Knowledge diffusion from FDI and Intellectual Property Rights

We study the extent to which a country's strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection mediates knowledge spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Following the opposing views in the IPR debate, we propose a negative effect of IPR strength on unintentional horizontal (intra-industry) knowledge diffusion. Using a unique firm-level dataset of large, publicly traded firms in 22 (mostly) developed countries, we find partial support for these expectations. Strong IPR indeed reduces horizontal knowledge diffusion, while it stimulates backward (to suppliers) knowledge diffusion. Somewhat unexpectedly however, we also find that forward (to customers) knowledge diffusion decreases with IPR strength. In general, and in line with earlier literature, the results regarding backward knowledge diffusion are most robust to changes in model specification. Our results contribute to the debate regarding the desirability of strengthening national IPR systems, and suggest that local firms might indeed benefit from this through their (backward) linkages with multinationals. Additionally, our results suggest that the moderating effect of IPR strength might partly explain the inconclusive results in the FDI knowledge diffusion literature.

Proceedings of the Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents

This paper addresses the discussion about the desirability of international trade. It starts out from the stylized observation that trade economists and ‘anti-globalists’ not only reject each others conclusions, but also the validity of the reference frame in which the other side makes its arguments. We mend for this problem, constructing a rational dialogue between the various parties by making differences in criteria and modes of analysis explicit. Instead of seeking to develop a comprehensive common framework, we adopt a ‘pluralist’ position, in which we only create a common structure in so far as necessary for meaningful dialogue. We judge the effects of trade as they follow from both the analytical models used by proponents and opponents and from the perspectives of both the criteria used by proponents and opponents. Applying different criteria to both standard and poverty-sensitive trade models, we find that both camps have valid cases, but also that diagonally opposite positions do not necessarily lead to different judgements regarding the desirability of trade. Once differences in preconceptions and criteria are cleared, a fruitful debate is therefore possible. We conclude that the debate about free trade cannot be settled by economics and should in the end take place in the moral and political arena.international trade, globalization,

Look before you leap: the economics of free trade and income redistribution

Economists tend to exalt the virtues of free international trade, while politicians are more skeptical. This paper suggests that this is the case because politicians mainly worry about the income distribution effects of trade liberalization, while economists focus on efficiency. Using textbook economic analyses we show that compensating the income distribution effects of free trade may be more complicated and hazardous than is often assumed, at least from a comparative static point of view. Hence politicians may favor trade liberalization only when distributional effects are ignored. By using a multitude of analytical tools and approaches, our paper also makes a useful teaching case for undergraduate students to test and gear their thinking about trade policy issues

Fixing soft margins

Non-parametric tolerance limits are employed to calculate soft margins such as advocated in Williamson's target zone proposal. In particular, the tradeoff between softness and zone width is quantified. This may be helpful in choosing appropriate margins. Furthermore, it offers policymakers a framework for reference in the case of changing exchange rate policy. The empirical applications include an evaluation of the EMS zone width. We also show that the procedures for calculating the soft margins are robust against alternative data-generating mechanisms

Trade liberalization and its fiscal implications in a north-south trade model

We study the fiscal implications of trade liberalization in a North-South trade model with nonhomothetic preferences. Combining a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of competitive goods and a public good, nonhomothetic preferences imply that both the global income distribution and the local income distribution matter for gauging the effects of different trade liberalization regimes on income taxes and public good provision. The fiscal implications of tariff reductions are typically more adverse for poorer countries than for richer countries. We also find that unilateral trade liberalization by richer countries is a more viable policy option to pursue than multilaterally reducing tariffs

Does preferential trade benefit poor countries? A general equilibrium assessment with nonhomothetic preferences

We study the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTA) in a model where income matters for consumption patterns. We develop a three-country Ricardian trade model in which goods are ranked according to priority and where economies differ in their income level. The poorest (richest) country has a comparative advantage in the production of lowest-ranked (highest-ranked) goods, specializing in goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand. The medium rich country specializes in the production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. We find that being a nonmember of PTA leads to a terms of trade deterioration for a poor country, and a terms of trade improvement for the high-income country. Becoming a member of a PTA also does not guarantee welfare gains for the low income country, unless it is so poor that it cannot import the higher-ranked goods that the rich country produces

Hub and spoke bilateralism and the global income distribution

We study the effects of hub and spoke liberalization in a model where income matters for consumption patterns. We use a three-country Ricardian trade model in which goods are ranked according to priority and where economies differ in their income level. The poorest (richest) country has a comparative advantage in the production of lowest-ranked (highest-ranked) goods, specializing in goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand. The medium rich country specializes in the production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. We find that a country’s income level is of decisive importance for assessing the impact of hub and spoke arrangements on welfare. Hubs do not necessarily gain and spokes do not necessarily lose