utilization can be defined. Figure 8.1 illustrates it for the case of two quotas. The term $v(Q_1, Q_2, \dots) = u$ is an indifference curve in the quota space, with the subscript denoting an element of the quota vector, $Q' = (Q_1, Q_2)$. (Ignore the K and L labels on the two axes and the y label on the indifference curve at this point.) Point A is a quota point not on the indifference curve, possibly associated with a reform. Following Deaton (1979), point A is evaluated relative to the quota setting necessary to maintain u by using the distance function: the radial expansion or contraction necessary to move from A onto the indifference curve. On the diagram, the scalar factor Δ equal to OA/OB is the distance measure of the value of point A : the coefficient of trade utilization.

An alternative equivalent definition is important for interpretation and empirical work. Note that at B , there is a supporting “budget” plane tangent to the indifference curve there. Its slope is equal to minus the ratio of the shadow prices of the quotas, and the value of the budget is the shadow value of dis-




Fig. 8.1 The distance function

torted trade which supports u . The shadow value of the quota bundle at A is represented on figure 8.1 by a plane through A with slope equal to the slope of the indifference curve at B . The alternative definition of the coefficient of trade utilization is the shadow value of the bundle at A relative to the shadow value of distorted trade necessary to support u . Intuitively, a higher budget implies a potential increase in welfare.

For perspective, it is important to relate the coefficient of trade utilization to two other literatures. First, the theory of trade distortions, following Meade, essentially explored conditions under which the budget line could be shown to shift out. The shadow price of quotas result (4) is in that spirit: a rise in an element of the quota vector raises the budget line if the shadow price is positive. The post-Meade literature, reflecting its theoretical orientation, was not concerned with scaling the shift. Practically oriented approaches to trade policy require comparability of one shift with another, however, and thus the applied literature has made do with inappropriate scaling factors. Since the shadow prices are determined only up to a factor of proportionality, the scaling factor can be called a normalization. The coefficient of trade utilization defines an appropriate normalization and thus opens the way to comparability.

Second, in sharp contrast, the theory of productivity measurement from its inception has been empirically oriented and has always used what are now known to be distance function methods. Thus on figure 8.1 the axes can be relabeled with the inputs K and L on the axes, and the contour can be an isoquant: $y = f(K, L)$. Point A is an inefficient point (using outmoded technology, or reflecting some inefficiency due to policy). The scale factor $T = OB/OA$ represents the factor by which the input bundle at A can be shrunk and still maintain output of y . The slope of the isoquant at B represents minus the ratio of the factor prices and the level of the budget line the minimum cost.

The distance measure of technical efficiency is the ratio of the cost associated with A to the minimum cost needed to produce y . The main practical use of T is in its rate of change form

$$\hat{T} = \hat{y} - (\alpha\hat{K} + (1 - \alpha)\hat{L}),$$

where \hat{T} is the famous rate of growth of total factor productivity, \hat{y} is the rate of change of output, α is the competitive cost share of payments to K , $(1 - \alpha)$ is the cost share of payments to L , and \hat{K}, \hat{L} are the input rates of change.

Now consider the connection of the two uses of the distance concept. In levels, the same operation (inverted, reflecting the difference between consumption of Q_1 and Q_2 and input demand for K, L) obviously defines both. The practical use of T is in its rate of change form, where the shares and the input rates of change are observable.⁴ The coefficient of trade utilization has an entirely analogous rate of change form developed below, where the role of competitive cost share is taken by "shadow value of quotas share." Using equation (4), these also are observable, as are the \hat{Q} s.⁵ The same techniques and means of interpreting and comparing total factor productivity growth rates are thus immediately available for interpreting and comparing the rate of change of trading efficiency as measured by the coefficient of trade utilization.

To return to a formal development of the coefficient of trade utilization, the distance in Q space from an arbitrary bundle Q to an arbitrary general equilibrium utility contour $v(\cdot) = u$ is its basis. Paralleling Hicks, there are "compensating variation" (the distance from the new bundle to the old utility contour) and "equivalent variation" (the distance from the old bundle to the new contour) measures of the total trade inefficiency. I assume $v_\Delta = -v_Q'Q/\Delta^2$ is negative.⁶ First, the compensating variation form of the coefficient of trade utilization is implicitly defined as the value of Δ such that

$$(5) \quad v(Q^1/\Delta, \omega; t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = u^0.$$

Δ exceeds unity for a reform in restricted trade when Q^1 is the new trade bundle and u^0 is the old trade utility (associated with trade restraint Q^0). Δ is

4. Strictly speaking, the distance operation picks up technical efficiency change only for fixed factor prices. When factor prices vary, it is necessary to use for \hat{K}, \hat{L} that portion of the change in input usage that is econometrically explained by changes in the factor prices. The residual changes in factor usage (in an estimated factor demand system) are the "factor augmentation rates." \hat{T} is alternately the share-weighted average of the factor augmentation rates.

5. A careful reader, in light of the previous note, will observe that the coefficient of trade utilization could claim a greater degree of accuracy than the standard productivity measure. The \hat{Q} s are directly measured, while the input rate of change residuals needed for productivity measurement reflect measurement error, misspecification of all sorts, estimation bias, and so forth. Much of the last thirty years of the productivity literature is devoted to explaining the residual in terms of underlying elements, a development that is entirely bypassed here.

