TESTING FOR MARKET SHARE STABILITY AND CARTELS

One of the most challenging problems to applied industrial economists is the detection of colluding behavior in oligopolistic markets. In this paper we postulate how low market share variability may be used as a primary indicator of cartel success to maintain the agreed upon levels of production, after controlling from exogenous fluctuations in the economic environment and the market structure. To test this hypothesis we use a unique data set consisting of government-sanctioned cartels in Sweden from 1976 to 1990. The use of a measure of share stability is shown to be an interesting and potentially informative statistic for making comparisons when the cartel agreement is in effect and when it is absent. The conclusion supports our hypothesis that horizontal price fixing cartels are significantly associated with a lower instability than in its absence. The normative implication of the paper is that a measure of market share variability may provide a basic framework for antitrust authorities to call for attention on the possible existence of tacit collusion in industries with similar market structure but significant differences in market share stability.Industrial Organization, Antitrust Economics, Panel Data Analysis

A Note on Strategic Delegation: The Role of Decreasing Returns to Scale

We build a model of optimal design of managerial incentive schemes when the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale and firms compete à la Cournot. We borrow Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Kräkel (2005) framework. We show how there is a dominant strategy for entrepreneurs to delegate output decisions. Results depend on the degree of diseconomies of scale. We demostrate how for a class of parameters, managers may increase profits through delegation, a result that with constant returns does not hold.

MARKET POWER IN THE SPANISH WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET

In the context of the recent electricity market reforms in Europe and the US, we evaluate the performance of the Spanish pool. Our method is not based on price-cost estimates but rather on the different behavior of operators with higher market power as compared to the behavior of more competitive operators. Our results indicate that the two larger operators in the market are able to increase prices by a significant amount as compared to the situation in which each plant is run independently.electricity market, competition, auction, market power

Economic Growth and Electricity Consumption in 12 European Countries: A Causality Analysis Using Panel Data

We apply recent panel methodology to investigate the relationship between electricity consumption and real GDP for a set of 12 European Union countries using annual data for the period 1970-2004. Recently developed tests for panel unit roots, cointegration in heterogeneous panels and panel causality are employed. The results show a long-run relationship between the series. We estimate this relationship and test for causality. We find no short-run causality in any direction. These results might help to design appropriate electricity consumption policies in the sample countries, as well as investment policies in interconnections to build a single European market for electricity.electricity consumption, economic growth, panel cointegration, panel causality

A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market

We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant which are to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Operator (OMEL) from May 2001 to December 2003. Our results indicate that the prediction of the model holds.supply function competition, electricity market

Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction

Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.market power, electricity market

A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags

In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.optimal punishments, detection lags, collusion sustainability

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors

The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.We thank MICINN (SEJ2006-06309 and ECO2009-09120) and Gobierno Vasco (DEUI, IT-313-07) for their financial support