70 research outputs found
Uberâs âpartner-bossesâ
Uber has long claimed itâs a technology company, not a transportation company, and an intermediary that connects supply (drivers) with demand (passengers). The language Uber uses communicates a strong message of distance between itself and its relationship to drivers: Uber classifies drivers as independent contractors, labels them âdriver-partnersâ, and promotes them as entrepreneurs, although the company faces legal challenges over issues of worker misclassification. Uber relies on the politics of platforms to elude responsibility as a traditional employer, as well as regulatory regimes designed to govern traditional taxi businesses. The terminology Uber uses fosters a certain promise about the freedom of automated systems for organizing work that credits workers with a lot of autonomy and independence
The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power
Sharing economy firms such as Uber and Airbnb facilitate trusted transactions between strangers on digital platforms. This creates economic and other value and raises a set of concerns around racial bias, safety, and fairness to competitors and workers that legal scholarship has begun to address. Missing from the literature, however, is a fundamental critique of the sharing economy grounded in asymmetries of information and power. This Article, coauthored by a law professor and a technology ethnographer who studies the ride-hailing community, furnishes such a critique and indicates a path toward a meaningful response. Commercial firms have long used what they know about consumers to shape their behavior and maximize profits. By virtue of sitting between consumers and providers of services, however, sharing economy firms have a unique capacity to monitor and nudge all participants â including people whose livelihood may depend on the platform. Much activity is hidden away from view, but preliminary evidence suggests that sharing economy firms may already be leveraging their access to information about users and their control over the user experience to mislead, coerce, or otherwise disadvantage sharing economy participants. This Article argues that consumer protection law, with its longtime emphasis of asymmetries of information and power, is relatively well positioned to address this under-examined aspect of the sharing economy. But the regulatory response to date seems outdated and superficial. To be effective, legal interventions must (1) reflect a deeper understanding of the acts and practices of digital platforms and (2) interrupt the incentives of sharing economy firms to abuse their position
Reputation Agent: Prompting Fair Reviews in Gig Markets
Our study presents a new tool, Reputation Agent, to promote fairer reviews
from requesters (employers or customers) on gig markets. Unfair reviews,
created when requesters consider factors outside of a worker's control, are
known to plague gig workers and can result in lost job opportunities and even
termination from the marketplace. Our tool leverages machine learning to
implement an intelligent interface that: (1) uses deep learning to
automatically detect when an individual has included unfair factors into her
review (factors outside the worker's control per the policies of the market);
and (2) prompts the individual to reconsider her review if she has incorporated
unfair factors. To study the effectiveness of Reputation Agent, we conducted a
controlled experiment over different gig markets. Our experiment illustrates
that across markets, Reputation Agent, in contrast with traditional approaches,
motivates requesters to review gig workers' performance more fairly. We discuss
how tools that bring more transparency to employers about the policies of a gig
market can help build empathy thus resulting in reasoned discussions around
potential injustices towards workers generated by these interfaces. Our vision
is that with tools that promote truth and transparency we can bring fairer
treatment to gig workers.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures, The Web Conference 2020, ACM WWW 202
Good Gig, Bad Gig: Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global Gig Economy
This article evaluates the job quality of work in the remote gig economy. Such work consists of the remote provision of a wide variety of digital services mediated by online labour platforms. Focusing on workers in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the article draws on semi-structured interviews in six countries (N = 107) and a cross-regional survey (N = 679) to detail the manner in which remote gig work is shaped by platform-based algorithmic control. Despite varying country contexts and types of work, we show that algorithmic control is central to the operation of online labour platforms. Algorithmic management techniques tend to offer workers high levels of flexibility, autonomy, task variety and complexity. However, these mechanisms of control can also result in low pay, social isolation, working unsocial and irregular hours, overwork, sleep deprivation and exhaustion
POTs: Protective Optimization Technologies
Algorithmic fairness aims to address the economic, moral, social, and
political impact that digital systems have on populations through solutions
that can be applied by service providers. Fairness frameworks do so, in part,
by mapping these problems to a narrow definition and assuming the service
providers can be trusted to deploy countermeasures. Not surprisingly, these
decisions limit fairness frameworks' ability to capture a variety of harms
caused by systems.
We characterize fairness limitations using concepts from requirements
engineering and from social sciences. We show that the focus on algorithms'
inputs and outputs misses harms that arise from systems interacting with the
world; that the focus on bias and discrimination omits broader harms on
populations and their environments; and that relying on service providers
excludes scenarios where they are not cooperative or intentionally adversarial.