6. The assumption that the shadow value of trade distortions be positive is analogous to a more familiar condition that trade revenue be positive but is more restrictive. The distance function method could still be used when v_Δ can change sign, but considerable care must be taken to avoid regions where Δ cannot be defined, as well as the obvious issues with multiple solutions.

equal to 1 when Q^1 is equal to Q^0 . Δ bears a close relation to Debreu's coefficient of resource utilization, hence its name. Second, the equivalent variation form is implicitly defined as the value of Δ^* such that

$$(6) \quad v(Q^0/\Delta^*, \omega; t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = u^*$$

for some arbitrary feasible reform utility u^* . Defining Δ^* in this way implies that a value less than one is a welfare improving reform.⁷ The equivalent variation measure Δ^* is in principle superior to Δ because of its transitivity property. It is a "quota-metric" utility function since it compares the new utility level to the old bundle Q^0 and, due to ordinality, Δ^*_u can be set equal to 1. The compensating variation measure need not be transitive, but it is more practical since it compares the new bundle to the old utility, whereas the equivalent variation requires using the complete general equilibrium model to compute the new level of real income. Transitivity of Δ is guaranteed in the special case of homothetic preferences (see Chipman and Moore 1980), which obtains in the application below. In the remainder of this discussion I stick to the compensating variation form. Equation (5) uses the bundle Q^1 as a reference, standing for a reformed Q , with rises in Δ measuring improvements in the efficiency of utilization of the trade opportunity. For a reform going all the way to free trade, Q^1 is equal to the free trade bundle.

From its implicit solution in (5), Δ is homogeneous of degree one in Q , and it has derivatives proportional to the shadow price of quotas vector, ρ . This allows a further refinement, following Deaton. The alternative measure of Δ suggested by figure 8.1 is the shadow value of Q relative to the shadow value of distorted trade needed to support u . How is the normalization factor, the denominator of the distance measure, to be defined? An "expenditure function" is suggested by the diagram: the Q bundle can be regarded as the "shadow-expenditure-minimizing" selection of Q subject to given shadow prices ρ and given u . If v is quasi-concave in Q , this is unexceptionable. Unfortunately, as is well known, v need not always be quasi-concave in Q . A further hypothesis of "efficient protection" might then be applied to rule out selection of points in Q space which are in the nonconcave portions of the indifference curves. Let G be the minimum value of distorted trade revenue:

$$(7) \quad G(\rho, u; \omega, t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = \min_Q \{ \rho' Q \mid v(Q, \omega; t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = u \}.$$

$G(\cdot)$ has all the standard expenditure function properties in ρ . Dual to G is a distance function (Deaton 1979):

7. Δ^* can be used for partial reform evaluation, but it is not generally defined in the move all the way to free trade, since Q^0 is not generally a radial contraction of the free trade trade vector. (The two measures are trivially identical in the two good case.) This means that v_u^* passes through zero somewhere, violating the assumption needed for use of the implicit function theorem. Stern (1986) discusses similar problems which arise when the distance function is used in consumer theory with labor supply as a choice variable.

$$(8) \quad \Delta(Q, u; \omega, t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = \min_p \{p'Q \mid G(p, u; \omega, t, p^*, \pi^*, R) = 1\},$$

where $G(\cdot) = 1$ is the normalization rule for quota shadow prices. Due to its derivation in (8), Δ is homogeneous of degree one in Q and concave.⁸ The concavity of Δ is especially useful in index number construction over discrete changes, since it justifies simple operational approximations which are an average of the Paasche and Laspeyres indices⁹ (see, e.g., Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 1982).

The two principal uses of Δ applied below are (i) the evaluation of actual quota policy over time and (ii) the evaluation of trade reform. In other work it will also be useful to compare the index of trading efficiency across countries. For the first use of (18),

$$(9) \quad \hat{\Delta} = \sum \beta_i \hat{Q}_i + (u\Delta_u/\Delta)\hat{u} + (R\Delta_R/\Delta)\hat{R} + (\pi\Delta_\pi/\Delta)\hat{\pi} + \dots,$$

where β_i is the shadow quota rent share for quota i , $p_i Q_i / p'Q$, and the sum of the β 's is unity (it is not necessarily true that all are positive, although positive shadow prices were found in the work below). Equation (9) allows for the influence of other price changes $\hat{\pi}$, the capital transfer \hat{R} , and real income \hat{u} . The latter is assumed to be growing exogenously to the process of quota policy, which is surely reasonable for the case of U.S. imported cheese. For simplicity in the calculations, the influence of all changes save real income are suppressed. Fortunately, for the case of homothetic preferences, the elasticity of Δ with respect to real income is -1 .¹⁰ Thus,

$$(9') \quad \hat{\Delta} = \sum \beta_i \hat{Q}_i - \hat{Y}.$$

This has the intuitive implication that a quota vector which grows less fast than the real income growth rate is increasing trade restrictiveness.

The second important use of equation (8) is to evaluate trade reform:

$$(10) \quad \hat{\Delta} = \sum \beta_i \hat{Q}_i,$$

where the same condition on the shares holds. In this case the proportional changes in the quotas are imposed by the reform structure.

