Credit risk and governance: evidence from credit default swap spreads

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder governance mechanisms on the firms' credit risk through credit default swap spreads. Our results suggest that higher and takeover provisions decrease the price of debt. We find that on average, addition of one antitakeover provision lowers the CDS spread by 3.46 basis points. In addition, we find that this effect is more pronounced for smaller, highly levered, low-rated, and less profitable firms. Since these firms arguably carry a higher financial distress risk, it appears that bondholders favor weaker shareholder governance when the conflict of interest between the shareholders and the bondholders peak

The impact of debt covenants on earnings announcement returns

We study the impact of debt covenants on earnings announcement returns, using event-study methodology, by creating 10 covenant groups and a covenant index. We find that during bad news, whether it stems from a bad earnings surprise based on analyst forecasts or a negative average market reaction, both the index and most covenant groups display a significantly negative impact on announcement returns. For good news, particularly when the market reaction is positive on average, we also observe a significantly positive effect from some covenant groups, but not the index. The strongest impact on returns comes mostly from debt-related covenants such as leverage tests, cross-default clause and debt issue restrictions. Finally, we also show that regardless of firm characteristics, risk measures or exposure to information asymmetry, most covenants have a negative impact on announcement returns for all firms when the news is bad. For the full sample and the good news subsample, however, we find that small, risky firms with high information asymmetry issues are rewarded by the market and vice versa

Are blockchain and cryptocurrency M&As harder to close?

We investigate whether distinctive features of the blockchain/cryptocurrency industry led to different completion rates of the announced mergers and acquisitions (M&As), relative to other industries, during the years 2013–2022. Despite having a significantly lower deal closure rate on average, we find that this effect is contained only in a few years and does not span the entire decade. We also find that bitcoin prices are an important determinant of the industry's deal completion rate. Our findings may help give a glimpse into the eventual fate of the most recent deals announced during the crypto crash that started in early 2022

The impact of debt covenants on earnings announcement returns

We study the impact of debt covenants on earnings announcement returns by creating 10 covenant groups and a covenant index using event-study methodology. We find that during bad news, whether it stems from a bad earnings surprise or a negative average market reaction, both the index and most covenant groups display a significantly negative impact on announcement returns. For good news, particularly when the market reaction is positive on average, we also observe a significantly positive effect from some covenant groups, but not the index. One exception is the debt issue restriction covenant which shows significant effects in the opposite direction of the market reaction. The strongest impact on returns comes mostly from debt-related covenants such as leverage tests, cross-default clause and debt issue restrictions. Among the merger-related (shareholder payout) covenants, poison put (share repurchase) exhibits the largest impact. Finally, we also show that regardless of firm characteristics, risk measures or exposure to information asymmetry, covenants have a negative impact on announcement returns for all firms when the news is bad. For the full sample and the good news subsample, however, we find that small, risky firms with high information asymmetry issues are rewarded by the market and vice versa

The effect of unionization on industry merger activity around negative economy-wide shocks

We investigate the effect of labor unionization on industry-level takeover activity after negative economy-wide shocks. Focusing on the 2008 financial crisis, we find that merger intensities drop significantly during the post-crisis period, though the degree of unionization in an industry attenuates this negative effect. Our analyses of the 2001 and 1990 economic recessions lead to similar results. While unionization is known to deter M&A activity on average, our results indicate that in dire times, when firm survival is at risk, unions appear to resist relatively less to restructuring activities in the form of mergers