"The Euro’s Surprises"

On 22 September last, the ECB and the Fed intervened to support the euro, which had fallen to $0.84. Two years previously, most economists had guessed that the euro would be a strong currency. They were optimistic about the outlook for growth in Europe and worried over the prospects of America’s trade deficit. Accordingly, they felt that the euro would provide an attractive alternative investment to the dollar. In practice, the strength of the American economy, fired by the New Economy, has attracted record investments across the Atlantic. Trends in the real economy continue to play a vital role in setting exchange rates. The capacity of the euro-zone to enter this “New Era” will largely determine the future parity of the single currency. In the short term, better predictability of European policy would help to reduce uncertainties that currently penalise the currency

What international monetary system for a fast-changing world economy

Though the renminbi is not yet convertible, the international monetary regime has already started to move towards a 'multipolar' system, with the dollar, the euro and the renminbi as its key likely pillars. This shift corresponds to the long-term evolution of the balance of economic weight in the world economy. Such an evolution may mitigate some of the flaws of the present (non-) system, such as the rigidity of key exchange rates, the asymmetry of balance of-payments adjustments or what remains of the Triffin dilemma. However it may exacerbate other problems, such as short-run exchange rate volatility or the scope for â??currency warsâ??, while leaving key questions unresolved, such as the response to capital flows global liquidity provision. Hence, in itself, a multipolar regime can be both the best and the worst of all regimes.Which of these alternatives will materialise depends on the degree of cooperation within a multilateral framework.

The G20 in the aftermath of the crisis: a Euro-Asian view

In 2009 the global economy switched from recession to recovery. However, the pace of the recovery has been very different in different parts of the world, with the divergence between emerging and mature economies becoming greater than expected. Europe and emerging Asia are in this respect in clearly opposite situations, while the Japanese situation is closer to that of Europe than to those of its neighbours (Figure 1 on the next page).

Comment définir les "circonstances exceptionnelles" ?

Dans sa version initiale, le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance (PSC) fixe à 3% le déficit public maximumpour chacun des pays membres de la zone euro. Toutefois, afin d'éviter de subir les procéduresde déficit public excessif, les pays peuvent éventuellement se prévaloir de "circonstances exceptionnelles".Celles-ci sont parfaitement codifiées : avec une récession supérieure à 2%, un pays peut lesinvoquer et donc s'affranchir de la limite de 3% de déficit public. Avec une récession comprise entre0,75 et 2%, des négociations sont engagées pour le déclenchement éventuel des sanctions

Fiscal Sustainability in the Presence of Systemic Banks: the Case of EU countries

International audienceWe provide a first attempt to include off-balance sheet, implicit insurance to SIFIs into a consistent assessment of fiscal sustainability, for 27 countries of the European Union. We first calculate tax gaps à la Blanchard (1990) and Blanchard et al. (1990). We then introduce two alternative measures of implicit off-balance sheet liabilities related to the risk of a systemic bank crisis. The first one relies on microeconomic data at the bank level. The second one is based on econometric estimations of the probability and the cost of a systemic banking crisis. The former approach provides an upper evaluation of the fiscal cost of systemic banking crises, whereas the latter one provides a lower one. Hence we believe that the combined use of these two methodologies helps to gauge the range of fiscal risk

The G20 is not just a G7 with extra chairs

The G20 is not just a G7 with Extra Chairs is a joint paper written by Agnes Benassy-Quere, Rajiv Kumar and Jean Pisani-Ferry (Director of Bruegel) following the International Cooperation in Times of Global Crisis: Views from G20 Countries conference in Delhi  on 14th and 15th of September, organised by Bruegel, CEPII and ICRIER. The publication draws together the authorsâ?? conclusions from the Delhi conference and reviews the real role of the G20, while questioning where the non-G7 interests fit into the groupâ??s agenda.

Comment définir les "circonstances exceptionnelles" ?

Dans sa version initiale, le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance (PSC) fixe à 3% le déficit public maximumpour chacun des pays membres de la zone euro. Toutefois, afin d'éviter de subir les procéduresde déficit public excessif, les pays peuvent éventuellement se prévaloir de "circonstances exceptionnelles".Celles-ci sont parfaitement codifiées : avec une récession supérieure à 2%, un pays peut lesinvoquer et donc s'affranchir de la limite de 3% de déficit public. Avec une récession comprise entre0,75 et 2%, des négociations sont engagées pour le déclenchement éventuel des sanctions.définition ; circonstances exceptionnelles; Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance

Une politique macroéconomique appropriée…en zone euro

Cet article examine en quoi la zone euro a suivi depuis 1999 les recommandations énoncées par l’OCDE en 2006 en matière de macroéconomie : des politiques monétaires et budgétaires saines, réactives au cycle d’activité et en coordination avec les réformes structurelles. Il montre que la politique monétaire a été davantage conforme aux préconisations de l’OCDE que la politique budgétaire. Selon l’auteur, une coordination des politiques budgétaires en Europe devrait s’intéresser à l’équilibre épargne-investissement global de chaque Etat membre et à la composition des recettes et des dépenses publiques, et non simplement au solde budgétaire, fût-il corrigé du cycle.This paper studies whether the Euro area has, since 1999, implemented OECD’s recommendations concerning macroeconomic policies, as formulated in 2006, i.e. sound and counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, in coordination with structural reforms. It argues that monetary policy has been more in line with OECD’s recommendations than has been fiscal policy. Furthermore, according to the author, fiscal coordination within the Euro area should be based on the global saving-investment imbalances of each Member state and also look at the composition of public revenues and expenditures across the Euro area rather than focus only on the fiscal balance, be it cyclically-adjusted or not

Reform of the international monetary system: Some concrete steps

Reform of the international monetary system is under discussion after three decades of apathy. Tectonic shifts in the balance of international power have made reform more urgent. However, in the short term, there is little chance of a grand redesign of the international monetary system. Nevertheless, concrete steps should be taken. First, consensus is needed on exchange rates, capital flows and reserves. Second, financial safety nets must be improved so that countries do not have to self-insure by accumulating  reserves or rely on possible bilateral swap lines to access liquidity. Third, a change in the composition of the Special Drawing Right should be planned for, to strengthen the multilateral framework. The most workable short-term deliverables seem to be (i) guidelines on and surveillance of capital controls; (ii) a new regime for deciding on SDR allocations that would facilitate more frequent use of this instrument; and (iii) the inclusion of the renmimbi in the SDR basket. These reforms would be a partial move, preparing the ground for further developments.

The Crisis: Policy Lessons and Policy Challenges

Bruegel Director Jean Pisani-Ferry, with Agnès Bénassy-Quéré (CEPII, University Paris-Ouest and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris), Benoît Coeuré (Ecole Polytechnique, Paris) and Pierre Jacquet (ENPC, Paris, and Agence Française de Développement) provide an in-depth analysis of the financial crisis. The authors review the main causes of the crisis, pointing to three different, non-mutually exclusive lines of explanation: wrong incentives in the financial sector, unsustainable macroeconomic outcomes, and misunderstood and mismanaged systemic complexity. They also discuss supervisory and regulatory reform going forward, including an examination of the issues of moral hazard, the separation of retail and investment banking, the desirable size of financial institutions, risk management, the role of central banks, and other issues. This working paper was previously published as CEPII (Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales) working document 2009-28.