126 research outputs found
Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement
This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness
Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality
A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest ināand endorsement ofājustification holism due to the revival of an abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by establishing a foundational entailment-sentence of deduction which is justified independently of theory choice and outside the context of a whole logical theory
Process Reliabilism, Prime Numbers and the Generality Problem
This paper aims to show that Selim Berkerās widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berkerās case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berkerās case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the case for process reliabilism (if any) is already captured by the generality problem
Hvad er Konsekventialisme?
Den filosofiske position konsekventialisme er ofte genstand for debat i filosofikredse, men alt for hyppigt opstĆ„r der misforstĆ„elser blandt de involverede, fordi de ikke er eksplicitte, hvad grundantagelser og vƦsentlige distinktioner angĆ„r. Denne korte artikel vil give en approksimation af, hvad der forstĆ„s ved konsekventialisme pĆ„ et generisk niveau. MĆ„let med artiklen er at klargĆøre nogle af de grundantagelser og distinktioner, som konsekventialister ofte benytter i deres teoridannelse, og som bĆør holdes for Ćøje i Ćønsket om en frugtbar debat
Logical disagreement : an epistemological study
While the epistemic signiļ¬cance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ālogical disagreementā. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a speciļ¬c proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ālogical disagreementā. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justiļ¬cation for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of oneās background logic and the logical theory one prefers (oļ¬cially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic signiļ¬cance of central principles from the literature are at best deļ¬ated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reļ¬ections on the potential epistemic signiļ¬cance of convergence in logical theorizing
Logical Disagreement
While the epistemic signiļ¬cance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ālogical disagreementā. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a speciļ¬c proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ālogical disagreementā. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justiļ¬cation for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of oneās background logic and the logical theory one prefers (oļ¬cially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic signiļ¬cance of central principles from the literature are at best deļ¬ated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reļ¬ections on the potential epistemic signiļ¬cance of convergence in logical theorizing
Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic
Default logic has been a very active research topic in artiļ¬cial intelligence since the early 1980s, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artiļ¬cial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In Ā§1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is brieļ¬y motivated, while Ā§2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we aim to model. On the heels of this, Ā§3 deļ¬nes our formal framework, viz., a reļ¬ned Horty-style default logic. Ā§4 then uses the framework to model deep disagreement, and ļ¬nally Ā§5 provides a critical discussion of the result
Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited)
This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness
Logical Akrasia
The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, Ā§1 and Ā§2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, Ā§3 and Ā§4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gƶdelās Second Incompleteness Theorem itās shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our arithmetical theorizing. If successful, these sections will underscore the pertinence and persistence of akrasia in arithmetic (by appeal to Gƶdelās seminal work). Thirdly, Ā§5 concludes by suggesting a way of translating the dilemma of arithmetical akrasia into a case of regular epistemic akrasia; and further how one might try to escape the dilemma when itās framed this way
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