Anonymity in giving in a natural context : an economic field experiment in thirty churches

The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either `closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants' contributions can be identified by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe the total amount given by the people who preceded them. Initially, contributions to the services' second offerings increase by 10% when baskets are used, whereas no effect is found for first offerings. The positive effect of using baskets peters out over the experimental period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both offerings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.

Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context-A Field Experiment in Thirty Churches

The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either 'closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendees can see the contribution made by their direct neighbors as well as the total amount already gathered. Contributions to offerings with an external cause initally increase by 10% when baskets are used, but this effect peters out over time. No effect is found for offerings with an internal cause. This result can be explained by the presence of social incentives, but is also in line with recent studies showing that asymmetric information about the quality of the charity leads to increased contributions.Social interactions, Anonymity, Field experiment

Anonymity in giving in a natural context : an economic field experiment in thirty churches

The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either `closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants' contributions can be identified by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe the total amount given by the people who preceded them. Initially, contributions to the services' second offerings increase by 10% when baskets are used, whereas no effect is found for first offerings. The positive effect of using baskets peters out over the experimental period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both offerings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.

Equilibrium properties of finite binary choice games

In this paper I derive a complete characterization for the equilibria that may arise in a binary choice interaction model with a ?nite number of interacting agents. In particular, the correspondence between the interaction strength, the number of agents and the set of equilibria is derived.

Price-setting behavior in the presence of social interactions

We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower managerial effort level that results in equilibrium negatively affects the ex ante value of the firm.

Social ties within school classes –- the roles of gender, ethnicity, and having older siblings

In this paper we identify the lines along which social ties between high school teenagers are primarily formed. To this end, we introduce interaction weights between pupils in the same school class that are a function of exogenous individual background characteristics, like gender, ethnicity, and having older siblings. The resulting model with endogenous interactions and school specific fixed effects is estimated using data from the Dutch National School Youth Survey (NSYS), a survey in which in principle all students in a sampled class are interviewed. By combining the 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2001 NSYS data, we are able identify trends in social relationships of teenagers. We find that the roles that gender and ethnicity play in how teenagers interact varies strongly across different types of behavior. For example, going out shows strong within-ethnicity interactions, while expenditures on cell phone and on clothing exhibit mainly between-girls interactions. Having older siblings has a minor effect on within school class social interactions. There is weak evidence of decreased ethnic segregation within school classes during the decade considered.teenage behavior, social interactions, segregation, time use, expenditures

Price-setting behavior in the presence of social interactions

We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower managerial effort level that results in equilibrium negatively affects the ex ante value of the firm.

Short run reference points and long run performance. (No) Evidence from running data

What motivates runners to bunch at round finishing times? Is it merely the immediate gratification that round time finishing brings, or do athletes set single-stage round time subgoals to help them attain multiple-stage end goals related to their future performance? To examine this question, I construct a new panel data set that covers all finishing times of 7000 major running events of different distances organized in the Netherlands between 1996–2016. For all distances and age groups, I find strong evidence of bunching at round finishing times for both genders, but men engage in round time finishing more frequently than women. No relation is found between round time finishing and running experience. In shorter distance runs, round time finishing is much more prevalent when the reference time is ambitious. This is no proof that runners do not set round time subgoals. It however does suggest that meeting or just missing such a single-race subgoal makes no difference for a runner's future performance in terms of continuing to race, running faster or running longer distances. It also suggests that the excessive amount of round time finishes we observe in all types of races is mainly driven by the immediate gratification (and possibly status) it gives the runner