Structural estimates of equilibrium unemployment in six OECD economies

In Europe, neither unemployment rates nor institutions are uniform. In the EMU, countries have coordinated their monetary policy, and fiscal policy might follow. Does convergence in fiscal policy imply that unemployment rates will converge, too, or is diversified fiscal policy desirable? An answer to this question requires insight into the dependence on fiscal policy of the unemployment rate in equilibrium. This study estimates the equilibrium rate of unemployment and shows that it has been affected significantly by taxes and benefits. Uniform fiscal policy would not, however, harmonise the unemployment rates because the impact of policy varies widely across the OECD economies.

New Economic Geography, Empirics, and Regional Policy

There are doubts about the effectiveness of regional policy. Well known are the vain attempts of Italy to bridge the gap between the Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap between the Neue Länder and the West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional disparities in general. We validate a salient explanation for the lack of effectiveness: agglomeration advantages lock business activity in relatively prosperous core regions, even though wages and production costs tend to be higher there. On the basis of the `New Economic Geography' - a set of general equilibrium models that focus on location choice - in combination with descriptive statistics and econometric analysis, we conclude that the European economic geography is characterized by a network of local and stable core-periphery systems. Since regional policy tend to be insufficient to counter centripetal market forces, disparities between cores and their peripheries at a subprovincial level of regional aggregation are with us to stay. Moreover, if regional policy does have an impact, it may be adverse as some policies targeted on peripheral regions trigger location choices in favour of core regions.

Documentation of CORTAX

CORTAX is applied in Bettendorf et al. (2006), a simulation study on the economic and welfare implications of reforms in corporate income taxation. This technical documentation of the model consists of the derivation and listing of the equations of the model and a justification of the calibration.

BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2008. IS EU COORDINATION NEEDED FOR CORPORATE TAXATION?

Should EU-member states give up their rights to design their own corporate income tax? Currently, member states are free to set their tax rates and are allowed to design their tax base as long as it does not constitute harmful tax competition. This is regulated in the Code of Conduct, which is not a legally binding instrument but does have political force. By adopting this Code, the member states have undertaken to roll back existing tax measures that constitute harmful tax competition and refrain from introducing any such measures in the future

Who benefits from tax competition in the European Union?

Statutory tax rates have declined in the European Union in the recent decades. An applied general equilibrium model on corporate taxation sheds light on the economic and welfare implications of tax rate reforms. Domestic distortions proof highly relevant as even unilateral reductions of the corporate income tax rate might reduce welfare if the labour tax rate has to be increased. Profit shifting induces countries to underbid each others tax rates, but this effect is sizable only if two countries are closely linked. The harmful external effects of CIT rate reductions are limited, which reduces the need for European coordination of CIT rates.

Innovation policy; Europe or the member states?

Innovation seldom has purely domestic causes and consequences, but how can a European innovation policy complement or substitute national policies? Taking the subsidiarity principle as a starting point, this report discusses the economic rationale of a European innovation policy. Explorative empirical analysis suggests that public R&D and public funding of private R&D are subject to economies of scale and external effects. This is an argument in favour of a European innovation policy but amongst other things, the heterogeneity in social economic objectives on public R&D spending between Member States pleas for national government involvement. In addition, there are scale economies in the protection of intellectual property and in the development of standards. We conclude that a European innovation policy could have, or already has, substantial benefits over purely national policy in these areas. With respect to innovation policies targeted at SMEs, we do not find economies of scale or external effects. It seems to be efficient that these policies are mainly conducted at the national level.

Does employment affect productivity?

We investigate the trade-off between employment and labour productivity in a panel of OECD countries in 1970-2003. The endogeneity of employment is shown to matter crucially for assessing its effect on productivity. Estimating a structural model with 3SLS, where employment depends on demographic variables and labour market institutions, we find that employment tends to boost productivity. Literature ignoring the endogeneity of employment, including our own OLS results, incorrectly finds a negative or insignificant effect from employment on productivity. The productivity gain is, however, not a guaranteed by-product of additional employment, as regressions with rolling windows reveal.

Will corporate tax consolidation improve efficiency in the EU?

Consolidation of the tax base in the European Union is expected to curve compliance costs and reduce profit shifting. A number of proposals for consolidation from the European Commission are simulated with the applied general equilibrium model CORTAX. We show that the benefits from consolidation are offset by two weaknesses in the proposals for a common consolidated tax base. Formula apportionment, which is needed to allocate the consolidated taxable profits across jurisdictions, creates new tax planning possibilities for MNEs and allows them to benefit from existing tax rate differentials in the European Union. In addition, it triggers tax competition as member states may attract foreign investment by reducing their tax rates. The second distortion is an unlevel playing field, which is introduced if only part of the firms participate in the consolidation. The gains from consolidation can be fully grasped if it is obliged for all firms and if it is accompanied by a harmonisation of the tax rate.

Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced cooperation in the European Union

This article assesses the economic implications of the introduction of consolidation with formula apportionment in the European Union under alternative enhanced cooperation agreements. We find that the consolidation is likely to yield a small aggregate welfare gain in Europe, but that not all countries benefit. A coalition of winning countries reduces the welfare gain and may induce a process of adverse selection that reduces the number of participating countries. We find that a coalition of similar countries (in terms of the size of their multinational sector) is more feasible in achieving agreement and is actually preferred by those countries over a European-wide reform.

New economic geography, empirics, and regional policy

There are doubts about the effectiveness of regional policy. Well known are the fruitless attempts of Italy to bridge the gap between the Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap between the Neue Länder and the West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional disparities in general. We validate one explanation: agglomeration advantages lock business activity in relatively prosperous core regions, even though wages – and thus production costs – tend to be higher there. We set off from the ‘New Economic Geography’, a set of general equilibrium models that focus on location choice. Theory, descriptive statistics, and econometric analysis support the conclusion that the European economic geography is characterized by a network of local and stable core periphery systems. This implies that disparities between core regions and their peripheries at a (sub) provincial level of regional aggregation are with us to stay, as regional policy targeted on peripheries tends to be insufficient to counter centripetal market forces. Moreover, even if such policy has an impact, it may be adverse, as core regions may benefit disproportionately in the long run. A focus of regional policy on local agglomerations, which have a realistic chance to hold on to economic activity, is therefore desirable.