Trans-modernism and a Legon tradition of African philosophy

Philosophic strands certainly underlie the characteristic claims of modernism, the creed whose foundational assumptions postmodern philosophy repudiates. This paper defends the thesis that three Ghanaian philosophers, who have been affiliated to the University of Ghana, Legon, have successfully created and defended a systematic and humanistic approach to philosophy in the African context that merits the status of a tradition of philosophy; and that these pioneers of a Legon tradition of philosophy espouse an eclectic, “trans-modernist” outlook that appropriates aspects of modernism and rejects some post-modernist features

Africa's development : the imperatives of indigenous knowledge and values

In post-colonial Africa, conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as the theories and strategies for achieving them have remained a territory traversed predominantly by non-African social scientists. In this context, social scientists studying Africa's development proclaimed, at the dawn of the 1990s, a "paradigmatic crisis" and embarked on a quest for new paradigms . In advancing this quest, a number of "homegrown" development strategies have emerged. This work argues that these are mere adaptations and reconstructions of dominant Eurocentic paradigms that exaggerate the value of economic goods and wealth creation founded on a competitive marketplace by making them immutable features of development. Yet the ethic of competition theoretically condones a trajectory of killing in the quest for wealth accumulation. In this way, internalist epistemologies perpetuate epistemicide and valuecide in Africa's strides towards development. The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies has resulted in the impasse of rationality. By this we mean that Reason, apotheosized since the Enlightenment, has advanced humanity out of barbarism to "civilization" but has now placed humanity on the brink of unredeemable barbarism. Reason, through its manifestations in the philosophy of Mutual Assured Destruction and global warming, has condemned humanity to willful but avoidable suicide. Since the subjects and objects of development must be one and the same, development is necessarily culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare as its ultimate aims. Accordingly, we defend the thesis that it is necessary for a framework meant for Africa's development to be founded on indigenous knowledge and values, if it is to succeed. And at this moment of impasse reached by Reason, an African ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on humaneness and "life is mutual aid", can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate Africa's development efforts from the intoxicating prison of profit making. Hence the institutions and frameworks devoted to Africa's development, such as the Constitution and Strategic Plan of the African Union as well as NEPAD, must incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating from the knowledge and ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the African future.Philosophy, Practical and Systematic TheologyD. Phil. (Philosophy

From 'man is the measure of all things' to money is the measure of all things : a dialogue between Protagoras and African philosophy

Protagoras’ declaration that “man is the measure of all things” is conventionally discussed in the context of epistemology. There was, however, a communal or social dimension to this even in ancient Greece. In the unfolding process of time, this latter dimension assumed greater intensity and expanded systematically into all aspects of human relations. The centrality of money in these relations speaks to the transition from “man is the measure of all things” to money is the measure of all things. It is precisely this thesis that the present essay proposes to defend

Kantian ethics and African philosophy: receptivity and disputations

African philosophers have long engaged with Kant’s practical philosophy. Since the 1980s, much of this engagement has been with Kant’s anthropology of race and its role in the theoretical foundations of racism and European colonization. Our paper departs from this latter orientation by examining Ghanaian philosophical reflections on the Categorical Imperative, which Kant sets out as the supreme principle of practical reason. We assess this critique, and conclude that while the Ghanaian philosophers accept several aspects of Kantian ethics, they depart from Kant’s idealist metaphysics and associated dualistic conception of human nature. More specifically, while the Ghanaian philosophers accept Kant’s universalizability demands in relation to moral judgement, they also make a sustained case, contra Kant, in favour of the role of the emotions in moral motivation. The paper thus contributes to broader efforts underway to enrich the discourse on the reception of Kant’s philosophy in the global south

Two Steps Forward: An African Relational Account of Moral Standing

This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, “The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.” In the original paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implica- tions for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of ‘pro-social,’ and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots

Reporting on African responses to COVID-19: African philosophical perspectives for addressing quandaries in the global justice debate

The first case of COVID-19 infection in Africa was recorded in Egypt on 14 February 2020. Following this, several projections of the possible devastating effect that the virus can have on the population of African countries were made in the Western media. This paper presents evidence for Africa’s successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and under-reporting or misrepresentation of these successes in Western media. It proceeds to argue for accounting for these successes in terms of Africa’s communitarian way of life and conceptions of self, duty, and rights; and that a particular orientation in theorizing on global justice can highlight the injustices inherent in the misrepresentation of these successes and contribute shared perspectives to formulating a framework of values and concepts that would facilitate the implementation of global policy goals for justice. The paper is thus grounded in a rejection of the insular tenets of theorizing prevalent in the global justice debate and to persistent inclinations in Western scholarship to the thinking that theorizing in the African context that draws inspiration from the cultural past has little to contribute to the quest for justice globally. On the contrary, it argues that reflexive critique of cultural history is a necessary source of normative ideals that can foster tolerant coexistence and a cooperative endeavour toward shared conceptions of justice in the contemporary world

Consciencism, Ubuntu, and Justice

Mkhwanazi (2017) has argued that Consciencism is an “expression of ubuntu” and that it “represents the essential elements of ubuntu”. Both Consciencism and ubuntu, according to him, are engaged with the re-humanization of African society for they both advocate for the restitution of humanist and egalitarian principles found in traditional African societies. In this paper, we argue that while Consciencism and ubuntu share common principles, the one cannot be understood as an expression or representation of the other. Rather, the principles they share should be understood as emanating from, and animated by, a primary source: traditional African communalism. This primary source is a true reflection and evidence of the commonality of the philosophical underpinnings of African thought – Consciencism, rooted in Akan (Ghanaian) thought and practices, and ubuntu, which is rooted in the thought and practices of peoples of Southern Africa. We highlight the significant differences between Consciencism as a philosophical system and ubuntu as an ethic or worldview of practical action, and in particular, their responses to the issue of justice. We submit that Consciencism can embrace the ethic of ubuntu in its harmonization of the conflicting heritages of African society; and that ubuntu can evolve into a system of thought by taking a cue from the systematicity and coherence of the philosophical anchoring of Consciencism