Impact of income and non-income shocks on child labour Evidence from a panel survey of Tanzania

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of income and non-income shocks on child labour using a model in which the household maximizes utility from consumption as well as human capital development of the child. Two types of shocks are considered: agricultural shocks as an income shock and the death of a parent or relatives as a non-income shock. We also investigate if access to credits and household assets act as buffers against transitory shocks. Our results indicate significant effects of crop shocks on child's overall work hours and buffering effects of access to a bank account on child labour and hunger

Inequalities and Conflict in Africa: An empirical investigation

Inequalities and poverty are important drivers of social exclusion, while conflict, social unrest and instability are its manifestation. The preponderance of conflicts in poor and unequal societies has long been documented in the literature.1 As Nagel succinctly argues, “political discontent and its consequences – protest, instability, violence, revolution – depend not only on the absolute level of economic well-being, but also on the distribution of wealth”. According to the Kuznets’ inverted-U theory, a high level of income inequality radicalises the proletariat, enhances class polarisation and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for low-income group participation in political and decisionmaking processes

Inequalities and Conflict in Africa: An empirical investigation

Inequalities and poverty are important drivers of social exclusion, while conflict, social unrest and instability are its manifestation. The preponderance of conflicts in poor and unequal societies has long been documented in the literature.1 As Nagel succinctly argues, “political discontent and its consequences – protest, instability, violence, revolution – depend not only on the absolute level of economic well-being, but also on the distribution of wealth” (Nagel, 1974:453). According to the Kuznets’ inverted-U theory, a high level of income inequality radicalises the proletariat, enhances class polarisation and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for low-income group participation in political and decisionmaking processes (Muller, 1997)