Examining the use of informal networks by NGOs in Azerbaijan and Georgia

To date little is known about the non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) use of informal networks, contacts and connections, as well as about the ‘informalization’ of post-communist civil society in the former Soviet Union. Research on the subject has been mostly restricted to the study of civil society organizations in Central Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Russia, leaving the use and significance of informality among the South Caucasus's NGOs largely ignored. Drawing on qualitative in-depth elite interviews, this study examines the importance of informal networking within the NGO sectors of post-Soviet-rule Azerbaijan and Georgia. The findings of this study document that in Azerbaijan and Georgia the practices of using informal networks of relying on patron–client relations with donors and of individuals using their positions within organizations for profit-making are widespread among the NGOs included in this research

The effects of the Saakashvili era reforms on informal practices in the Republic of Georgia

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia’s state institutions, reducing corruption and ‘formalising’ the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili’s reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets

Strong militias, weak states and armed violence: towards a theory of ‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries

This article challenges the well-established presentation within conflict studies of paramilitary organizations as state-manipulated death squads or self-defence groups, and argues that some present-day militias extend their functions well beyond the role of shadowy pro-regime enforcers. Drawing its empirical insights from Ukrainian pro-government volunteer battalions and supporting its findings with empirical observations from other parts of the world, the article posits that the rise of powerful militia organizations acting in parallel with the state makes it imperative to revisit the theory and typology of paramilitary violence. The key theoretical argument of the article is that ‘state-parallel’ militias differ qualitatively from the ‘state-manipulated’ paramilitaries that are typical of the Cold War period. The article shows that although ‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries are not a new phenomenon, they have thus far remained critically understudied and undertheorized

Post-Soviet informality: towards theory-building

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to suggest that informal practices and institutions of post-Soviet countries differ from informality in other post-socialist regions and, therefore, proposes categorizing it as “post-Soviet informality” – a composite definition that extends beyond the concept of “informal economy” and encompasses, along with economic activities, social and political spheres. Design/methodology/approach – The arguments of the paper are based on a comprehensive analysis of secondary sources. Findings – This paper shows that, owing to the effects of antecedent regime’s legacies and the problems of post-communist transition, for the proper analysis of informality in post-Soviet countries it needs to be based on an own concept. Originality/value – This study, in contrast to the existing literature on informality in post-communist spaces, specifically focuses on the informal sphere of post-Soviet countries, suggesting that the informal institutions and practices thriving across the vast post-Soviet space not only differ from the informal spheres elsewhere in the world, but also from informality in other post-communist regions

End to informality? Examining the impact of institutional reforms on informal institutions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine

What happens to informal institutions in the process of institutional reforms? This article aims to examine one particular aspect of the complex interaction between institutional reforms and informality; the impact of reforms on informal political institutions. The success of Ukraine’s Euromaidan in overthrowing the autocratic government of Viktor Yanukovich in 2014 has ushered a wind of change into the post-Soviet political landscape, for decades dominated by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian forms of governance and the reliance on informal institutions engraved in political traditions. This study is among the first to question as to whether an ambitious reform agenda currently being implemented by the Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan government has had a notable impact on the deeply rooted informal relations in the political sphere. Drawing its empirical insights from a series of in-depth interviews conducted in Kiev in 2015, this study shows that while informal relations have become increasingly vulnerable to formalization efforts and, as a result, various informal institutions in present-day Ukrainian politics have lost their functions and influence, other informal institutions are not only being preserved by the political elites, but also are being employed to promote the reform processes

Civil society in the South Caucasus: kinship networks as obstacles to civil participation

The research to date on informal networks of the post-communist South Caucasus has tended to focus either on the informal institutions’ role in providing social safety nets for the population or on the networks’ economic functions. This article examines the impact of informal kinship networks on participation in organized civil society in the present-day Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In order to explore how kinship institutions affect membership in civil society organizations across the South Caucasus, this research builds on a variety of primary and secondary sources. The findings of this study reveal that kinship-based networks serve as a significant source of social capital in the South Caucasus: they offer social support to their members and encourage intra-network bonding, making participation in civil society unattractive. However, the prevalence of kinship networks does not significantly affect popular attitudes towards organized civil society and the reliance on kinship structures is not seen as substitute for membership in formal civil society

Informal institutions in Azerbaijan: exploring the intricacies of tapsh

Research on informal aspects of the post-communist economy and political institutions has developed rapidly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While there is no lack in research on informal practices in Russia and other Eastern European countries, comprehensive empirical investigations of informality in peripheral regions of the former Soviet Union—such as the Caucasus and Central Asia—are still rare. This article aims to fill this gap by providing an evidence-based empirical account of informal practices in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Drawing its empirical data from a two-decade-long ethnographic participant observation carried out in various locales of Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, this study offers nuanced insights into the hitherto unexplored informal practice of tapsh

Why are some civil wars more lethal than others? The effect of pro-regime proxies on conflict lethality

Previous large-N studies on conflict lethality have focused in large part either on structural factors or on the properties of key conflict protagonists – governments and rebels. This article challenges the dyadic two-actor approach to studying conflict lethality that examines exclusively the key actors of the dyad, and – on the example of pro-regime militias – hypothesises that participation of extra-state actors in civil wars can exert significant influence on battlefield lethality. It is proposed here that pro-regime militias can swell the number of combat deaths through, first of all, acting as ‘extra boots’ on the ground, providing governments with auxiliary forces and local intelligence, and enabling incumbents to launch more effective and often more deadly attacks on insurgents. Militias also affect the number of battle deaths by forcing rebels to protect their civilian support bases, which exposes insurgents to lethal government attacks. This assumption is empirically tested on 88 civil wars from 1981 to 2015 with militia presence. The findings show that the presence of pro-regime militias in civil wars is highly conducive to the incidence of high-casualty conflicts

Pro-regime militias and civil war duration

Research on civil war duration has tended to focus almost exclusively on governments and rebels as actors accounting for the longevity of armed conflicts. The impact of extra-dyad actors has thus far been absent from the analysis of factors contributing to civil war duration. This study contributes to both research on civil war duration and multi-actor models of intrastate conflicts by extending the analysis beyond the government-rebel dichotomy. With the focus on pro-regime militias, this article investigates whether the deployment of extra-dyad actors increases the duration of civil wars. Survival analysis models conducted on the sample of 250 civil war episodes between 1991 and 2015 reveal that participation of pro-regime militias in intrastate warfare has consistent association with the incidence of longer civil wars

The logic of ethnic responsibility and progovernment mobilization in East Ukraine conflict

The extant theory of ethnic defection rests on the importance of ethnic identity shift and loyalism toward the regime, which were thus far presented as key explanations of side switching in ethnic conflicts. This article challenges the validity of these claims and proposes an alternative theoretical argument. This study argues that individuals mobilize against their coethnics on the side of government that explicitly challenges and opposes ethnonationalist aspirations of their own ethnic group due to perceived obligation of ethnic responsibility to protect their ethnic values. Ethnic defection is likely to occur when and if the rebels are suspected by their coethnics of violating or disregarding sociocultural, ideological, or religious values of their ethnic group. Third-party prorebel intervention is likely to further aggravate or even trigger ethnic defection. This argument is examined empirically in the case of progovernment mobilization during East Ukraine conflict in 2014 to 2015. Microlevel interview data from Ukraine demonstrate that Ukrainian Russian speakers mobilized for the government side, driven by the strong sense of ethnic responsibility, engendered in the perception that separatists misrepresent ethnic values of Ukraine’s Russian speakers