8. Since $v(Q, \pi)$ need not be concave in Q , the minimizing assumption "concavifies" the underlying preferences. In the proposed use of Δ in evaluating trade reform, this is appropriate because we regard the planner or analyst as evaluating proposed bundles Q relative to the minimum value of distorted trade needed to support u^0 . In the equivalent variation form, proposed reforms resulting in utilities u^* are evaluated by comparing the value of bundles Q^0 to the minimum value of distorted trade needed to support u^* .

9. In practice, when $v(\cdot)$ is not concave in Q , the change in the true index need not lie between the conventional measure of the change in the Paasche and Laspeyres indices. The true measure requires calculations of the minimizing shadow prices.

10. The market-clearing relations are $E_p = Q$. For homotheticity, $E_p(p, \pi, u) = uE_p'(p, \pi)$. Then $Q/\Delta = uE_p'(p, \pi)$. Constant restrictiveness (constant Δ with no change in p) is possible only if Q grows at the same rate as u .

It is important to emphasize that $\hat{\Delta}$ is conceptually identical to the productivity measures like \hat{T} used to track the behavior of economies over time and space. It converts the actual or proposed changes into a uniform equivalent change in trade, just as the productivity index is a uniform equivalent growth in factors. Also, like the productivity measure, it is operational and offers a basis of comparison of trade policies. The natural units of the coefficient of trade utilization and the public's familiarity with productivity measures give it an added advantage in communicating the results of policy evaluations.

8.1.2 Comparison with Current Methods

The coefficient of trade utilization is a proper index of trade distortions. The index which is commonly used by default for intertemporal comparisons is a trade-weighted average of tariffs, or in the present case of "tariff equivalents" of quotas. It has well-known defects due to the substitution effect: a high tariff equivalent will be associated with a small quota, other things equal. In section 8.3 an index of this type is constructed for cheese imports in the U.S. from 1964 to 1979 and its rate of change is contrasted with the rate of change of the coefficient of trade utilization. If the two measures agree in their implication for restrictiveness, a rise in the average tariff equivalent should coincide with a fall in the coefficient of trade utilization. It is highly significant that for eight of the fifteen observations on one-year changes, protection measured by the average tariff equivalent moved in the same direction as the coefficient of trade utilization.

Other measures of the effect of trade distortions have different purposes and thus do not permit comparison over space and time. For example, when correctly applied the standard measures of the effect of trade reform (compensating and equivalent income variations) give correct measures of the shift in the relevant general equilibrium budget constraint (the shift from B to A), but they lack a scale (normalization) that would permit comparisons. Some analysts report the unscaled compensating or equivalent variation numbers. This biases the measure upward for large countries in cross-country comparisons and for later periods in intertemporal comparisons. Several varieties of scale have been attempted. For large reforms such as complete free trade, it is usual to report the compensating variations as fractions of national income. This biases the measure downward in cross-country comparisons for "naturally" less open economies like that of the United States. A more sophisticated version of the expenditure function model, which appears to allow comparability, arises when the effect of the reform is scaled by the trade expenditure or by the total gain from trade. I used both expedients in partial equilibrium in my 1985 cheese paper reviewed in the next section.

While the ratios of compensating variations to either the trade expenditure or the gain from trade are natural, they are not appropriate for comparison purposes. With the compensating variation methods that typically would be used, let Q^0 and Q^1 be two quota vectors with associated domestic prices p^0

and p^1 . Suppose for simplicity that all rent is retained domestically. The gain from trade reform measure relative to base expenditure is

$$(11) \quad \frac{E(p^1, \pi, u^0) - E(p^0, \pi, u^0) + \text{net rent change}}{E(p^0, \pi, u^0)}.$$

For proper applications, the numerator is a legitimate measure of the income which could be deducted from the representative consumer facing the new prices while maintaining u^0 . The denominator measure is the net trade expenditure, equal in general equilibrium to the base quota rent plus any transfer. The ratio (11) is the proportion of base expenditure (rent plus transfer) that could be deducted from the representative consumer facing the new prices while maintaining u^0 . Thus far, all is well. But consider a new initial point p^2 , associated, for example, with a more restrictive initial condition and hence a lower u^2 . If the compensating variation is transitive, the value of the numerator in the move from 0 to 1 will exceed the value of the numerator in the move from 0 to 2; that is, the two values of the numerator will correctly sign the welfare comparison. But the two proportionate changes are no longer comparable; they do not have the same base. In Anderson (1985), reviewed in the next section, equation (11) was used with the wrinkle that the partial equilibrium nature of the study meant that the denominator was total expenditure on cheese.

The alternative measure used in Anderson (1985) and sometimes applied elsewhere is the relative inefficiency measure for quota reform:

$$(12) \quad \frac{E(p^1, \pi, u^0) - E(p^0, \pi, u^0) + \text{net revenue change}}{E_p(p^0, \pi, u^0)p^* - E(p^*, \pi, u^0)},$$

where the denominator is the gain from a complete liberalization of trade (the gain from free trade in the cheese sector in the application below). Once again the denominator shifts with the initial condition and vitiates comparability. Finally, it is conceivable to scale by the value of the leap from autarky to free trade: p^0 is set equal to the autarky level. This does resolve the noncomparability issue of the preceding two scales but is infeasible, since calculation of autarky prices is rarely credible.

