Stochastic Resonance Can Drive Adaptive Physiological Processes

Stochastic resonance (SR) is a concept from the physics and engineering communities that has applicability to both systems physiology and other living systems. In this paper, it will be argued that stochastic resonance plays a role in driving behavior in neuromechanical systems. The theory of stochastic resonance will be discussed, followed by a series of expected outcomes, and two tests of stochastic resonance in an experimental setting. These tests are exploratory in nature, and provide a means to parameterize systems that couple biological and mechanical components. Finally, the potential role of stochastic resonance in adaptive physiological systems will be discussed

Range-based techniques for discovering optimality and analyzing scaling relationships in neuromechanical systems

In this paper, a method for decoupling the neuromuscular function of a set of limbs from the role morphology plays in regulating the performance of an activity is introduced. This method is based on two previous methods: the rescaled range analysis specific to time series data, and the use of scaling laws. A review of the literature suggests that limb geometry can either facilitate or constrain performance as measured experimentally. Whether limb geometry is facilitatory or acts as a constraint depends on the size differential between arm morphology and the underlying muscle. "Changes in size and shape" are theoretically extrapolations of morphological geometry to other members of a population or species, to other species, or to technological manipulations of an individual via prosthetic devices. Three datasets are analyzed using the range-based method and a Monte-Carlo simulation, and are used to test the various ways of executing this analysis. It was found that when performance is kept stable but limb size and shape is scaled by a factor of .25, the greatest gain in performance results. It was also found that introducing force-based perturbations results in 'shifts' in the body geometry/performance relationship. While results such as this could be interpreted as a statistical artifact, the non-linear rise within a measurement class and linear decrease between measurement classes suggests an effect of scale in the optimality of this relationship. Overall, range-based techniques allow for the simulation and modeling of myriad changes in phenotype that result from biological and technological manipulation

Exotic circuit elements from zero-modes in hybrid superconductor/quantum Hall systems

Heterostructures formed by quantum Hall systems and superconductors have recently been shown to support widely coveted Majorana fermion zero-modes and still more exotic `parafermionic' generalizations. Here we establish that probing such zero-modes using quantum Hall edge states yields non-local transport signatures that pave the way towards a variety of novel circuit elements. In particular, we demonstrate quite generally that at low energies the zero-modes convert chirally moving quasiparticles into oppositely charged quasiholes propagating in the same direction---that is, they swap the sign of the chiral edge currents. One may then construct new and potentially useful circuit elements using this `perfect Andreev conversion' process, including superconducting current and voltage mirrors as well as transistors for fractional charge currents. Characterization of these circuit elements should provide striking evidence of the zero-mode physics.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, v2: references adde

Exotic non-Abelian anyons from conventional fractional quantum Hall states

Non-Abelian anyons--particles whose exchange noncommutatively transforms a system's quantum state--are widely sought for the exotic fundamental physics they harbor as well as for quantum computing applications. There now exist numerous blueprints for stabilizing the simplest type of non-Abelian anyon, defects binding Majorana modes, by judiciously interfacing widely available materials. Following this line of attack, we introduce a device fabricated from conventional fractional quantum Hall states and s-wave superconductors that supports exotic non-Abelian anyons that bind `parafermions', which can be viewed as fractionalized Majorana fermions. We show that these modes can be experimentally identified (and distinguished from Majoranas) using Josephson measurements. We also provide a practical recipe for braiding parafermions and show that they give rise to non-Abelian statistics. Interestingly, braiding in our setup produces a richer set of topologically protected qubit operations when compared to the Majorana case. As a byproduct, we establish a new, experimentally realistic Majorana platform in weakly spin-orbit-coupled materials such as GaAs.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure

