Paillole (Paul). Notre Espion Chez Hitler

Adamthwaite Anthony. Paillole (Paul). Notre Espion Chez Hitler. In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 66, fasc. 4, 1988. Histoire - Geschiedenis. pp. 901-903

Paillole (Paul). Notre Espion Chez Hitler

Adamthwaite Anthony. Paillole (Paul). Notre Espion Chez Hitler. In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 66, fasc. 4, 1988. Histoire - Geschiedenis. pp. 901-903

Marianne et John Bull : la mésentente cordiale 1945-1957

Adamthwaite Anthony. Marianne et John Bull : la mésentente cordiale 1945-1957. In: Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps, n°18, 1990. La mésentente cordiale : les relations franco-britanniques, 1945-1957, sous la direction de René Girault . pp. 38-43

Democracies, Dictatorships and Public Opinion : Government, Press and Opinion in Britain and in France in the Approach to Munich

Statements such as 'Britain and France wanted peace in 1938' are the stock-in-trade of the textbooks. Despite a large literature on war origins little has been written about public opinion in the approach to war. The paper has three aims. First to show that British and French leaders exercised considerable influence on opinion in the approach to Munich. Second to argue that, contrary to what is often asserted, public opinion was not independent of the policies of the two western democracies. Thirdly I argue that in the early months of 1938 there was a sizeable minority in disagreement with official policy. By September 1938 opinion was delicately balanced and required only small pushes to tilt it decisively for or against war. If British and French governments had exercised their influence on the media in a different sense the outcome of the international crisis might have been quite changed.Adamthwaite Anthony. Democracies, Dictatorships and Public Opinion : Government, Press and Opinion in Britain and in France in the Approach to Munich. In: Opinion publique et politique extérieure en Europe. II. 1915-1940. Actes du Colloque de Rome (16-20 février 1981) Rome : École Française de Rome, 1984. pp. 341-352. (Publications de l'École française de Rome, 54-2

The British Foreign Office since 1945

1982 is the bicentenary of the Foreign Office. Since 1945 the dominant theme of British foreign policy has been one of decline, humiliation and failure. Although the Foreign Office had its weaknesses it would be wrong to saddle it with the main responsibility for decline. Britain's national decline had deep-seated causes, principally the collapse of economic and financial power after 1945 and the emergence of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1945 the framework of foreign policy making has changed profoundly. Firstly it is no longer a national preserve. In some major areas of diplomacy British policy is formed wholly within a European context. Secondly, the Foreign Office no longer has a virtual monopoly of overseas representation. Its chief role today is that of a co-ordinating body working with the many other Whitehall departments involved in overseas policy. Bread and butter diplomacy, the battle for economic survival, has replaced the traditional focus on external security and political influence. The main weakness of British diplomats and foreign secretaries has been a lack of foresight and strategic thinking, an excessive pragmatism.Adamthwaite Anthony. The British Foreign Office since 1945. In: Opinion publique et politique extérieure en Europe. III. 1940-1981. Actes du colloque de Rome (17-20 février 1982) Rome : École Française de Rome, 1985. pp. 201-211. (Publications de l'École française de Rome, 54-3

The British Foreign Office since 1945

1982 is the bicentenary of the Foreign Office. Since 1945 the dominant theme of British foreign policy has been one of decline, humiliation and failure. Although the Foreign Office had its weaknesses it would be wrong to saddle it with the main responsibility for decline. Britain's national decline had deep-seated causes, principally the collapse of economic and financial power after 1945 and the emergence of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1945 the framework of foreign policy making has changed profoundly. Firstly it is no longer a national preserve. In some major areas of diplomacy British policy is formed wholly within a European context. Secondly, the Foreign Office no longer has a virtual monopoly of overseas representation. Its chief role today is that of a co-ordinating body working with the many other Whitehall departments involved in overseas policy. Bread and butter diplomacy, the battle for economic survival, has replaced the traditional focus on external security and political influence. The main weakness of British diplomats and foreign secretaries has been a lack of foresight and strategic thinking, an excessive pragmatism.Adamthwaite Anthony. The British Foreign Office since 1945. In: Opinion publique et politique extérieure en Europe. III. 1940-1981. Actes du colloque de Rome (17-20 février 1982) Rome : École Française de Rome, 1985. pp. 201-211. (Publications de l'École française de Rome, 54-3

Le facteur militaire dans la décision franco-britannique avant Munich

Adamthwaite A. P. Le facteur militaire dans la décision franco-britannique avant Munich. In: Revue des études slaves, tome 52, fascicule 1-2, 1979. Munich 1938 : mythes et réalités, sous la direction de Antoine Marès. pp. 59-66

Democracies, Dictatorships and Public Opinion : Government, Press and Opinion in Britain and in France in the Approach to Munich

Statements such as 'Britain and France wanted peace in 1938' are the stock-in-trade of the textbooks. Despite a large literature on war origins little has been written about public opinion in the approach to war. The paper has three aims. First to show that British and French leaders exercised considerable influence on opinion in the approach to Munich. Second to argue that, contrary to what is often asserted, public opinion was not independent of the policies of the two western democracies. Thirdly I argue that in the early months of 1938 there was a sizeable minority in disagreement with official policy. By September 1938 opinion was delicately balanced and required only small pushes to tilt it decisively for or against war. If British and French governments had exercised their influence on the media in a different sense the outcome of the international crisis might have been quite changed.Adamthwaite Anthony. Democracies, Dictatorships and Public Opinion : Government, Press and Opinion in Britain and in France in the Approach to Munich. In: Opinion publique et politique extérieure en Europe. II. 1915-1940. Actes du Colloque de Rome (16-20 février 1981) Rome : École Française de Rome, 1984. pp. 341-352. (Publications de l'École française de Rome, 54-2