In contrast, the coefficient of trade utilization is a proper index for trade distortions. In all cases, the practitioner can use an appropriate transformation to accommodate shifts in the nondistortion variables (note that there is no apparent way to extend the measures above) and can be certain that all trade distortions are evaluated using true shadow prices. The comparability problem is solved in principle.

8.2 The Cheese Import Model

I review here a portion of my (1985) paper, in order to provide a self-contained treatment. The purpose of my earlier paper was to document the

potential large welfare inefficiency implied by the common practice of allocating quotas at a detailed by-commodity-by-country level and prohibiting resale. U.S. cheese imports were selected for study because the data were good, the quotas were so allocated, and the domestic policy objective in limiting cheese imports apparently did permit a reallocation over types, while preserving the same aggregate level of imports. An econometric model of cheese demand was fitted to use in the welfare evaluation.

In this paper the data are used for two applications. First, the data for the earlier study are used along with the estimated aggregate elasticity of cheese demand to form a time series of the rate of change of the coefficient of trade utilization. Second, the 1985 exercise is repeated but with the coefficient of trade utilization as the welfare measure.

I first describe the market for imported cheese in the United States and then explain the computation of reform magnitudes for the second exercise.

8.2.1 The U.S. Dairy Industry and the Quota System

The U.S. dairy quota system originated as a by-product of the dairy price support system. The main element is support of a manufacturing-grade milk price, but there are also butter and American-type cheese support prices. To avoid supporting foreign farmers, quotas have been imposed on a variety of cheeses under executive authority, which is very broad.

The essential principle of the quota system is, however, to set detailed levels of imports on a basis consistent with historic proportions. The presidential quota authority does not stipulate that this principle is to be carried through to allocation by country of origin, but the quota administrators have so proceeded. In contrast, quota administrators appear to regard their objective as a target level of milk-equivalent tonnage in groups identified as substituting for domestic milk products (see, e.g., Emery 1969, 9–11).

Thus the stated objective of the quota administrators supports a noneconomic constraint of the simple form in which individual by-commodity-by-country quotas could be reallocated subject to a constant total. Despite this, the current allocation system creates detailed binding quotas. The USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) quota system administrators develop license allocations by commodity by country from base-year allocations in the legally mandated categories. They claim to have effective auditors who implicitly frustrate resale of licenses. Measured differences in average quota rent margins, reported in Anderson (1985), bear out the claim.

The Census trade data have nine commodity categories of continuously imported cheese plus a catch-all, with six of the nine plus a part of the catch-all category subject in part or whole to quota constraint. This creates the circumstances for a case study of quota inefficiency when the quota constraints are converted into an overall constraint on the six categories. Inefficiency arises due to (1) inefficient allocation by country within the same cheese type (a matter of administrative discretion) and (2) inefficiency allocation over types

(partially mandated in current presidential proclamations, but presumably easily changed within the spirit of presidents' previous exercises of authority).

I now rationalize a partial equilibrium approach to the U.S. market for imported cheese. The United States is a small consumer of foreign cheese; hence the foreign price of foreign cheese is reasonably taken to be exogenous. Its domestic price in quota constrained categories is of course endogenous. U.S. consumption of cheese is a tiny fraction of total food consumption, so ignoring spillover effects onto noncheese prices may be reasonable; the prices are assumed to be exogenous. The domestic price of domestic cheese is endogenous save when the government is maintaining a floor price through large purchases. Endogenous domestic prices of both imported and domestic cheese were fitted to an implicit reduced form in the econometric work on cheese demand discussed in Anderson (1983). The "fitted prices" were used as instruments in estimation of the demand system.

In principle, it is possible to model the supply side of the domestic cheese industry. Domestic cheese production and sale is dominated by and large by the government's milk, cheese, and butter price supports. Successfully dealing with the supply side of the domestic cheese markets probably requires a model of how the government sets its supports. Fortunately, in the welfare (as opposed to the econometric) analysis it is permissible to treat the U.S. price of U.S. cheese and related dairy products as independent of import policy changes, since it can be assumed that the government will offset any domestic price effect by support purchase. This is effectively true in a large part of the sample (1964–79), particularly in the later years.

A nine-equation model of imported cheese demand was estimated for the years 1964–79. An implicitly separable food and beverage expenditure function is assumed to exist for a representative U.S. consumer identifiable in the aggregate data (see Anderson 1983 for discussion of the implied assumptions). The almost ideal demand system (AIDS) expenditure function is used, with the further wrinkle that only a tiny portion of total food and beverage consumption is estimated—that for nine imported cheeses (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980 for a general treatment of AIDS). AIDS is used because it is a flexible function form with particularly simple capability for allowing non-homothetic preferences while permitting exact linear aggregation.

The results reported in Anderson (1983) were reasonably "good," with sensible elasticities, absence of obvious specification bias, and a good fit. The null hypothesis of homotheticity could not be rejected in a joint test. As is common in flexible functional form estimation, however, concavity of the demand system was rejected in unconstrained estimation, and had to be enforced about the point of means. The main additional sources of possible specification error are in aggregation over consumers and over cheeses. The data do not permit an attack on these problems. To give some feel for the demand structure that results, appendix table 3.A1 in Anderson (1988) presents point estimates of compensated price elasticities. The elasticities are evaluated at

the point of means of the shares. These imply an aggregate price elasticity of demand for imported cheese as a group of -3.54 , which is plausible for a product group with good domestic substitutes. A reader skeptical of the econometric methods used is free to regard these and the underlying parameters as plausible guesses to be used in simulation.

