3 research outputs found
Open Sesame: A Novel Non-SAT-Attack against CAS-Lock
CAS-Lock (proposed in CHES2020), is an advanced logic locking technique that harnesses the concept of single-point function in providing SAT-attack resiliency. It is claimed to be powerful and efficient enough in mitigating state-of-the-art attacks against logic locking techniques. Despite the security robustness of CAS-Lock as claimed by the authors, we expose a serious vulnerability by exploiting the same and device a novel attack algorithm. The proposed attack can reveal the correct key by extracting the Distinguishing Input Patterns (DIPs) pertaining to a carefully chosen key simulation of the locked design. The correct key is obtained from the combination of elements from the set of extracted DIPs.
Our attack is successful against various AND/OR cascaded-chain configurations of CAS-Lock and reports a 100% success rate in recovering the correct key
NiLoPher: Breaking a Modern SAT-Hardened Logic-Locking Scheme via Power Analysis Attack
LoPher brings, for the first time, cryptographic security promises to the field of logic locking in a bid to break the game of cat-and-mouse seen in logic locking. Toward this end, LoPher embeds the circuitry to lock within multiple rounds of a block cipher, by carefully configuring all the S-Boxes. To realize general Boolean functionalities and to support varying interconnect topologies, LoPher also introduces additional layers of MUXes between S-Boxes and the permutation operations. The authors of LoPher claim resilience against SAT-based attacks in particular. Here, we show the first successful attack on LoPher. First, we uncover a significant limitation for LoPher’s key-space configuration, resulting in large numbers of equivalent keys and, thus, a largely simplified search space for attackers in practice. Second, motivated by their well-proven working against ciphers, we employ a power side-channel attack against LoPher. We find that ISCAS-85 benchmarks locked with LoPher can all be broken in few thousands of traces. Finally, we also outline a simple and low-cost countermeasure to render LoPher more secure