We propose Protective Optimization Technologies (POTs). POTs provide means
for affected parties to address the negative impacts of systems in the
environment, expanding avenues for political contestation. POTs intervene from
outside the system, do not require service providers to cooperate, and can
serve to correct, shift, or expose harms that systems impose on populations and
their environments. We illustrate the potential and limitations of POTs in two
case studies: countering road congestion caused by traffic-beating
applications, and recalibrating credit scoring for loan applicants.Comment: Appears in Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
(FAT* 2020). Bogdan Kulynych and Rebekah Overdorf contributed equally to this
work. Version v1/v2 by Seda G\"urses, Rebekah Overdorf, and Ero Balsa was
presented at HotPETS 2018 and at PiMLAI 201
Production, consumers' convenience, and cynical economies: The case of Uber in Buenos Aires
Based on twelve months of fieldwork into Uber's conflict in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article examines convenience's role in the emergence of what I call cynical economies: a method and logic of production expressly organized on the awareness of a distance the very rhetoric of convenience exacerbates. For the city's middle class, convenience defined a democratizing, empowering arena of private relations away from the hierarchies and exclusions proper to the private sphere. As Uber's ratings translated consumers' experiences into a political economy for the trade, drivers organized the production of the ride knowing that whatever exceeded the immediate intelligibility of the experience could not matter in that political economy. In the process, cynical economies delegitimize complex and inherently social categories like risk, responsibility, and liability, as well as the social sphere that frames them, without offering an alternative order in return
Algorithmic Accountability
Accountability is fundamentally about checks and balances to power. In theory, both government and corporations are kept accountable through social, economic, and political mechanisms. Journalism and public advocates serve as an additional tool to hold powerful institutions and individuals accountable. But in a world of data and algorithms, accountability is often murky. Beyond questions about whether the market is sufficient or governmental regulation is necessary, how should algorithms be held accountable? For example what is the role of the fourth estate in holding data-oriented practices accountable
Predicting Human Behavior
Countless highly accurate predictions can be made from trace data, with varying degrees of personal or societal consequence (e.g., search engines predict hospital admission, gaming
companies can predict compulsive gambling problems, government agencies predict criminal activity). Predicting human behavior can be both hugely beneficial and deeply problematic depending on the context. What kinds of predictive privacy harms are emerging? And what are the implications for systems of oversight and due process protections? For example, what are the implications for employment, health care and policing when predictive models are involved? How should varied organizations address what they can predict
Inequalities and Asymmetries
The availability of data is not evenly distributed. Some organizations, agencies, and sectors are better equipped to gather, use, and analyze data than others. If data is transformative, what are the consequences of defense and security agencies having greater capacity to leverage data than, say, education or social services? Financial wherewithal, technical capacity, and political determinants all affect where data is employed. As data and analytics emerge, who benefits and who doesn't, both at the individual level and the institutional level? What about the asymmetries between those who provide the data and those who collect it? How does uneven data access affect broader issues of inequality? In what ways does data magnify or combat asymmetries in
power
Networked Employment Discrimination
Employers often struggle to assess qualified applicants, particularly in contexts where they receive hundreds of applications for job openings. In an effort to increase efficiency and improve the process, many have begun employing new tools to sift through these applications, looking for signals that a candidate is âthe best fit.â Some companies use tools that offer algorithmic assessments of workforce data to identify the variables that lead to stronger employee performance, or to high employee attrition rates, while others turn to third party ranking services to identify the top applicants in a labor pool. Still others eschew automated systems, but rely heavily on publicly available data to assess candidates beyond their applications. For example, some HR managers turn to LinkedIn to determine if a candidate knows other employees or to identify additional information about them or their networks. Although most companies do not intentionally engage in discriminatory hiring practices (particularly on the basis of protected classes), their reliance on automated systems, algorithms, and existing networks systematically benefits some at the expense of others, often without employers even recognizing the biases of such mechanisms. The intersection of hiring practices and the Big Data phenomenon has not produced inherently new challenges. While this paper addresses issues of privacy, fairness, transparency, accuracy, and inequality under the rubric of discrimination, it does not pivot solely around the legal definitions of discrimination under current federal anti-discrimination law. Rather, it describes a number of areas where issues of inherent bias intersect with, or come into conflict with, socio-cultural notions of fairness
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