8.2.2 The Cheese Quota Reform Exercise

The essential ingredients of the study of cheese import inefficiency are the trade quantities and prices (see Anderson 1983, 1985, for more details on these data). Domestic auction prices and foreign port values of imported cheeses were obtained from USDA and Census data. The domestic part of the total quota premium equals the difference between these less a marketing margin based on similar unconstrained imported cheeses. These are converted to annual averages for the calculations below. The foreign part of the quota premium is based on data reported in Boisvert, Hornig, and Blandford (1988). The trade quantities come from Census data.

The theoretical analysis of my earlier paper (1985) derives the efficient¹¹ reallocation of existing quotas policy as equivalent to a uniform specific tariff that would achieve the same aggregate quantity of constrained cheese. The estimated demand functions evaluated at the point of means can be substituted into the constraint and the resulting equation solved for the efficient tariff. Thus the model solves for t in

$$\sum E_{p_i}(p^* + t, u) = \bar{Q},$$

where \bar{Q} is the aggregate quota constraint, and, by Shepard's Lemma, E_{p_i} is the demand for the i th quota-constrained cheese. (Strictly speaking, u changes with the reform, but the change is trivial.) The estimated AIDS demand function is used for E_{p_i} . After t is solved, a welfare analysis of the reform is calculated. The replication of these results is reported in the next section.

8.3 The Results

Two uses of the new concept of trading efficiency are made here. I first present the time-series results. The sixteen-year period of the data was marked by considerable fluctuation in the restrictiveness of the various quotas, with an overall dramatic increase in restrictiveness. Most notably, the coefficient of trade utilization and the average tariff equivalent give opposite implications in over half the observations. Second, I reevaluate the potential improvement in trade efficiency due to an efficient allocation of cheese imports as in Anderson (1985). The surprise here is that the by using the coefficient of trade utilization measure, the relative importance of the commodity-alone reallocation grows from less than two per cent to over a fifteen per cent of the commodity-and-

11. Based on eq. (4), I now know what I did not in 1985, that the implied reform, while more efficient, is not optimal, since the shadow price of the quota is not equal to the unit rent.

country reallocation gain. The inefficient allocation is equivalent to 14 (89) percent reduction in average constrained cheese imports under commodity-alone (commodity-and-country) reallocation.

8.3.1 The Increase in Restrictiveness, 1964–1979

Using equation (9'), we can readily calculate the local rate of change of the coefficient of trade utilization. For discrete changes, it is customary to use β shares that are the arithmetic average of the shares at the two end points. This procedure is exact for the translog form of the underlying function Δ and is appropriate for any concave function Δ in the sense that the true value of the change in Δ must lie between the values formed using the new and old shares.¹² Thus, while Δ is not a translog (despite the essentially translog structure of the AIDS system), and indeed has no closed form, I assume the usual procedure, which would generally be used by other practitioners, is close enough.¹³

To control for noise in such disaggregated data, the \hat{Q} series is based on the calculated demands rather than the measured imports.¹⁴ The tariff rate used in constructing the shadow price of quotas, ρ , is set at the import-weighted average ad valorem rate on all imports in each year. The aggregate elasticity of demand for constrained imports is obtained from the AIDS system and the standard formula

$$(13) \quad \epsilon = \sum \sum w_i \epsilon_{ij},$$

where the ϵ_{ij} 's are the partial elasticities of demand, estimated in Anderson (1983). At the point of means, ϵ is equal to -3.54 . The results reported below hold it constant rather than the more refined version allowing the elasticity to vary endogenously. The differences are minor. The data series reported in section 8.2 yield the quota premium based on the average eternal f.a.s. price.

12. This follows from a straightforward application of the mean value theorem for a concave function. By concavity,

$$\Delta_Q(Q^0)[Q^1 - Q^0] \geq \Delta(Q^1) - \Delta(Q^0) \geq \Delta_Q(Q^1)[Q^1 - Q^0].$$

See Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) for more discussion.

13. In principle, it is possible to check the appropriateness of the assumption by calculating Δ from the nonlinear system

$$(i) \quad \frac{Q^1}{\Delta} = E_p(p, \pi, u),$$

$$(ii) \quad R = E(p, \pi, u) - (1 - \omega)[p - p^*] \frac{Q^1}{\Delta} - tE_\pi(p, \pi).$$

Equations (i) and (ii) solve for p, Δ in terms of R, u, π^*, p^*, t , and ω , using $\pi = \pi^* + t$. This can be done for the specific AIDS system estimated by Anderson. Time did not permit resolution of the convergence problems encountered here.

14. The measured imports do not correspond exactly to the quotas due to (1) the Commerce Department's practice of reporting the import data in the month in which the information arrives from the Customs Bureau rather than the month of shipment, and (2) minor inconsistencies in the statistical classification schemes.

This lies above the foreign marginal cost due to rent captured by foreigners, as Boisvert et al. (1988) show. Following their data, the rent retention rate ω is set equal to .50.