The Role of Emotion in Constitutional Theory

Although the role of emotion in law has become a major field of scholarship, there has been very little attention paid to the role of emotion in constitutional theory. This Article seeks to fill that gap by providing an integrated account of the role of emotion within the individual, how emotion affects constitutional culture, and how constitutional culture, properly understood, should affect our evaluation of major constitutional theories. The Article begins by reconstructing one of the most important and influential accounts of emotion in the philosophical literature: that of Thomas Aquinas. Because Aquinas’s description of the nature of emotion accords with modern science and the insights of many law-and-emotion theorists, it provides a firm foundation for an analysis of emotion in constitutional theory. Having laid that foundation, the Article examines the role of emotion in constitutional culture, the subset of national culture concerned with a constitution. Constitutional culture combines a society’s ideas about, and emotional attachments to, its constitution. Here, the Article develops a novel synthesis between Aquinas’s model of emotion and Edmund Burke’s sophisticated exploration of the importance of emotion in constitutional culture. Burke argues that theories of constitutional legitimacy shape constitutional culture and must accord with it. If a theory of legitimacy is at odds with a society’s constitutional culture, the society risks the instability of the regime. This insight—which is consistent with Aquinas’s model of emotion—is the primary basis for understanding the role of emotion in constitutional theory. Finally, the Article turns its attention to constitutional theory. Observing that popular sovereignty is the theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture, the Article argues—based on the synthesis of the Thomistic and Burkean accounts— that emotion should play an important role in evaluating the contours and viability of theories of legitimacy. Theories of legitimacy that accord with popular sovereignty have a stronger argument in their favor because they reinforce the emotional attachments that lend stability to our Constitution. Theories of legitimacy that reject popular sovereignty, by contrast, must be modified or abandoned or, alternatively, must explain why attempts to change our constitutional culture will avoid the instability that the Thomistic and Burkean accounts would predict. The Article therefore has particular relevance to assessing radical constitutional theories—whether from the political right or the political left—that are critical of American constitutional culture. The Article concludes by exploring the implications of emotion for constitutional doctrine, focusing on stare decisis and the examples of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

The Moral Authority of Original Meaning

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of originalism as represented by Vermeule, presenting an affirmative argument for originalism from within the natural law tradition. Although other theorists have offered natural law justifications for originalism, they have not yet developed a theory of legitimate authority, which is essential both to the natural law tradition and to originalism. This Article fills that gap by grounding originalism in the legitimate authority of the people-as-sovereign. In doing so, it draws upon and adapts centuries-old natural law arguments in favor of popular sovereignty that have rarely been mentioned in American law reviews and have never been presented as the basis for originalism. By creating a novel synthesis between this natural law theory of popular sovereignty and originalism, the Article offers new responses to longstanding objections to popular-sovereignty-based originalist theories, such as the exclusion of women and enslaved Black people from the ratification process. Finally, having answered those criticisms, the Article shows that obeying the orig- inal meaning of the Constitution is necessary to preserve the legitimate authority of the people, which is essential to achieving the common good. This allows the Article to confront the core of the natural law critique: that originalism is incompatible with the natural law because it privileges the original meaning above the natural law when they are in conflict. The Article demonstrates that this critique overlooks the natural law limits on judicial authority that undergird the common good. By grounding originalism in a moral argument drawn from the natural law, this Article shows that, far from being a morally empty jurisprudence, originalism is justified by the moral authority of original meaning

The October 2021 Term and the Challenge to Progressive Constitutional Theory

This Essay examines the ways in which the Supreme Court\u27s October 2021 Term challenges core theoretical commitments of progressive constitutional theory. Progressive constitutional theory originated in the progressive political theory of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Accordingly, progressive constitutional theory shares progressive political theory\u27s commitments to two propositions: rationalism and individualism. These commitments lead to an understanding of history as moving in a particular direction--one that is generally in line with progressive ideology. The originalist and traditionalist approaches of the Court\u27s October 2021 decisions call into question the progressive confidence in the direction of history while simultaneously rejecting the rationalistic and individualistic premises of progressivism. This helps explain why many progressive constitutional theorists have found the Court\u27s decisions so disorienting and confounding. The October 2021 Term challenged--even though it did not definitively refute--the progressive narrative of constitutional redemption through history. The implications of the Court\u27s decisions will reverberate through American constitutional theory for decades to come

