The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: The “Superfund” Myth and the Law of Unintended Consequences

Two months after the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP and the Obama White House announced the creation of the $20 billion Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust (“the Trust”) to pay individuals and businesses suffering losses arising from the disaster. Although BP initially paid certain claimants, Kenneth R. Feinberg, a Washington lawyer who previously administered the 9/11 Compensation Fund, opened the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“the Facility” or GCCF) in August to “independently” resolve disaster claims against BP. As publicly advertised, the Facility and the$20 billion Trust, to which it has access to pay claims, are designed to address claims by individuals and businesses but do not cover governmental claims for cleanup costs, lost revenues, or natural resource damages. The Superfund “myth” is that a trust fund would compensate victims expeditiously and avoid (or at least defer) litigation over the liability of potentially responsible parties. The myth of the GCCF created last year is the same – those injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster will be compensated expeditiously without the delays and costs associated with litigation. This Article explores some of the issues present in the GCCF context that are analogous to those that appeared during the formative years of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA’s unfortunate realities need not be the GCCF’s realities, at least not entirely. CERCLA is a law of unintended consequences, where the quest for quick compensation and remedial response (“shovels first, lawsuits later”) became a ponderous litigation-oriented regime with high transaction costs. This Article identifies potential unintended and undesired consequences for the GCCF by exploring the surrounding myths, with the hope that by doing so, some of those consequences experienced under CERCLA may be avoided. Part II explores the myth of the Superfund, examining the similarities between CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which is directly implicated in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Part III compares and contrasts the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, which establishes the $20 billion Trust with BP money and authorizes expenditures related to the incident, with the protocols now governing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility administered by Feinberg. Part IV compares aspects of CERCLA’s and OPA’s liability regimes, focusing on affirmative and partial defenses, the role of causation (especially proximate cause), the equitable allocation of responsibility among liable parties, and the related issue of the effect of partial settlements. Part V hones in on the ultimate critical issue – the competition among various categories of claimants, including the federal government, states, local governments, private businesses, and individuals, for BP’s money. Finally, Part VI shows how the GCCF has evolved while unintended consequences of the Facility’s original design have surfaced and continue to exist

Of Square Pegs, Round Holes and Recalcitrants Lying in the Weeds: Superfund\u27s Legal Lessons for Everglades Restoration

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal mejorar el proceso de ventas de la librería Comercial GD, por medio de la implementación de un sistema de información comercial, con una población de 46 procesos de ventas semanales para el tiempo promedio de atención al cliente y el tiempo promedio en registrar una compra, teniendo una muestra para estos dos indicadores de 41 procesos de venta; y con una población de 96 reportes de venta para el tiempo promedio en generar un reporte del día, teniendo como resultado una muestra de 77 reportes de venta para este tercer indicador. Se desarrolló bajo la metodología RUP, con el lenguaje de programación JAVA y el gestor de base de datos PostgreSQL. Se hizo la contrastación de hipótesis mediante la prueba paramétrica llamada Prueba Z, y se obtuvo en el primer indicador, que el tiempo promedio en atender un cliente con el sistema manual actual fue de 76.26 minutos, entretanto que con el sistema propuesto fue de 47.42 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el tiempo del 37.82%; en el segundo indicador, el tiempo promedio en registrar una venta con el sistema manual actual fue de 39.93 minutos, entretanto que con el sistema propuesto fue de 15.57 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el tiempo del 61%; y finalmente, el tercer indicador, el tiempo promedio en generar un reporte de venta del día con el sistema manual actual fue de 24.6 minutos, entretanto que con el sistema propuesto fue de 2 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el tiempo del 91.87%