40 research outputs found
Of Square Pegs, Round Holes and Recalcitrants Lying in the Weeds: Superfund\u27s Legal Lessons for Everglades Restoration
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: The “Superfund” Myth and the Law of Unintended Consequences
Two months after the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP and the Obama White House announced the creation of the 20 billion Trust, to which it has access to pay claims, are designed to address claims by individuals and businesses but do not cover governmental claims for cleanup costs, lost revenues, or natural resource damages.
The Superfund “myth” is that a trust fund would compensate victims expeditiously and avoid (or at least defer) litigation over the liability of potentially responsible parties. The myth of the GCCF created last year is the same – those injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster will be compensated expeditiously without the delays and costs associated with litigation. This Article explores some of the issues present in the GCCF context that are analogous to those that appeared during the formative years of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA’s unfortunate realities need not be the GCCF’s realities, at least not entirely. CERCLA is a law of unintended consequences, where the quest for quick compensation and remedial response (“shovels first, lawsuits later”) became a ponderous litigation-oriented regime with high transaction costs. This Article identifies potential unintended and undesired consequences for the GCCF by exploring the surrounding myths, with the hope that by doing so, some of those consequences experienced under CERCLA may be avoided.
Part II explores the myth of the Superfund, examining the similarities between CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which is directly implicated in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Part III compares and contrasts the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, which establishes the $20 billion Trust with BP money and authorizes expenditures related to the incident, with the protocols now governing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility administered by Feinberg. Part IV compares aspects of CERCLA’s and OPA’s liability regimes, focusing on affirmative and partial defenses, the role of causation (especially proximate cause), the equitable allocation of responsibility among liable parties, and the related issue of the effect of partial settlements. Part V hones in on the ultimate critical issue – the competition among various categories of claimants, including the federal government, states, local governments, private businesses, and individuals, for BP’s money. Finally, Part VI shows how the GCCF has evolved while unintended consequences of the Facility’s original design have surfaced and continue to exist
Lifting \u3cem\u3ePrintz\u3c/em\u3e off Dual Sovereignty: Back to a Functional Test for the Etiquette of Federalism
Product Line and Continuity of Enterprise Theories of Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA
Conscripting State Law to Protect Volunteers: The Odd Formulation of Federalism in Opt-Out Preemption
Of Square Pegs, Round Holes and Recalcitrants Lying in the Weeds: Superfund\u27s Legal Lessons for Everglades Restoration
La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal mejorar el proceso de ventas de
la librería Comercial GD, por medio de la implementación de un sistema de información
comercial, con una población de 46 procesos de ventas semanales para el tiempo promedio
de atención al cliente y el tiempo promedio en registrar una compra, teniendo una muestra
para estos dos indicadores de 41 procesos de venta; y con una población de 96 reportes de
venta para el tiempo promedio en generar un reporte del día, teniendo como resultado una
muestra de 77 reportes de venta para este tercer indicador. Se desarrolló bajo la
metodología RUP, con el lenguaje de programación JAVA y el gestor de base de
datos PostgreSQL. Se hizo la contrastación de hipótesis mediante la prueba paramétrica
llamada Prueba Z, y se obtuvo en el primer indicador, que el tiempo promedio en atender
un cliente con el sistema manual actual fue de 76.26 minutos, entretanto que con el
sistema propuesto fue de 47.42 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el
tiempo del 37.82%; en el segundo indicador, el tiempo promedio en registrar una venta con
el sistema manual actual fue de 39.93 minutos, entretanto que con el sistema propuesto
fue de 15.57 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el tiempo del 61%; y
finalmente, el tercer indicador, el tiempo promedio en generar un reporte de venta del día
con el sistema manual actual fue de 24.6 minutos, entretanto que con el sistema
propuesto fue de 2 minutos, obteniendo una reducción significativa en el tiempo del
91.87%