In contrast, the standard approach to summarizing developments in the import of cheese would be based on tariff equivalents of quotas, or quota premia. There is a great deal of variation in the quota premia over time, and a rising trend predominates. While the correlation between the six premia time series is high, it is not perfect. Thus a highly diverse picture presents itself to the analyst, and prior to the methods of this paper there was no adequate way to summarize the developments. The main alternative would be the annual percentage change in the trade-weighted average tariff equivalent of the quotas, which is reported below.

The average annual rate of change of trade utilization, $\hat{\Delta}$, calculated using equation (9') as explained above is -14 percent, effectively cutting in half the imports of cheese every six years. This average masks some spectacular annual variations. Table 8.1 presents the annual percentage changes in the coefficient of trade utilization for cheese imports from 1965 to 1979 in the first column. Notice the very restrictive policies followed in the mid and late 1970s with a break in 1976, a year in which a temporary relaxation of the quota was permitted to help in the political struggle against food price inflation.

The annual percentage change in the trade-weighted average tariff equivalent of the quotas, \hat{T} , (T.E.) is presented in the second column. The average change over the fifteen years is 4 percent, doubling the average tariff rate every eighteen years, and similarly implying a sharp rise in restrictions. To provide

Table 8.1 **The Rate of Decline of Cheese Trade Efficiency, 1965-1979**

Year	Rate of Change of Average T.E.	Rate of Change of CTU
1965	.10	-0.17
1966	.26	0.13
1967	.05	-0.03
1968	.40	0.06
1969	-.47	-0.11
1970	-.02	-0.16
1971	.13	-0.18
1972	-.04	-0.09
1973	-.08	-0.08
1974	-.05	-0.33
1975	-.03	-0.40
1976	-.006	0.02
1977	.12	-0.26
1978	.06	-0.19
1979	.15	-0.28
Average	.04	-0.138

Note: Bold type indicates that the observations for the two measures have the same sign.

contrast, the observations for which the two measures have the same sign (diverge in implication) are printed in boldface. This occurs in eight of fifteen cases. Another way to describe the result is with correlation analysis. One might expect the two series to be perfectly negatively correlated in a rank sense. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient for the two series is 0.34, which does not permit rejection of the null hypothesis of no relation between the series.

The level of restrictiveness on average in the sample period is high according to either measure. The average level of *ad valorem* tariff equivalent is around 25 percent (the basis for the changes in table 8.1). It should be noted that this figure corresponds to the retained rent concept $(1 - \omega)(p - p^*)$. The coefficient of trade utilization for the move to free trade is 2.3, meaning that a 130 percent average rise in quantity can be achieved. The two percentages are very roughly connected via the aggregate elasticity of -3.5 .

Since all time series are substantially driven by cyclical phenomena, it is worth noting that cyclic disturbances are purged by the device of using Q_s calculated to lie on the demand functions, which should take care of much of the problem. A complete accounting of cyclic versus other reasons for the behavior of effective trade policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but something like 1966 to 1976 is a complete cycle, and the data do not suggest the dominance of cyclic phenomena in cheese policy.

8.3.2 Reform Evaluation

Section 8.2 reviews the background of my (1985) evaluation of the efficiency gain from a reallocation of quota licenses subject to the constraint that the total import of cheese in constrained categories did not change, all evaluation being done at the point of means. Two variants were assessed. In one, the country allocations were frozen, so that the average foreign price of cheese in each category remained constant. A reallocation over the six types resulted in the gain shown in table 8.2, first row of column (1) (adapted from Anderson). The other variant permitted reallocation to a (conservatively chosen) low-cost supplier, with results shown in the second row of column (1). Two features of this study should be noted, because they contrast with the methods used below. First, while apparently reasonable, the scaling methods used in table 8.2 have no real foundation in theory and can be misleading in reform evaluation because they do not use shadow prices. They result in rather modest measures of gain which are not readily comparable with other reforms under other circumstances. Second, a notable implication of table 8.2 appears to be that the gain from a commodity reallocation is modest compared to the gain from picking a more efficient supplier, since .0028 (in the first row) is less than 2 percent of .152 (in the second row). The coefficient of trade utilization permits a more appropriate scale that is quite intuitive. Its use turns out to revise upward the estimation of the efficacy of a commodity-alone reallocation by almost an order of magnitude.

Table 8.2 Efficiency Gains from Cheese Quota Reform

	Welfare/Base Expenditure		Relative Inefficiency (1)/(2)
	Efficient Tax (1)	Free Trade (2)	
No supply reallocation	.0028	.087	.103
Supply reallocation	.152	.497	.306

Table 8.3 CTU Measure of Gains from Cheese Quota Reform

	% Change in CTU		Relative Inefficiency (1)/(2)
	Efficient Tax (1)	Free Trade (2)	
No supply reallocation	.139	1.278	.109
Supply reallocation	.891	3.623	.246

Table 8.3 contains the calculated gain in the coefficient of trade utilization under the same circumstances. The entries have the interpretation of an average percentage increase in the aggregate quota. Thus moving to an efficient quota (equivalent to that implied by a uniform specific tax) under no supply reallocation is effectively a 14 percent increase in the aggregate quota, while under country reallocation the efficient quota is effectively a 90 percent increase in the average quota.