An Originalist Victory

Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey are no more. Like Plessy v. Ferguson before them, Roe and Casey were constitutionally and morally indefensible from the day they were decided, yet they endured for generations, becoming the foundation of a mass political movement that did all it could to prevent their overruling. Thus, like the overruling of Plessy, the overruling of Roe and Casey was by no means inevitable; it was the result of a half-century of disciplined, persistent, and prudent political, legal, and religious effort. The victory in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization was earned by the coalition of teachers and students, priests and parishioners, lawyers and politicians, who, through efforts as humble as parish potlucks and as prominent as federal litigation, brought about the most important legal and human rights achievement in America since Brown v. Board of Education

The Moral Authority of Original Meaning

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of originalism as represented by Vermeule, presenting an affirmative argument for originalism from within the natural law tradition. Although other theorists have offered natural law justifications for originalism, they have not yet developed a theory of legitimate authority, which is essential both to the natural law tradition and to originalism. This Article fills that gap by grounding originalism in the legitimate authority of the people-as-sovereign. In doing so, it draws upon and adapts centuries-old natural law arguments in favor of popular sovereignty that have rarely been mentioned in American law reviews and have never been presented as the basis for originalism. By creating a novel synthesis between this natural law theory of popular sovereignty and originalism, the Article offers new responses to longstanding objections to popular-sovereignty-based originalist theories, such as the exclusion of women and enslaved Black people from the ratification process. Finally, having answered those criticisms, the Article shows that obeying the original meaning of the Constitution is necessary to preserve the legitimate authority of the people, which is essential to achieving the common good. This allows the Article to confront the core of the natural law critique: that originalism is incompatible with the natural law because it privileges the original meaning above the natural law when they are in conflict. The Article demonstrates that this critique overlooks the natural law limits on judicial authority that undergird the common good. By grounding originalism in a moral argument drawn from the natural law, this Article shows that, far from being a morally empty jurisprudence, originalism is justified by the moral authority of original meaning

The Role of Emotion in Constitutional Theory

Although the role of emotion in law has become a major field of scholarship, there has been very little attention paid to the role of emotion in constitutional theory. This Article seeks to fill that gap by providing an integrated account of the role of emotion within the individual, how emotion affects constitutional culture, and how constitutional culture, properly understood, should affect our evaluation of major constitutional theories. The Article begins by reconstructing one of the most important and influential accounts of emotion in the philosophical literature: that of Thomas Aquinas. Because Aquinas’s description of the nature of emotion accords with modern science and the insights of many law-and-emotion theorists, it provides a firm foundation for an analysis of emotion in constitutional theory. Having laid that foundation, the Article examines the role of emotion in constitutional culture, the subset of national culture concerned with a constitution. Constitutional culture combines a society’s ideas about, and emotional attachments to, its constitution. Here, the Article develops a novel synthesis between Aquinas’s model of emotion and Edmund Burke’s sophisticated exploration of the importance of emotion in constitutional culture. Burke argues that theories of constitutional legitimacy shape constitutional culture and must accord with it. If a theory of legitimacy is at odds with a society’s constitutional culture, the society risks the instability of the regime. This insight—which is consistent with Aquinas’s model of emotion—is the primary basis for understanding the role of emotion in constitutional theory. Finally, the Article turns its attention to constitutional theory. Observing that popular sovereignty is the theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture, the Article argues—based on the synthesis of the Thomistic and Burkean accounts—that emotion should play an important role in evaluating the contours and viability oftheories of legitimacy. Theories of legitimacy that accord with popular sovereignty have a stronger argument in their favor because they reinforce the emotional attachments that lend stability to our Constitution. Theories of legitimacy that reject popular sovereignty, by contrast, must be modified or abandoned or, alternatively, must explain why attempts to change our constitutional culture will avoid the instability that the Thomistic and Burkean accounts would predict. The Article therefore has particular relevance to assessing radical constitutional theories—whether from the political right or the political left—that are critical of American constitutional culture. The Article concludes by exploring the implications of emotion for constitutional doctrine, focusing on stare decisis and the examples of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)