Assessing the relative significance of country reallocation, .139 (in the first row) is about 16 percent of .891 (in the second row), so that commodity reallocation alone is seen to be much more (almost ten times more) significant than with the methods of table 8.2. It is important to understand why the results differ.

The difference in results is mainly due to the difference in scaling factors: the results in table 8.2 are scaled by base expenditure, while the results in table 8.3 use a proper normalization as a scaling factor. For example, in the first column of table 8.2, the ratio (1.11) is evaluated under commodity-alone and commodity-by-country reallocations. The denominator (base expenditure) is the same in both cases, while the numerator of the expression evaluated in the second row of table 8.2 is greater than that evaluated in the first row by $(.152 - .0028) \times (\text{base expenditure})$. In contrast, for the results reported in table 8.3, the coefficient of trade utilization concept normalizes the change in distortion revenue implied by the new quota bundle minus the old bundle. The normalization factor is the shadow rent needed to support initial utility (or, the marginal shadow rents used to evaluate quota changes are normalized), so that the expressions evaluated in the second row of table 8.3 have a different denominator as well as a different numerator from those in the first

Table 8.4 Effect of Tariffs and Rent Sharing on CTU Gains

	% Change in CTU		
	Pure Import Q (1)	Tariff Effect (2)	Shadow Price (3)
No supply reallocation	0.132	0.102	.139
Supply reallocation	1.351	1.314	.891

row. In this application the normalization reduces greatly the difference between the first and second rows of table 8.3 relative to table 8.2. The normalization factor has a large influence because the terms of trade effect of the country reallocation substantially increases some of the marginal shadow rents (a rise in trade is associated with an improvement in the terms of trade, raising the shadow price) over the value for the commodity-alone reallocation.¹⁵ The scale in table 8.3 is much more appropriate to comparisons of sources of inefficiency in the quota allocation, since it is a marginal concept.

A careful reader might note that the reallocation in table 8.3 is not strictly comparable to the reallocation in table 8.2 due to the allowance for rent sharing in the latter but not in the former. This plays a minor role in the results, as it turns out. A calculation of the coefficient of trade utilization under the assumption of full rent retention yields gains of .132 under commodity reallocation and 1.35 under commodity-by-country reallocation (see table 8.4 below), so that commodity-alone reallocation gets about 10 percent of the full gain, as opposed to 16 percent under the rent-sharing assumption and less than 2 percent with the old measure.

Since future applications of the coefficient of trade utilization will probably be with less adequate data, sensitivity to bad data is an important issue. There is no substitute for good information on the quota premiums, but the results of this study suggest that the other elements of the shadow price of quotas may not be of critical importance. Table 8.4 shows the coefficient of trade utilization gain from the efficient quota under the two cases of supply reallocation with alternately the assumption of a pure import (full rent retention) quota, the pure quota plus a tariff on other goods, and the main case of a 50 percent rent retention quota plus a tariff on other goods. The two effects go in opposite directions under the separability assumption, hence they tend to cancel, as seen in the first row. In the second row this effect is combined with the effect of a terms of trade improvement from the country reallocation. Since

15. Let p_i^* be the average foreign price of imported cheese in category i . The country reallocation causes a drop in p_i^* . For the purposes of the calculation, this drop is related to the change in Q_i by calculating the "derivative" dp_i^*/dQ_i . The shadow price of the quota includes the component $-(1 - \omega)p_i^*Q_i$, from differentiating (1). Under the circumstances of a reallocation toward low-price producers, $p_i^*Q_i$ equals $\sum Q_i |dp_i^*/dQ_i|$ and is negative. Thus the shadow price of the quota is increased by the inclusion of this term.

half of the terms of trade improvement will accrue to foreigners as rent (based on the rent-sharing data discussed above), and since this is bigger than the reduction in the domestic price as a result of the reform, the result is that the last column of the second row (.891) is less than the second column (1.314).

8.4 Conclusion

This paper has illustrated the use of the coefficient of trade utilization concept for trade reform and for time-series evaluation of fixed trade policy in the U.S. market for imported cheese from 1964 to 1979. The new concept is readily operational and offers distinct advantages over current methods because it solves the comparability problem. The significance of this is illustrated in two ways. In the first, a time-series index allows the intertemporal comparison of the quota policy implied in sixteen annual observations. In the second, two different quota reforms are compared in importance on a consistent basis. In both cases, the coefficient of trade utilization gives quite different implications than the common alternative.

In future work I plan to expand the set of commodities covered and extend the years covered, looking to build a time series capable of assessing the overall trend in U.S. trade policy. I encourage other investigators to begin using this concept for other countries' trade data. Eventually this will lead to a set of measures with which to compare national trade policies, one that is as easy for the public to understand as are productivity measures.

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Comment Satya P. Das

The paper has two parts. In the first part, Anderson illustrates and discusses the measure of trade restriction developed earlier by Anderson and Neary,¹ which is named “coefficient of trade utilization” (CTU). In the second part, Anderson attempts to apply this measure to compare the degree of U.S. restrictions on imports of cheese over the sample period 1965–79.

The theory behind the CTU measure is certainly an improvement over the traditional methods in that it is more micro founded. In a nutshell, the theory is as follows. Consider a small open economy. Let there be quantity restrictions on imports of two or more commodities. Let this “quota” vector at time t be denoted by \bar{Q}_t . Assuming that these restrictions are binding, the equilibrium domestic prices of these goods are endogenous and are higher than the respective foreign prices, the difference being the “quota rent” per unit. Assuming further that preferences are homothetic and alike across the domestic consuming units so that perfect aggregation holds, let $V(\bar{Q}_t)$ be the indirect utility at the equilibrium. Now consider two periods, 0 and 1, respectively the base and the current period. Let \bar{Q}_0 and \bar{Q}_1 be the corresponding quota vectors. In general, some elements of \bar{Q}_1 will be greater than the corresponding elements in \bar{Q}_0 and some will be less. So the problem is: How can we determine whether the current quota systems \bar{Q}_1 is more or less restrictive than the original quota system \bar{Q}_0 ? This is an index number problem.

As a solution, CTU is defined by k where

$$(1) \quad V(\bar{Q}_1/k; \dots) = V(\bar{Q}_0; \dots)$$

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1. J. E. Anderson and J. P. Neary, “The Coefficient of Trade Utilization: Back to the Baldwin Envelope,” in *The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert Baldwin*, ed. R. Jones and A. Krueger (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

There is some intuition in this. If, for example, all quantities in \bar{Q}_1 are higher than those in \bar{Q}_0 , bundle 1 is surely less trade restrictive than bundle 0; k will be clearly greater than unity, so that the CTU associated with bundle 1 is greater than that with bundle 0. The CTU resembles the Hicksian compensating variation in income.

Intuitive as it may seem, there is a tricky problem with the Anderson-Neary formula. It is that by defining a common denominator k for all quantities, some quantities (elements) of \bar{Q}_1/k may exceed the corresponding free trade quantities. If this is so, those (theoretical) quotas are not binding, and hence the corresponding prices will be their foreign prices, implying that the $V(\cdot)$ function is not the same between period 0 and period 1. In other words, the $V(\cdot)$ function in the left-hand and right-hand sides of (1) may not remain invariant. This may invalidate the comparison between \bar{Q}_0 and \bar{Q}_1 . Note that this is true even if both \bar{Q}_0 and \bar{Q}_1 may be binding.

Assuming that the above problem is somehow solved, more generally, an axiomatic approach may be developed. Let us imagine a scalar k such that

$$(1') \quad V(\bar{Q}_1, k; \dots) = V(\bar{Q}_0; \dots),$$

which defines $k = k(\bar{Q}_0, \bar{Q}_1; \dots)$. One could begin by specifying some "desired" axioms and then find if there exists a $k(\cdot)$ function which satisfies those axioms. If yes, is it unique? Some of these axioms may be the following:

- (a) *Two-way consistency*: If $V(\bar{Q}_1, k_1) = V(\bar{Q}_0)$ and k_1 implies more trade restriction, then k_2 defined by $V(\bar{Q}_0, k_2) = V(\bar{Q}_1)$ should imply less trade restrictions.
- (b) *Three-way consistency or transitivity*: If $V(\bar{Q}_1, k_1) = V(\bar{Q}_0)$, $V(\bar{Q}_2, k_2) = V(\bar{Q}_1)$, and both k_1 and k_2 imply more (or less) trade restriction, then k_3 defined by $V(\bar{Q}_2, k_3) = V(\bar{Q}_0)$ should imply more (or less) trade restriction.
- (c) *Independence of irrelevant alternatives*: This may perhaps be another desirable axiom, although in some cases it may not be very appropriate. If $V(\bar{Q}_1, Q^*, k^*) = V(\bar{Q}_0, Q^*)$ and $V(\bar{Q}_1, Q^{**}, k^{**}) = V(\bar{Q}_0, Q^{**})$, then k^* implies more trade restriction if and only if k^{**} implies more trade restriction.
- (d) *Homogeneity*: Let $V(\bar{Q}_1, k; \dots) = V(\bar{Q}_0; \dots)$. If $\bar{Q}_1 = \lambda \bar{Q}_0$, then $k = \lambda$.

It is easy to verify that the Anderson-Neary CTU formula does not satisfy axiom (c), because CTU appears as the common denominator of *all* quotas.² On the other hand, axiom (c) itself can be argued to be inappropriate if in the quota basket the goods are sufficiently close substitutes of one another. In any event, it will be worthwhile to ask if there is an impossibility or possibility theorem regarding the existence and uniqueness of a k function that satisfies axioms (a)–(d). I am optimistic. My own hunch is that there is a possibility

2. If, on the other hand, the CTU is designed to leave out the common quotas in two periods, it would then violate transitivity. This is true whether CTU is defined analogous to the compensating variation or the equivalent variation in income.

theorem. The exact functional form would of course depend upon the form of the indirect utility function.

Coming to the empirical part, one of the major limitations, as the author points out, is the supply side of the model. The firm behavior is mostly assumed away. Doing so, Anderson ends up with a demand system model that is structural, whereas the equations that determine price are in reduced form. This is presumably due to a data problem—lack of firm-level production and other data. However, given that such data are becoming increasingly available, I suppose that these types of problems will be overcome in the near future.

To sum up, this is an interesting and useful paper. Although, as I have illustrated, the CTU measure has its weaknesses as an index of trade restrictions, I think that it is a significant conceptual improvement over the usual indices of trade restriction.

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